Essays in applied econometrics and health economics by Guber, Raphael
Essays in Applied Econometrics and
Health Economics
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
vorgelegt von
Raphael Guber
2017
Referent: Prof. Dr. Joachim K. Winter
Korreferent: Prof. Axel Börsch-Supan, Ph.D.
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 31. Januar 2018
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 19.01.2018
Namen der Berichterstatter: Joachim Winter, Axel Börsch-Supan, Amelie Wup-
permann
Acknowledgements
Out of the many people that accompanied me on this journey, I would rst and
foremost like to thank my supervisor and mentor Joachim Winter for his contin-
uous support, eort, advice and honesty at any point of my dissertation. I am
deeply grateful to my second advisor Axel Börsch-Supan for encouraging discus-
sions and for providing me an ideal research environment at the Munich Center
for the Economics of Aging, without which this dissertation would not have been
possible. I thank Amelie Wuppermann for serving as a third reviewer on my dis-
sertation committee.
Writing this dissertation was an intellectually stimulating and challenging experi-
ence, which I enjoyed very much. This is to no minor part due to my co-authors
Helmut Farbmacher, Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Johan Vikstroem and Martin Kocher,
whom I would like to thank for their critical remarks and advice. I would like to
especially thank Helmut Farbmacher, Tabea Bucher-Koenen and Martin Spindler
at MEA for their encouragement and support in the past years. I greatly enjoyed
my research stay at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies
and would like to thank Lisa Berkman for inviting me.
Probably one of the greatest experiences this dissertation oered was being part
of the "Evidence-Based Economics" graduate program at the University of Mu-
nich. Being part of a cohort of highly motivated peers and, now, friends made this
journey a enjoyable and memorable one. Here, I'd like to thank Joachim Winter
and Florian Englmaier for their endless eorts in bringing this graduate program
to a success for all its members. I am grateful to the Max-Planck Society and
the Elitenetwork of Bavaria for providing funding at various occasions during my
studies.
Finally, I thank Michaela for her loving support throughout the years.
Contents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables vi
Preface 1
1 Left-handedness, Social Norms and Human Capital 9
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Handedness and switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Data and descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Left-handedness and switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Outcome, channel and control variables . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.3 Left-handedness and switching across cohorts . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Parental investment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Labor market outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5.2 Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.3 Channel analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.5.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
i
Contents
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix 1.A Personality and the Locus of Control . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix 1.B Reporting left-handedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2 Increasing the Credibility of the Twin Instrument 68
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2 Zygosity and selection on (un)observables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2.2 Twin births in Sweden and the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2.3 Selection on observable and unobservable characteristics . . 76
2.3 Learning from monozygotic twins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.2 Identication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.3.3 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.4 Empirical applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4.1 Swedish register data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4.2 1980 US Census data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.4.3 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Appendix 2.A Empirical assessment of Weinberg's rule . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix 2.B Statistic relevance of the dierences in the instruments . 102
Appendix 2.C Additional Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3 The Burden of Child Rearing andWorking on Maternal Mortality108
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.4.1 Completed fertility and old age mortality . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.4.2 Twins and old age mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
ii
Contents
3.4.3 Results by educational level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.4.4 Results by pension income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Appendix 3.A ICD codes of outcome variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Appendix 3.B Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4 Does Having Insurance Make Overcondent? 135
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.2.1 Experimental procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.2.2 More information on the real-eort task . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.2.3 Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.2.4 Experimental participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.3.1 Descriptive results on overcondence and insurance choice . 143
4.3.2 Regression analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Appendix 4.A Additional Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Appendix 4.B On-screen instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Appendix 4.C Experimental instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
References 167
iii
List of Figures
1.1 Share of missing observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2 Left-handedness and switching by year of birth . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Switching by gender, East/West Germans and year of birth . . . . . 29
1B.1 Left-handedness and writing by gender and year of birth . . . . . . 63
2.1 Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) between 1940 and 2007. . . 76
2.2 Assessing the importance of selection on observables. . . . . . . . . 78
2.3 Assessing the importance of selection on unobservables. . . . . . . . 79
2.4 Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) by maternal age. . . . . . . 84
2B.1 Kernel density estimates of bootstrap replications . . . . . . . . . . 103
2C.1 Robustness analysis of the eect of having more than two children
- US Census data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2C.2 Robustness analysis of the eect of having more than two children
- Swedish data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1 Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) between 1930 and 2007. . . 119
3.2 Survival rates of mothers with and without twins 1990 to 2010 . . . 124
4.1 Experimental procedure and denition of variables. . . . . . . . . . 141
4.2 Distribution of variable rankdi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4A.1 Distribution of forecasting errors in practice and payout-relevant
rounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4B.1 Stage 2a: The real eort task in practice rounds. . . . . . . . . . . . 154
iv
List of Figures
4B.2 Stage 2b: Feedback to the real eort task in practice. . . . . . . . . 155
4B.3 Stage 3: Decisions whether to buy the insurance. . . . . . . . . . . 156
4B.4 Stage 4: Message on realized insurance status. . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4B.5 Stage 5: The real eort task in payo-relevant rounds. . . . . . . . 158
4B.6 Stage 6: Ranking of own performance within session. . . . . . . . . 159
v
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Regressions on switching indicator in left-hander sample . . . . . . 28
1.3 Baseline results for labor market outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 Channels: Schooling, full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Channels: Schooling, wage sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Channels: Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, full sample . . . . . . 38
1.7 Channels: Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, wage sample . . . . . 39
1.8 Log(wage) including channels (Random Eects model) . . . . . . . 43
1.9 Log(wage) including channels years of education and personality
(Random Eects model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.10 Employment status including channels (Random Eects model) . . 45
1.11 Robustness checks for log-hourly wages (Random Eects model) . . 49
1.12 Robustness checks for employment status (Random Eects model) . 50
1.13 Robustness checks for years of education (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.14 Robustness checks by denition of left-handedness and switching . . 52
1.15 OLS and 2SLS estimates for labor market outcomes . . . . . . . . . 55
1.16 Robustness checks for employment status in 2SLS estimation . . . . 56
1.17 Robustness checks for log-hourly wages in 2SLS estimation . . . . . 57
1A.1 SOEP items used to construct Big Five personality traits and Locus
of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1B.1 Regressions on left-handedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Summary statistics for our sample of Swedish mothers . . . . . . . 74
2.2 Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Labor
Force Participation - Swedish data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.3 Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Yearly
Labor Income - Swedish data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.4 Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Log(Yearly
Labor Income) - Swedish data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.5 Eect of having more than two children - US Census data . . . . . 98
2A.1 Sex composition of dizygotic twins in the East Flanders Prospective Twin
Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2C.1 Eect of having more than two children - Swedish data in 1990 . . . 106
2C.2 Assessing the importance of selection on observables. Point esti-
mates. Swedish data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1 Descriptive statistics by mothers' education . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.2 Mortality by number of children and twinning . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3 Results by education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.4 All-cause mortality by pension income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3A.1 ICD codes of causes of death and hospitalization. . . . . . . . . . . 133
3B.1 Selection into dierent samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.1 Sample distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.2 Mean and standard deviation of rankdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.3 Insurance choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.4 Insurance and overcondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4A.1 P-values for zero mean t-test of rankdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4A.2 P-values from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of pairwise dierence
in rankdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
vii
Preface
Economics strives to gain insight in the determinants of human decision making
and its consequences for both the individual and the aggregate economy. From this
knowledge, the goal is to derive informed policy recommendations that improve
the welfare of the society at large.
In light of the challenges posed by a rapidly changing nature of the labor
market, the need for life-long learning, and an aging society (Börsch-Supan, 2003),
a crucial relationship that requires a deeper understanding are the reciprocal eects
of health and labor markets. Health is an established driver of individual's labor
productivity and well-being (Smith, 1999). Both health and productivity are major
determinants of economic growth and development (Bloom et al., 2004; Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2008). Furthermore, technological progress and demographic
change have led growth in public spending on health care to consistently outpace
growth in GDP in rich countries (WHO, 2015). Preserving the sustainability of
publicly funded health and other social insurances is a major challenge for many
governments in the presence and future.
One important step in the process of generating knowledge for policy makers
is to provide data-based evidence on the causal impact of reforms, interventions
and individual choices. Isolating causes from correlates is no easy task. It requires
the precise manipulation of one factor of interest while holding all other factors
constant. This is rather easily possible in theoretical models, but in the real world,
the factor of interest is connected to a multitude of other variables that move
together simultaneously, thereby blurring the causal eect. Signicant progress
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has been made on the methodological possibilities for the identication of causal
eects in observational data in recent years, which have considerably increased the
credibility of empirical ndings (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).
These methods build on the exploitation of natural experiments. In contrast
to e.g. laboratory experiments, which provide the researcher with a controlled en-
vironment, in natural experiments an event outside of the researchers control gen-
erates quasi-experimental variation in treatments (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000).
This approach has now become a standard tool in applied economic research using
observational data (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Indeed, some research questions
can only be answered by natural experiments, because randomized controlled tri-
als would be too expensive, unethical or politically impossible, such as randomly
sending some individuals to war to study the eect of veteran status on labor
income (Angrist, 1990).
The need to inform policy debates on the relationship of health and labor
markets and the development of econometric methods to eectively do so is the
starting point of my thesis. Its aim is to provide credible, data-based insights. More
specically, it contributes to the knowledge on how early childhood interventions
inuence adult labor productivity, how fertility decisions aect female labor market
attachment and, in interaction with the latter, mortality in old age.
This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters. A common theme across
all chapters is the application and advancement of methods that estimate causal
eects. In the rst chapter, I apply a dierence-in-dierence strategy to estimate
the causal eect of forced right-hand writing of left-handers on labor market out-
comes. The second chapter proposes a method to eliminate sample selection bias
in the twin birth instrument, which is often used to instrument fertility decisions
in various settings. The third chapter relies on reduced form estimation to study
the long-run consequences of fertility and its interaction with labor market partic-
ipation on mothers' mortality in old age. While the previous chapters are based
on natural experiments, the fourth chapter employs a laboratory experiment to in-
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vestigate whether insuring against losses makes individuals overcondent in their
own ability relative to others. The four chapters are now motivated and described
in more detail.
In the rst chapter, I investigate whether early childhood interventions can
compensate or engrave innate disadvantages. This essay is motivated by work of
James Heckman and his co-authors who in a series of papers have shown that
early childhood interventions, such as educational support and parental counsel-
ing, can have large long-run benets for socio-economically disadvantaged children
(Heckman, 2000; Cunha and Heckman, 2010). I study whether the forced right-
hand writing ("switching") of children who were born as left-handers has similar
consequences for labor market outcomes later in life. Left-handers are a partic-
ular interesting population in this context, as previous research has shown that,
on average, left-handed children perform signicantly worse in standardized math
and reading tests, obtain fewer years of schooling, and are more likely to suer
from learning disabilities and behavioral problems (Goodman, 2014). Left-handed
adults earn lower wages because they select into occupations that require lower
levels of cognitive skills.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), I nd that
switched left-handers perform equally well on the labor market and have simi-
lar levels of education than right-handers, the control group, while non-switched
left-handers experience the previously documented decits associated with left-
handedness. I show that non-cognitive skills, personality traits and locus of con-
trol, also dier between these three groups, but do not explain the gap observed
among labor market outcomes. Schooling stands out as the single most impor-
tant mediating variable between switching and wages. These results are robust to
various model specications as well as sample and treatment status denitions.
Nevertheless, unobserved variables such as parental endowment and the child's
motivation might be the true cause behind switching and the outcome variables.
To address potential selection bias, I employ a dierence-in-dierences approach,
3
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where I exploit the variation in switching across cohorts and handedness. In eect,
cohort trends of the outcome variables of right-handers, who were never switched,
are used as a counterfactual for left-handers, thus allowing for a time-constant
dierence between left- and right handers. I argue that this strategy will deliver
downward biased estimates on the causal eect of switching, but observe that OLS
and IV estimates dier only little from each other.
I conclude that, even though potentially harmful for the child in the short run,
switching has had a positive eect on adult outcomes, compensating for innate
decits. One potential explanation is that these children receive additional at-
tention and care by their teachers and parents, resulting in higher human capital
accumulation. A successful switching of the writing hand may also induce a feeling
of success and motivate children to improve their skills further in the future. This
is in line with Heckman's conclusion that motivation, more than cognitive skills,
is a crucial determinant of childrens' future success.
The second chapter is joint work with Helmut Farbmacher and Johan Vikstroem.
There exists a huge interest in the causal eect of fertility on mothers' economic
outcomes, in particular labor market participation (Gronau, 1973). However, a
simple comparison between mothers with dierent numbers of children does not
deliver a causal eect, as mothers dier also in other, potentially unobservable
dimensions, e.g. a preference for having a career, which could drive the observed
relation between fertility and employment. Therefore, most papers use instrumen-
tal variable (IV) techniques. One commonly employed instrument are twin births
(Angrist and Evans, 1998; Mogstad and Wiswall, 2016; Lundborg et al., 2017).
The birth of twins is a natural experiment, which randomly increases some moth-
ers' number of children, independent of their unobserved preferences. However, it
has been questioned if having twins really is a random event. In particular, dizy-
gotic (fraternal) twinning depends on, for example, maternal age, height, weight,
race, and the use of fertility treatments, such as in-vitro fertilization (IVF). On the
other hand, monozygotic (identical) twin births are considered a random event,
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since they are the result of the random and spontaneous division of a single fertil-
ized egg.
In this essay, we propose a new instrument based on monozygotic twin births
which corrects for the non-randomness of dizygotic twin births. Our key assump-
tion is that monozygotic twinning is exogenous, but since zygosity is rarely known
our approach does not rely on observing zygosity directly. We show that it is possi-
ble to use the observed opposite-sex dizygotic twin mothers to correct the same-sex
twin instrument by the remaining selection bias induced from the same-sex dizy-
gotic twins. This is possible because we know that all monozygotic twins are of the
same-sex and that dizygotic twin births with same-sex twins are equally likely as
dizygotic twins with opposite-sex. Our new approach can easily be implemented
using standard regression techniques.
The new instrument is applied to US Census data and Swedish administrative
data. In line with our expectations, we nd that the new instrument delivers larger
estimates on the negative eect of children on maternal labor market outcomes
than the previous twin instruments. This is because mother who get dizygotic
twins are a positively selected group, a fact that we also demonstrate using our
administrative data.
Our newly developed instrument is a strong improvement over existing instru-
ments for fertility decisions. As fertility treatments, in particular in-vitro fertiliza-
tion, become more common among younger cohorts, the original twin instrument,
which assumes randomness of twinning, becomes less credible over time. Restrict-
ing data sets to older cohorts of mothers were this issue is less relevant is an
unsatisfying alternative. We thus believe that our new instrument is highly rel-
evant and even necessary for future research that attempts to study the causal
eect of fertility decisions on various outcomes.
The third chapter is joint work with Helmut Farbmacher, Tabea Bucher-Koenen
and Johan Vikstroem. As female labor market participation rates increase, the po-
tential double burden posed by raising children and having a career and its eect
5
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on maternal health in old age becomes of signicant research interest (Sabbath
et al., 2015). Actively raising children and pursuing a career are two conicting,
because time consuming, activities. One often made argument in the public debate
on how to improve the reconciliation of family and working life is that mothers
(and fathers) need to be shielded from stress. However, there exists actually very
little evidence on the existence and long-run eects of this double burden on ma-
ternal health (Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen, 2012; Kruk and Reinhold, 2014).
This essay aims at lling this gap in the literature, focusing on maternal mortality
in old age.
The analysis is based on linked administrative birth and death registries from
Sweden which enable us to reliably link children to their parents. The sample
for our analysis includes more than 400,000 mothers that were 55-65 years old,
alive and resident in Sweden in 1990. We can follow these mothers over time for
twenty years until 2010. Since we cannot directly measure life-time stress, we
analyze mortality due to two specic groups of medical diagnoses that have been
related to stress during life in the literature: Cardiovascular diseases, specically
heart attacks and strokes, and smoking-related diseases, specically lung cancer
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
In order to study the combined eect of fertility and labor force activity on
maternal health, an ideal set-up would provide exogenous variation in both labor
market participation and having and raising children. We use twins at rst birth
as an unplanned shock to fertility. While previous studies used the birth of twins
as an instrumental variable (IV) for fertility, we study the reduced form eects of
twinning and interpret them as being caused by a random event. The reason for
this approach is that, in the context of health, the birth of twins might violate the
exclusion restriction. The issue of non-random twinning discussed in the second
chapter of my thesis is much less of a problem here, as the mothers in our sample
had their rst birth between 1940 and 1970, well before the availability of in-vitro
fertilization.
6
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In order to nd variation in labor force attachment we stratify the sample
along two variables which are strongly related to labor market activity, educational
attainment and pension income at age 70. One obvious worry when splitting the
sample in this way is selective sorting. Twins at rst birth could directly aect
the level of education, pension income or survival and retirement until age 70. We
show that these concerns do not realize in our data.
The approach in this paper is a signicant improvement on past research that
studies the interacting eects of fertility and working life and maternal mortality.
Existing research investigated dierences in mortality rates across groups of moth-
ers characterized by stylized work-family proles, but was not able to control for
selection into these proles (Sabbath et al., 2015).
We nd that mothers' probability to die over a period of 20 years is strongly
increased when having twins at rst birth. Moreover, the eects are largest among
highly educated mothers and those with above-median pension income. These
results are is in line with our hypothesized double burden eect.
Our ndings have important policy implications. Excess deaths due to the
described double burden have to be considered in the cost-benet analysis of fu-
ture family-friendly policy measures. Furthermore, our ndings with respect to
mortality from stress-related diseases hint at increased costs for the health care
system over the adult life course. Policies that aim at alleviating stress from rais-
ing children and pursuing a career could help in avoiding such long-run costs. Our
ndings are particularly important as among younger generations, an increasingly
larger group of women stays attached to the labor force until old age (Goldin and
Mitchell, 2017).
The fourth chapter is joint work with Joachim Winter and Martin Kocher.
We start from the observation that overcondence, as other behavioral biases,
has now been established as an important dimension and driver of individual's
economic behavior (Thaler, 2000). Behavioral biases have a signicant impact on
contract design in many settings. For example, overcondence has been found to
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predict excess market entry of entrepreneurs, risky investment decisions of CEOs
and speculative trading (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005). In the context of insurance, it has been shown that if
the share of overcondent individuals in the population is large enough, compulsory
insurance is not pareto optimal anymore (Sandroni and Squintani, 2007).
However, this literature takes over- or undercondence in individuals implicitly
as pre-determined or xed. This is not unique to condence however, as other
behavioral aspects, such as loss aversion or present bias, are equally assumed
to be stable within individuals in a certain decision environment. This paper
provides evidence for self-condence to be malleable in a setting that has relevant
implications. We show in a laboratory experiment that condence in one's own
performance depends on whether people acquire insurance or not.
More specically, we develop an experimental design that allows us to cleanly
disentangle eects from the incentives provided by the insurance contract from
eects coming from selection into the contract. In our setup, an insurance partially
covers potential losses from bad performance in a real-eort task. Before solving
the task, individuals are given the choice to buy an insurance contract. Conditional
on this choice, actual insurance status is randomized. The rst part allows us
to measure pure selection eects, while the second part identies pure incentive
eects.
Our results are consistent with insurance increasing individual's condence as
compared to a control group. At the same time, we nd no evidence for more
condent individuals choosing more or less insurance in the rst place.
These ndings have important implications for the design and research on
insurance contracts. Instead of focusing only on issues resulting from self-selection
based on over- or under-condence, researchers should take incentive eects into
account and design contracts to counter the increase in overcondence, which is
known to correlate with risky behavior.
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Chapter 1
Making it right? Left-handedness,
Social Norms and Human Capital
Abstract: Can early childhood interventions compensate for in-
nate decits? In this paper, I study the forced right-hand writ-
ing of left-handed children (switching). While previous litera-
ture has found that, due to innate cognitive decits, left-handers
obtain less human capital and lower wages than right-handers, I
nd that switched left-handers perform equally well or even better
in the labor market than right-handers. Only non-switched left-
handers exhibit the decits of left-handers found in earlier stud-
ies. To address potential selection bias, I employ a dierence-in-
dierence approach, where I exploit the rapid decline of switching
across cohorts. Cohort trends of the outcome variables of right-
handers, who were never switched, are used as a counterfactual for
left-handers. Using rich data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), I show that the observed dierences in outcomes
occur due to dierential human capital accumulation, rather than
cognitive or non-cognitive skills. My ndings are consistent with
switching compensating for the innate decits of left-handers.
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1.1 Introduction
Experimental evidence demonstrates that early childhood interventions at school
entry age are followed by huge benets later in life (Cunha et al., 2006; Heckman
et al., 2013). Since then, economists and policy makers have become increasingly
interested in ways to apply such interventions to the general population (Cunha
and Heckman, 2010). However, there exist few studies that exploit naturally oc-
curring interventions and that are able to look at long-term eects, see Currie and
Almond (2011) for an overview.
In this paper, I study forced right-hand writing of left-handers, called switching
from now on, as a case where parents invest into their children at an early age.
I analyze the long-run consequences on labor market outcomes in adulthood and
investigate a set of potential channels, ranging from human capital accumulation
to cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Forced right-hand writing is motivated by
stigma against left-handedness which varies by cohort.
To address potential selection bias, I employ a dierence-in-dierences ap-
proach, exploiting the variation in switching across cohorts and handedness. In
eect, cohort trends of the outcome variables of right-handers, who were never
switched, are used as a counterfactual for left-handers, thus allowing for a time-
constant dierence between left- and right handers. I argue that this strategy will
deliver biased downwards estimates on the causal eect of switching, but observe
that OLS and IV point estimates dier only little from each other.
Left-handers are a particularly interesting population for an early childhood
intervention, as they also signicantly dier from right-handers with respect to
cognitive and non-cognitive skills caused by dierent brain structures.1 Recent lit-
erature nds that, on average, left-handers experience decits in skills and human
capital accumulation when compared to right-handers. Using ve comprehensive
data-sets from the US and the UK, Goodman (2014) shows that left-handed chil-
1The importance of these traits for long-term economic performance is studied by Borghans
et al. (2008).
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dren perform signicantly worse in standardized math and reading tests, obtain
fewer years of schooling, and are more likely to suer from learning disabilities
and behavioral problems. Left-handed adults earn lower wages because they select
into occupations that require lower levels of cognitive skills. Johnston et al. (2009,
2013) nd that left-handed children in the Longitudinal Study of Australian Chil-
dren (LSAC) and in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) perform
worse on cognitive development test scores than right-handed children. On the
other hand, Denny and O'Sullivan (2007) nd a wage premium for left-handedness
among males and a wage penalty for women in the National Child Development
Study (NCDS), see also Ruebeck et al. (2007). The child samples in the above stud-
ies are drawn from countries and cohorts in which switching and stigma against
left-handedness is rather rare. Thus, they demonstrate a natural dierence be-
tween left- and right-handers at a young age.
Whether switching increases or compensates for such innate decits is highly
informative for other early childhood interventions which also target vulnerable
populations. As far as the knowledge of the author extends, no study concerning a
non-institutional intervention, with the potential to have negative eects on those
treated, has so far appeared in the literature.
Surprisingly, I nd that switched left-handers perform equally well or even
better than right-handers in terms of labor market outcomes and human capital
accumulation, while non-switched left-handers exhibit the previously documented
decits of lefties. Cognitive skills, which are measured at adulthood, dier little,
while non-cognitive skills are signicantly dierent between left-(switched and non-
switched) and right-handers. However, these dierences explain only a small part
of the observed gaps in labor market performance. The most important channel
is human capital. Taking into account human capital accumulation, switched left-
handers show about the same wage decits as non-switched left-handers. These
ndings are consistent with switching as a compensatory investment for the innate
decits of left-handers.
11
Chapter 1. Left-handedness, Social Norms and Human Capital
My data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large and
representative panel survey of the German population that provides a unique op-
portunity to observe this intervention. The data set covers a wide range of cohorts,
individuals born between 1920 and 1997, with considerable variation in the preva-
lence of switching. Starting among cohorts born in 1950, switching rates decline
monotonically from about 90% to 60% by 1960 and to nearly zero in 1990. Across
all cohorts, 57% of left-handers are switched. In contrast, the share of naturally
born left-handers remains fairly constant, at 9%, in particular from the 1940 cohort
on.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briey review some of
the literature on left-handedness and switching. Section 1.3 introduces the data
and gives a descriptive analysis of left-handedness and switching across cohorts.
Section 1.4 sets up a simple parental investment model that accommodates social
norms to predict which parents are likely to switch their child. These predictions
are then tested empirically. In Section 1.5 I present the dierences between right-
handers and switched and non-switched left-handers in labor market performance
and discuss potential channels. In Section 1.6 I outline a strategy to identify the
causal eect of switching. Finally, I conclude in Section 1.7.
1.2 Handedness and switching
Left-handers have faced discrimination in various areas of life (Harris, 1980, 1990).
To a signicant extent, prejudices about left-handers' inferiority have originated
in religion, but not exclusively so. For example, in Christianity, the left hand was
considered to be the devil's hand, and in Islam it is forbidden to use the left hand
for eating and human interaction. Nonetheless, non-religious China has one of the
lowest reported left-handedness rates worldwide, where right-hand writing is a so-
cial convention, rooted in the stroke order of Chinese characters (Kushner, 2013).
Such attitudes may explain why switching the writing hand of left-handers is still
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common in developing countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Amer-
ica (Medland et al., 2004; Zverev, 2006; Porac and Martin, 2007; Kushner, 2013).
On more practical grounds, the world is primarily designed for right-handers, in
particular, machinery, equipment and tools in everyday use. For these reasons,
forcing a left-handed child to use the right hand for writing and other daily ac-
tivities seems to be to the child's long-term benet. Today, however, parents and
teachers are advised not to interfere with a child's natural handedness, as it can
lead to stuttering (Sattler, 1996).2
The share of left-handers in the population is estimated at 10%15%, with
variation in the country and cohort under study (Perelle and Ehrman, 2005).3 A
large literature on left-handedness, or laterality, exists in neuro-psychology, the
neuro-sciences, and related elds (Coren, 2012). The origins of left-handedness
are still unclear, however. Recent large-scale twin studies have shown that early
theories based on a simple genetic model cannot be sustained (McManus et al.,
2013). Satz (1972) proposes the idea of a pathological left-hander. According
to this theory, even mild damage to the left brain hemisphere during the pre- or
perinatal period can cause a shift of lateral dominance to the right hemisphere.
Hence, lower cognitive skills, behavioral problems and left-handedness have the
same cause. Goodman (2014) concludes that his ndings are in line with the idea
of a pathological left-hander.
In contrast to handedness, the consequences of switching are much less well
researched, whether in psychology or any other eld.4 Depending on the country
and cohort considered, the methods of switching range from friendly persuasion
and positive incentives to threats, parental neglect, immobilization, beatings, and
even breaking the left-arm (Perelle and Ehrman, 1994; Zverev, 2006). What con-
sequences of switching can be expected? Sattler (1996) reports that in school,
2King George VI (The King's Speech) is a well-known example from generations of left-
handers aected in this way (Kushner, 2011, 2012).
3See McManus (2009) for an overview of the prevalence of left-handedness across time and
geography.
4Previous work in psychology includes, e.g., Porac et al. (1986); Porac and Searleman (2002).
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children forced to switch have to invest an over-proportional share of their en-
ergy and concentration in learning to write with the wrong hand. Hence they are
quickly exhausted and are less able to follow the lessons.
Switching may also alter the brain's structure. Klöppel et al. (2010) nd that
the volume of gray matter in the putamen, a part of the forebrain that contains
the executive and cognitive aspects of motor control, is reduced among switched
left-handers, compared to non-switched right- and left-handers. A positive eect of
switching might stem from increasing the brain's connectivity, such as the corpus
callosum, which is known to be larger among left-handers (Witelson, 1985).
To summarize, some aspects of switching suggest negative consequences, either
via physiological (overtaxing of the non-dominant brain hemisphere) or psycho-
logical (social exclusion, violence) channels, while others could have a positive
eect, such as stimulating brain activity and additional attention from parents
and teachers.
1.3 Data and descriptives
1.3.1 Left-handedness and switching
My sample is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large and
representative panel survey of the German population that was started in 1984
(Wagner et al., 2007). As part of a grip strength measurement module conducted
biannually between 2006 to 2014, respondents were asked Are you a natural right-
or left-hander? and With which hand do you actually write?.5 I take a dierence
in the answers to these questions as an indication for switching of the writing hand.
In this study, an individual is dened as being naturally left-handed if he reports
5In 2006 and 2014, individuals had left- and right-hander as a third answer option for both
questions. I assign these 28 (13 for writing) individuals to the left-handed group (the writing
hand is the left hand). Qualitatively, the ndings do not change if I include them in the right-
handed group. See Ambrasat and Schupp, 2011 (in German only) for further details on the grip
strength measurement.
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so at least once in any wave of the SOEP. The reasoning for this approach is that
no true right-hander has an incentive to ever report being left-handed. Similarly,
an individual is dened as switched if she reports a dierence between her innate
and writing hand during the same interview at least once. Reassuringly, only 32
out of a gross sample of 13,442 individuals report being innately right-handed, but
write with their left hand today. I drop these observations.
The analysis sample is restricted to individuals born after 1920 and before 1997,
in order to avoid small cell sizes. The total sample size is 12,757, of which 1,129
observations are left-handed and 633 switched. The resulting share of left-handers
is 8.85%, of which 56.06% are switched. This share of left-handers is lower than
the 10% to 15% reported in recent economic (Goodman, 2014; Johnston et al.,
2013) or psychological (McManus, 2009) studies. One explanation for this is that
these studies are able to create a more precise measure of handedness by combining
statements on the preferred hand for writing, throwing, and eating, while my data
set provides only one item on this trait. I now discuss the limitations of my
measures.
One obvious concern is dierent reporting behavior by true handedness, true
switching status and across cohorts. The way respondents interpret the term
natural right- or left-hander may be directly inuenced by these factors. Given
the stigma of left-handedness, social desirability might lead to underreporting left-
handedness or to missing values on the handedness questions. I use the left-to-right
grip strength ratio to check whether true left-handers are less likely to answer the
questions on innate handedness in the rst place, but nd no evidence for this.6
6Information on innate and writing hand is available for more than half of the individuals
who refused the grip strength measurement. Similarly, for more than half of the individuals
with missing information on handedness, information on grip strength measures are available.
I compare the distributions of the left-to-right ratio of grip strength between those with and
without missing information on handedness. The reasoning is that in my data, left-handers
left-to-right grip strength ratio is on average more than one-third of a standard deviation higher
than that of right-handers. A WilcoxonMannWhitney test does not reject the hypothesis that
the two distributions (missing vs. non-missing information on innate handedness) of the grip
strength ratio are equal (p-value 0.43), suggesting that left-handers are not over-represented
among those with missing handedness information.
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Furthermore, if the switching practice disappears across cohorts, we would expect
that the share of reported left-handers increases, since switching that occurred too
early in life to be remembered decreases. As I will show below, this is not the case.
Another concern may be that older individuals are less likely to write at all
and hence report being right-handed. I oer two pieces of evidence against this
hypothesis. First, Figure 1.1 shows the share of non-response to the original hand-
edness and writing hand questions. I nd no evidence that certain cohorts are
more or less likely to answer the questions. Linear or quadratic cohort trends are
non-signicant for either question. Second, in unreported xed eects logit regres-
sions, I make use of the panel structure of the grip strength measurement module
and nd that age is not a signicant predictor of the writing hand. Nevertheless,
in robustness checks, I adopt dierent assignment rules for left-handedness and
switching and nd that my results still hold.
1.3.2 Outcome, channel and control variables
Employment status and log-hourly wages observed between 2004 to 2014 are the
primary outcomes of interest in this study. Labor market outcomes can be seen as
a summary of long-term consequences from early interventions (Heckman et al.,
2013). I then investigate human capital, cognitive and non-cognitive skills as
potential channels of switching as an intervention, from early childhood to labor
market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006).
Channels: Human capital Human capital accumulation is measured by com-
pleted years of education and retrospective grades in Math and German from the
last school certicate. Years of education includes time spent in apprenticeships,
training, or tertiary education. I use the highest observed value for years of edu-
cation in the panel, but individuals had to be at least 25 years old at this point to
be included in the sample.
The school is an integral part in the switching process, as it is the primary place
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Figure 1.1: Share of missing observations
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Note: Share of missing observations on handedness and writing hand by year of birth. Includes
95% condence intervals.
to develop writing skills. Teachers in Germany have considerable discretionary
power over tracking, which starts very early, after elementary school at age 10.
Only the highest track (Gymnasium) leads to college education, see Krueger and
Pischke (1995) for a more detailed description. The East German schooling system
had no such early tracking, but access to the higher education granting track was
strongly limited and required alignment with the state's ideology, see Baker et al.
(2007).
Math grades serve as the earliest available proxy for cognitive skills, before
college or occupational choices are made. In addition, writing and verbal skills,
which might be inuenced by switching, are much less important in Math than
in German. Individuals are only included in the sample of grades if they were
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at least of age 20 at the time of the interview and thus likely to have completed
schooling. Note, however, that grades are self-reported and therefore subject to
recall bias, which may dier by handedness or writing hand. For example, left-
handers might report worse grades because their memories of schooling is tainted
by discrimination they experienced.
Channels: Cognitive skills For cognitive skills, I use the symbol-digit test
(SDT) and the animal naming task (ANT).7 Both were elicited in 2006 and 2012
from a random sample of SOEP participants and have been used in other studies
(Dohmen et al., 2010; Heineck and Anger, 2010). During the SDT, individuals
had to match as many numbers to symbols as possible within 90 seconds and
enter their answers in the interviewer's computer. This test intends to measure an
individual's uid intelligence, which is the ability to process and make use of new
information that is not already stored in the memory (Cattell, 1987). The ANT
is a mixture of uid (word uency) and crystallized (vocabulary) intelligence. It
requires respondents to name as many distinct animals as possible in 90 seconds.
I use the number of uniquely named animals, excluding repetitions.
Channels: Non-cognitive skills Cunha et al. (2006) document that IQ gains
in the Perry Preschool Program were short-lived and faded out within six years
after the intervention. In contrast, non-cognitive skills such as self-motivation were
responsible for the program's positive eect on later life outcomes. In this study,
non-cognitive skills are represented by the Big Five personality traits (McCrae
and Costa Jr, 1999) and the external locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Personality
traits were elicited in 2005, 2009, and 2013, using three items for each trait.8
The external locus of control was elicited in 2005 and 2010 using six items. I do
not use all items in constructing these variables, due to their low reliability. See
Appendix B for an overview on the construction of these variables. The external
7See Lang et al. (2007) for the validity and reliability of these tests in the SOEP.
8See Dehne and Schupp (2007) for the validity and reliability of these measures in the SOEP.
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locus of control has been found to be an important predictor of wages (Groves,
2005; Heineck and Anger, 2010) and job search strategies (Caliendo et al., 2015).
The role of personality traits for labor market returns in the SOEP is analyzed in
Heineck and Anger (2010). For both, cognitive and non-cognitive channels, I use
the earliest available observation per individual.
Control variables My control variables comprise gender, year of birth, being
born in East Germany (the former German Democratic Republic)9, migration
background (none, 1st generation, 2nd generation), mother's and father's educa-
tion (none/basic, middle, high, and missing) and urbanization at age 15 (large city,
mid-sized city, small town, countryside, and missing). Individuals whose country
of birth is not Germany are referred to as migrants.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics by handedness and switching status. Sim-
ple comparisons of the means show that left-handers report worse grades in German
and score lower on conscientiousness and extraversion than right-handers. Left-
handers are less likely to be female, East German, or non-native. A more detailed
analysis of reported left-handedness is deferred to Appendix 1.B. The fact that
females are less likely to report left-handedness than males is well-known in the lat-
erality literature (Harris, 1990) and I nd no evidence that this dierence changes
across cohorts, suggesting a true biological cause. Dierences by country of birth
and between East and West Germany can be explained by past and prevailing
anti-left attitudes, which are discussed in the Appendix. Apart from these basic
characteristics, there are no signicant dierences in socio-economic background.
Unconditional mean comparisons between switched and non-switched left-handers
are not very informative here, as they are strongly confounded with cohort eects,
which will be corrected for in regression analysis. Selection into switching will be
discussed in Section 1.4.
9East German is dened by having lived in the GDR in 1989 or by being in sample C (D-Ost)
in the SOEP.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
All Left-handers
Right Left Non-switched Switched Total N
Share in sample: 91.15% 8.85% 43.93% 56.07%
Employed 0.821 0.812 0.775 0.839 0.820 53,213
(0.383) (0.391) (0.417) (0.367) (0.384)
Log-hourly wage 2.597 2.589 2.532 2.629 2.596 43,514
(0.639) (0.661) (0.668) (0.653) (0.641)
Years of Education 12.350 12.386 12.321 12.425 12.353 11,249
(2.769) (2.874) (2.961) (2.822) (2.778)
Math grade 0.005 -0.053 -0.245 0.078 0.000 7,541
(1.002) (0.981) (1.067) (0.896) (1.000)
German grade 0.006 -0.062 -0.158 0.004 0.000 7,265
(1.001) (0.990) (1.035) (0.955) (1.000)
Higher track 0.608 0.585 0.617 0.566 0.606 9,940
Symbol-Digit Test -0.005 0.041 0.448 -0.214 0.000 5,033
(0.993) (1.061) (1.021) (1.006) (1.000)
Animal Naming Test 0.007 -0.071 0.027 -0.123 0.000 2,275
(0.994) (1.052) (1.078) (1.039) (1.000)
Openness -0.003 0.031 0.076 0.001 0.000 11,037
(1.002) (0.974) (0.966) (0.979) (1.000)
Conscientiousness 0.006 -0.059 -0.131 -0.011 0.000 11,032
(1.000) (0.997) (1.051) (0.958) (1.000)
Extraversion 0.007 -0.070 -0.007 -0.112 0.000 11,038
(0.999) (1.009) (0.995) (1.017) (1.000)
Agreeableness 0.005 -0.049 -0.054 -0.045 0.000 11,041
(1.000) (0.997) (1.011) (0.988) (1.000)
Neuroticism -0.004 0.036 -0.018 0.072 0.000 11,041
(1.000) (1.003) (1.019) (0.992) (1.000)
External locus of control 0.000 -0.000 0.026 -0.015 0.000 8,037
(1.002) (0.980) (0.931) (1.008) (1.000)
Year of birth 1962.2 1962.9 1975.2 1953.2 1962.2 12,757
(18.949 (18.495) (14.997) (14.848) (18.909)
Female 0.533 0.477 0.488 0.469 0.528 12,757
East German 0.220 0.192 0.115 0.253 0.218 12,757
Migration background
None/Native 0.791 0.827 0.788 0.858 0.794 12,757
1st Generation 0.090 0.093 0.123 0.070 0.090 12,757
2nd Generation 0.119 0.080 0.089 0.073 0.116 12,757
Father's education
None/Basic 0.604 0.614 0.510 0.695 0.605 12,757
Middle 0.170 0.163 0.198 0.136 0.169 12,757
High 0.132 0.139 0.192 0.098 0.133 12,757
Missing 0.094 0.084 0.100 0.071 0.093 12,757
Mother's education
None/Basic 0.632 0.637 0.524 0.725 0.633 12,757
Middle 0.211 0.205 0.258 0.163 0.210 12,757
High 0.087 0.096 0.147 0.055 0.088 12,757
Missing 0.070 0.063 0.071 0.057 0.069 12,757
Urbanization at age 15
Large city 0.203 0.206 0.198 0.213 0.204 12,757
Mid-size city 0.168 0.201 0.226 0.182 0.171 12,757
Small town 0.230 0.224 0.258 0.197 0.230 12,757
Rural 0.380 0.352 0.292 0.398 0.377 12,757
Missing 0.019 0.017 0.026 0.009 0.019 12,757
Religious aliation
Catholic 0.313 0.321 0.314 0.326 0.313 10,189
Protestant 0.359 0.374 0.415 0.349 0.360 10,189
None 0.274 0.259 0.210 0.289 0.272 10,189
Other 0.055 0.046 0.061 0.037 0.054 10,189
Table displays means and standard deviations of non-binary variables in parenthesis below. Left-handed
equals one if a respondent in the German SOEP reports at least once to be a natural left-hander during grip
strength measurements performed in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Switched equals one if respondent
reports at least once a dierence between her natural and writing in the same year. All switched individuals
are left-handers. Sample restricted to cohorts born between 1920 and 1997. SDT is the sum of correct
entries in the symbol digit task within 90 seconds. ANT (90s) refers to the sum of uniquely named animals
in the animal naming task within 90 seconds. SDT, ANT, grades, Big Five personality traits, and locus of
control are standardized in full sample. Employment status and log(wage) applies for individuals observed
at age 25 and 60 between years 2004 to 2013.
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1.3.3 Left-handedness and switching across cohorts
This section provides a description of switching and left-handedness in the data.
The rst panel in Figure 1.2 shows the share of innately left-handed individuals
and left-hand writers across cohorts. The second panel only uses left-handers and
shows the share of switched across cohorts. All curves are estimated by local linear
regression with ROT bandwidth. Starting with the rst graph, I nd that the
share of left-handers increases, though rather noisily, from 6% in the 1920 cohort
to about 9% in 1940. It remains constant from then on. The initially lower share
of left-handers was to be expected if the stigma of left-handedness and writing
with the left hand has decreased over time. Although such a stigma was arguably
no longer prevalent at the time of the hand grip measurement (2006 to 2014),
the longer socialization of elderly individuals during times when prejudices were
prevalent are likely to lead to the observed pattern.10 Over the same period, the
share of individuals who at least once report writing with their left hand increases
rst only mildly until the 1950 cohort, before rising sharply from then on, and
eventually equaling the share of left-handers in the cohorts of the late 1990s.
Looking at the share of switched individuals, in the second graph of Figure 1.2,
I nd that about 90% of left-handers born before the end of World War Two write
with their right hand today. This share rapidly decreased among those born in
1960 or later and reached zero by the late 1990's.
For at least 40 years (19201960), there existed a pooling equilibrium in which
close to all left-handers were successfully switched and it can be reasonably as-
sumed that a good fraction of non-switched left-handers at least tried to switch.
Within less than another 40 years this practice vanished. Why did the norm of
right-hand writing disappear so quickly? Young (1996) argues that previously
stable conventions can suddenly reach a tipping point and change due to some
10The competing and somewhat prominent hypothesis that left-handers have a lower survival
rate than right-handers (Coren and Halpern, 1991; Halpern and Coren, 1988) was quickly refuted,
because the authors did not take stigma and switching among older cohorts into account (Harris,
1993).
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Figure 1.2: Left-handedness and switching by year of birth
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their left hand by year of birth. Lower panel: Share of switched (if left-handed) by year of birth.
Includes 95% condence intervals.
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idiosyncratic shock. Although only few agents are initially aected by the shock, a
new generation of agents samples from the behavior of the previous one and adopts
their convention according to the majority observed. Young's example is that of
right-side driving in continental Europe, which was rst introduced in France after
the French Revolution and then spread by Napoleon into occupied territories, with
neighboring countries successively following suit.
Here, such a shock may be the social upheavals of the 1960s, which found their
climax in 1968 in Germany (68er-Bewegung) and elsewhere. The abandonment of
conservative social norms, of which the correct writing hand is obviously just one,
was initiated by this rst generation of post-war raised parents.11
Another explanation may be technological change, for two reasons. First, labor
became less manually intensive with a decline in the necessity to use tools and
machinery which may be geared towards right-handers. Second, as production
techniques became more exible, goods whose functionality depends on manual
handling (e.g., scissors and knives) were more and more produced for left-handers,
making it unnecessary to switch hands.
1.4 Parental investment decisions
1.4.1 Theory
This section sets up a simple child investment model based on Becker and Tomes
(1994). It incorporates social norms to deliver predictions about the relation be-
tween switching and parental characteristics.
Let d be a parental investment (switching). As in Becker and Tomes (1994),
the parents' utility at time t depends on their own consumption of a good zt minus
11A similar observation has been made by Coudé et al. (2006), who nd a sharp increase in
reported left-handedness among individuals who entered school shortly after the events of May
1968 in France. I do not nd this increase in the share of reported left-handers, but instead a
steep decline in switching rates.
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the immediate treatment costs k plus their child's utility uc. They try to maximize
ut = u(zt − kd) + δ uch(ydt+1), (1.1)
with respect to d, where δ is the parents' degree of altruism and ydt+1 is some
(discounted) future outcome of the child, such as its human capital. Consider
only two points in time, t and t+ 1, and assume all utility functions are concave.
I now incorporate the parents' social norms when making investment decisions,
as proposed by Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008). The parents may not know
whether y1t+1 or y
0
t+1 is larger, but their expectations ỹ
d
t+1 are inuenced by a social
norm d̄t at t:
ỹdt+1 = y(at)− c |d̄t − d|, (1.2)
where y′ > 0, c is a penalty term corresponding to the degree of conformity to the
norm and at is a set of other important factors, such as parental education and
resources, institutional policies, and innate ability. This formulation of conformity
is borrowed from the model of social distance by Akerlof (1997). It reects the
idea that parents think that non-conformity with the existing norms leads to a
possibly life-long penalty for the child due to stigmatization by teachers, peers
and employers.12 Note that I assume here that parents expect the norm to also
exist at time t+ 1. The decision whether to switch the child's handedness is based
on (1.1), where ydt+1 is replaced with ỹ
d
t+1. If d̄t = 1, then parents will switch their
child if
u(zt − k) + δ uc(y(at)) ≥ u(zt) + δ uc(y(at)− c) (1.3)
⇔ δ (uc(y(at))− uc(y(at)− c)) ≥ u(zt)− u(zt − k). (1.4)
12This is similar to Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), who study the imposition of work norms by
parents on their children.
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Switching will thus be performed when the present forgone utility of doing it is
smaller than the child's future gain, scaled by altruism. Obviously, no switching
will take place if parents are selsh (δ = 0), sardistic (δ < 0), non-conformists
(c ≤ 0), or simply do not know that d̄t = 1.
What predictions can be derived from this simple model? As seen from (1.4),
the threshold for switching the child is lower when parents have a high level of
consumption, because then the dierence u(zt) − u(zt − k) is relatively lower for
low levels of consumption. Altruism δ in general induces parents to invest in
their child's future well-being. Hence, switching is merely one from among a
range of measures that parents can undertake to foster their child's capabilities
and standing in society. On the other hand, the dierence uc(y(at)) − uc(y(at) −
c) decreases in endowments at. A stronger conformism to norms (expressed in
a higher c) could lead to a negative empirical selection mechanism of switched
individuals.
Lastly, the parent's switching decision may not be perfectly implementable.
Instead, its probability of success depends on the child's already developed cogni-
tive skills and motivation at time t. This concern is conrmed by Sattler (1996),
who notes that it are usually the brighter and more motivated children on which
switching attempts are successful. Empirically, this would link switching and skills
in adulthood through a reverse causality. This step in the switching process is non-
negligible. Using a world-wide survey of more than 11,000 individuals, Perelle and
Ehrman (1994) nd that switching attempts were successful in only 72% of the
cases.
In summary, my parental investment decision model gives us some reasons to
expect a positive selection of switched left-handers and some reasons to expect
a negative. I now investigate these predictions empirically. Since I do not di-
rectly observe parental endowment, altruism, or conformism, I resort to parental
education, degree of urbanization at age 15, and religious aliation as proxies.
25
Chapter 1. Left-handedness, Social Norms and Human Capital
1.4.2 Empirics
Table 1.2 shows the results from a linear probability model regression of switching
on control variables in the sample of left-handers. Starting with the basic demo-
graphic variables in column one, I nd that females are 4.4 percentage points less
likely to be switched. This dierence is stable across cohorts, as shown in the
upper graph of Figure 1.3.
East Germans are about 10 percentage points more likely to be forced to switch
their writing hand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in East Germany, as in other
Eastern European ex-communist states, left-handers were suspected of being more
creative than right-handers and hence as more likely to be a threat to the ruling
regime. This threat was supposed to be eliminated by switching the writing hand
Sattler (1996). I illustrate switching trends between West and East Germany in
the lower graph of Figure 1.3. I nd that the level dierence between East and
West is driven by cohorts born after 1960. The Berlin Wall was built in 1961 and
brought a new wave of oppression. As dissidents could no longer simply leave the
country, the regime aimed to stigmatize those who did not conform to the socialist
ideology, starting early in school. Thus, the liberal movement of the 1960s was
much less developed in the East than in the West (Ohse, 2010).
High paternal education negatively predicts switching, but the coecients are
not signicant. In contrast, higher maternal education is signicantly positively
associated with switching. Highly educated mothers may have higher reputational
concerns and like to see their children conform to existing norms.
Both coecients of migration background are negative, but not signicantly
so. Column two of Table 1.2 excludes migrants from the sample and uses reli-
gious aliation as an alternative explanatory variable. Individuals belonging to
the Protestant Evangelical denomination are 7.6% less likely to be switched than
Catholics. The dummy for 'other' aliations (Islam and other Christian denomi-
nations) exhibits a large and positive coecient which is not signicant due to a
low number of cases. The degree of urbanization at age 15 is never a signicant
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predictor.
In conclusion, the regression analysis shows that gender, being East German,
and maternal education are signicant predictors of successful switching, conrm-
ing some predictions of the theoretical model.
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Table 1.2: Regressions on switching indicator in left-hander sample
(i) (ii)
Sample restrictions: Non-mig-
rants only
Share of switched: 56.07% 58.14%
Female -0.044* -0.033
(0.024) (0.030)
East German 0.099*** 0.075**
(0.031) (0.038)
Mothers education
Basic/none (ref.)
Middle/other 0.077** 0.059
(0.039) (0.051)
High 0.103* 0.091
(0.054) (0.076)
Missing -0.035 -0.133
(0.066) (0.094)
Fathers education
Basic/none (ref.)
Middle/other 0.025 0.033
(0.038) (0.050)
High -0.064 -0.075
(0.049) (0.063)
Missing -0.017 0.026
(0.056) (0.084)
Urbanization at age 15
Large city (ref.)
Mid-size city -0.011 0.002
(0.039) (0.050)
Small town -0.037 0.047
(0.037) (0.046)
Countryside -0.001 0.027
(0.035) (0.043)
Missing -0.061 0.128
(0.104) (0.176)
Migration background
none (ref.)
1st Generation -0.032
(0.037)
2nd Generation -0.039
(0.052)
Religious aliation
Catholic (ref.)
Protestant -0.076**
(0.035)
Denomination free -0.011
(0.046)
Other 0.158
(0.111)
Missing -0.077
(0.047)
Cohort xed eects yes yes
N 1,129 934
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.401
Switched is an indicator equal to one if an individual
self-reports at least once that he is born as a left-hander
and writes with the right hand within one interview in
any survey year. Robust standard errors in in parenthesis
below. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Figure 1.3: Switching by gender, East/West Germans and year of birth
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Note: Upper panel: Share of switched (if left-handed) by gender and year of birth. Lower
panel: Share of switched (if left-handed) by East/West Germans and year of birth. Includes 95%
condence intervals.
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1.5 Results
In this section I investigate dierences in later life (labor market) outcomes between
left- and right-handers and between the three groups, switched left-handers, non-
switched left-handers, and right-handers, where the last are the reference group in
both cases. Though not the main focus of this paper, pure leftright dierences
are included for comparison with the existing literature.
I use OLS and random eects (RE) models for the estimation. Thus, my
results do not allow for a causal interpretation, since the switching decision has
to be made consciously by parents and teachers. It is thus a priori unlikely that
the individual's characteristics that have been found (in the previous section) to
(weakly) correlate with the intervention are its sole predictors. In particular, a
possible reverse causality with respect to innate cognitive and non-cognitive skills
is worrisome. Furthermore, and as derived by my theoretical model, parents with
higher altruism and involvement with their child's development may contribute to
a positive selection bias.
I undertake two measures to address these concerns. First, I show, in robustness
checks, that my results do not change signicantly when including control vari-
ables that are strong predictors of the outcome variables, in particular parental
education. Second, in the next section I discuss a dierence-in-dierence strategy
to identify the causal eect of switching, and nd very similar results.
Nevertheless, the contrasts reported here are interesting enough on their own,
because they can demonstrate associations of an endogenous childhood interven-
tion with personality traits, cognitive skills, and economic performance in adult-
hood, something rarely observed. In particular, given that decits in these quan-
tities have been reported for left-handers in general, it is worthwhile to document
that social norms can have any inuence on innate and hard-wired skills. For now,
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the regression model takes the form
yit = αL leftyi + β0Xi + µt + εit (1.5)
to investigate dierences between left- and right-handers and
yit = αN non-switched leftyi + αS switched leftyi + β0Xi + νt + δit (1.6)
to investigate dierences between switched and non-switched left-handers with re-
spect to right-handers. The index t denotes the survey year and is irrelevant for
all channel outcome variables which are cross-sectional. My preferred specication
includes cohort xed eects µt and all control variables Xi from column one of
Table 1.2. Age xed eects are included for labor market outcomes. All control
variables are pre-determined before the intervention or non-changeable by the indi-
vidual (such as parental education), to avoid bias from bad controls. In particular,
I do not include occupation or industry controls. I use linear probability models
for binary outcomes (employment status, higher track).
1.5.1 Labor market outcomes
Table 1.3 shows regressions on employment status and log-hourly wages. Starting
with general leftright dierences in the rst panel, I nd that left-handers are 2.3
percentage points less likely to be employed and if they are, they earn about 7%
lower wages, which is close to the wage gap of 6% reported by Goodman (2014).
The second panel in Table 1.3 splits left-handers into switched and non-switched.
I nd that it is the latter who perform signicantly worse on both measures, being
about 6 percentage points less likely to be employed, as well as earning 11% lower
wages than right-handers. Switched left-handers earn a statistically insignicant
3% lower hourly wages.
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Table 1.3: Baseline results for labor market outcomes
(i) (ii)
Outcome: Employed Log(Wage)
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.023∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.022)
Split up left-handers
Switched lefty 0.005 -0.033
(0.016) (0.028)
Non-switched lefty -0.057∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.033)
Controls, cohort and age f.e. yes yes
N 53,213 43,514
N(cluster) 8,513 7,600
Overall R2 0.061 0.164
Left-handed equals one if a respondent in the German SOEP re-
ports at least once to be a natural left-hander during grip strength
measurements performed in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014.
Switched lefty equals one if the respondent reports at least once
a dierence between her natural and writing in the same year.
The upper panel regresses outcome variables on controls and an
indicator for being left-handed. The lower panel dierentiates be-
tween switched and non-switched left-handers. In both cases, right-
handers are the reference group. Table uses a linear random eects
model for all outcomes. All regressions control for cohort xed ef-
fects, whether the individual grew up in West or East Germany,
gender, migration background (none, 1st generation, 2nd gener-
ation), mothers' and fathers' education (low/none, middle, high,
missing), and urbanization at age 15 (large city, mid-size city, small
town, countryside, missing). Sample restricted to individuals be-
tween age 25 and 60. Pools observations between years 2004 to
2014. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 1.4: Channels: Schooling, full sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Outcome: Education Higher track Math grade German grade
Unconditional mean 12.353 0.606 0.000 0.000
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.069 -0.031** -0.036 -0.029
(0.083) (0.015) (0.039) (0.039)
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.252 0.033 0.113
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.091 -0.004 0.047 -0.008
(0.101) (0.019) (0.046) (0.048)
Non-switched lefty -0.339** -0.076*** -0.159** -0.062
(0.141) (0.025) (0.067) (0.063)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 11,249 9,940 7,541 7,265
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.252 0.034 0.113
The upper panel regresses outcome variables on controls and an indicator for being left-handed.
The lower panel dierentiates between switched and non-switched left-handers. In both cases,
right-handers are the reference group. Table uses linear regression for all outcomes. All regres-
sions control for cohort xed eects, whether the individual grew up in West or East Germany,
gender, migration background (none, 1st generation, 2nd generation), mothers' and fathers' ed-
ucation (low/none, middle, high, missing), and urbanization at age 15 (large city, mid-size city,
small town, countryside, missing). Sample restricted to cohorts born between 1920 and 1997.
Years of education includes only individuals of age greater or equal to 25 at time of observation
in survey. Higher track is a dummy variable equaling one if completed schooling track is higher
than the lowest (Hauptschule). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.5: Channels: Schooling, wage sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Outcome: Education Higher track Math grade German grade
Unconditional mean 12.799 0.723 -0.008 -0.045
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.050 -0.023 -0.019 -0.001
(0.105) (0.018) (0.050) (0.049)
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.159 0.0287 0.127
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.205 0.009 0.110* -0.009
(0.135) (0.024) (0.061) (0.065)
Non-switched lefty -0.372** -0.062** -0.170** 0.007
(0.160) (0.027) (0.077) (0.071)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 7,434 6,609 4,940 4,739
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.159 0.030 0.127
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables, and Table 1.4
for the denition of the outcome variables. In contrast to the sample in Table 1.4, the sample
in this table is restricted to individuals included in the regression on wages from column two of
Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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1.5.2 Channels
Human capital accumulation
I now investigate potential channels which could lead to the observed dierences
in long-run labor market outcomes. A natural start consists of measures of human
capital, as writing is primarily learned in school and the correct writing hand
might matter for school success. Table 1.4 shows the results, using the same model
specication as for labor market outcomes (excluding age dummies).
Dierences between left- and right-handers (upper panel) are rather small, and
only signicant for tracking in column two. Similar to labor market outcomes,
the contrasts in human capital between switched and non-switched left-handers
to right-handers are remarkably dierent. Non-switched lefties report about one-
third fewer years of education, or 0.12 standard deviations (column one). Column
two shows that they are also 7.6 percentage points (12.5%) less likely to graduate
from a school track which is higher than the lowest. As hypothesized in Section 1.3,
teachers might prohibit left-handers from pursuing higher school tracks when they
fail to switch their writing hand to the right. Hence discrimination by teachers
based on the signal of the writing hand could explain later life outcomes alone.
However, non-switched left-handers also report signicantly lower grades compared
to right-handers and switched left-handers, which indicates that switching might
be related to more than just conformity. Math grades are 0.16 standard deviations
lower (column three) and German grades 0.06 standard deviations lower (column
four), although the latter coecient is insignicant.13 It is unlikely that grades
from the last school certicate are driven by discrimination by teachers, especially
in Math. Grades in German show no signicant dierences (column four).
While Table 1.4 used the full sample, the results for the sample with positive
wages are shown in Table 1.5. The coecients are largely similar, but switched
left-handers obtain 0.2 more years of education and a signicant 0.1 standard
13The dierence in Math grades is not driven by selection into dierent school tracks. Con-
trolling for the latter leads to very similar results.
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deviation higher Math grades than right-handers.
Cognitive and non-cognitive skills
Next, I investigate whether left-handedness and, in particular, switching, is also
correlated with cognitive and non-cognitive skills in adulthood. Again I use the
same regression specication as for human capital measures. The results are dis-
played in Table 1.6. Starting with my two measures of cognitive skills in columns
one and two, I nd that there are no signicant dierences either between left- and
right-handers, nor when I split up left-handers into switched and non-switched.
To some extent, this comes as a surprise since the previous literature found that
left-handers perform worse than right-handers in some of these tests. However, not
in all of them. Johnston et al. (2009, 2013) nd that left-handed children do not
perform worse than right-handers in tests which require vocabulary and expressive
language skills, which the animal naming test requires. Goodman (2014) reports
that left-handers perform worse in reciting numbers backwards but not forwards,
which requires short-term memory skills. Thus, the symbol-digit test might not
capture the dimensions of cognitive skills in which left-handers perform worse. It
is interesting to note, however, that neither the switching status is associated with
a dierence in these measures.
Roughly the same holds for the Big Five personality traits in columns three to
seven of Table 1.6. Left-handers describe themselves as signicantly less conscien-
tious and extroverted, but are more neurotic. Less conscientiousness and a higher
level of neuroticism could be correlated with the behavioral and learning problems
in childhood which Goodman (2014) and Johnston et al. (2009, 2013) document
for left-handers. Similar coecients for switched and non-switched left-handers
indicate that such behavioral problems arise for both types of left-handers. In
contrast, there are signicant dierences in the external locus of control (LoC)
(column eight). Switched left-handers have a signicantly higher external LoC
than right-handers. This is in line with Piatek and Pinger (2015), who nd that
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the locus of control's inuence on wages is mostly through education.
Table 1.7 repeats the previous regressions for employed individuals. As was the
case for human capital variables, I nd similar results, but in this sample, the con-
trasts between left- and right-handers are mainly driven by switched left-handers.
They report signicantly less conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and
more neuroticism. This is in line with the psychological literature documenting
that switched left-handers are often introverted and tend to disagree with others
(Sattler, 1996).
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Table 1.6: Channels: Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, full sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Cognitive skills Non-cognitive skills
SDT ANT Openness Conscient- Extra- Agreeable- Neuroticism External locus
iousness version ness of control
Unconditional mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.017 -0.073 0.013 -0.068** -0.072** -0.026 0.078** 0.024
(0.042) (0.073) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038)
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.114 0.049 0.027 0.026 0.040 0.058 0.047
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty -0.023 -0.087 0.015 -0.070* -0.088** -0.042 0.081* -0.023
(0.053) (0.090) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048)
Non-switched lefty -0.006 -0.045 0.010 -0.065 -0.046 -0.000 0.072 0.104*
(0.066) (0.122) (0.049) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.059)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 5,033 2,275 11,037 11,032 11,038 11,041 11,041 8,037
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.113 0.049 0.027 0.026 0.040 0.058 0.048
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables. SDT refers to the sum of correct entries
within 90 seconds in the symbol-digit test. ANT refers to the sum of uniquely named animals within 90 seconds in the animal
naming test. Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism comprise the Big Five personality
traits. See text for further details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Channels: Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, wage sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Cognitive skills Non-cognitive skills
SDT ANT Openness Conscient- Extra- Agreeable- Neuroticism External locus
iousness version ness of control
Unconditional mean 0.238 0.186 0.056 0.092 0.027 -0.032 -0.038 -0.075
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.052 -0.034 -0.004 -0.063∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.085∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.058
(0.055) (0.102) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.048 0.034 0.014 0.023 0.028 0.050 0.033
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty -0.033 -0.088 -0.048 -0.092∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.134∗∗ 0.091∗ 0.010
(0.071) (0.127) (0.052) (0.049) (0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.062)
Non-switched lefty -0.077 0.051 0.055 -0.024 -0.049 -0.018 0.072 0.130∗
(0.084) (0.161) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065) (0.063) (0.068)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 2,965 1,397 6,596 6,596 6,595 6,597 6,597 5,046
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.048 0.035 0.014 0.023 0.029 0.050 0.033
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables. See the notes of Table 1.6 for the denition
of the outcome variables. In contrast to the sample in Table 1.6, the sample in this table is restricted to individuals included
in the regression on wages from column two of Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1.
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1.5.3 Channel analysis
I now set out to understand which of the channels considered in the previous section
are responsible for the observed dierences in labor market outcomes. To do this,
I step-by-step include the channel variables which showed a signicantly dierence
for either switched or non-switched left-handers to right-handers.14 Thus, the
regression model becomes
yit = αL leftyi + β Xi + τ Mi + µt + εit (1.7)
to investigate how the dierences between left- and right-handers, but becomes
yit = αN non-switched leftyi + αS switched leftyi + β Xi + τ Mi + νt + δit (1.8)
to investigate how the dierences between switched and non-switched left-handers
and right-handers change after inclusion of channel, or mediating, variables M .
To interpret the coecients τ as causal would require the sequential ignorability
assumption to hold (Imai et al., 2010): Conditional on values of some treatment T
and pre-treatment covariables X, the mediating variables M have to be indepen-
dent of potential outcomes Y (t,m).15 Given that the mediating variables appeared
as outcome variables in the previous section, this assumption is unlikely to hold
here. Therefore, I do not attempt to conduct a fully elaborate mediation analysis,
but provide a mere descriptive analysis on the role of schooling and skills for the
observed dierences in labor market performance by left-handedness and switching
status.
Note that not all channel variables are observed for all individuals from Table
1.3. As a consequence, the sample size is reduced by about 20%, which raises
14I do not include Math grades as a channel, as the number of observations for this outcome
is very low.
15For completeness, the sequential ignorability assumption by Imai et al. (2010) also requires
that T is independent of potential outcomes given X, which corresponds to a selection-on-
observables assumption.
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worries about sample selection. However, I show that my baseline results still hold
in the most restricted sample and in samples for which only one group of channel
variables is observed.16
I start with log-hourly wages. Column one in Table 1.8 repeats column two of
Table 1.3 in the sample where all mediator variables are observed. Similarly to
the results in the full sample, I nd that non-switched left-handers earn 10% lower
wages than right-handers, while the dierence for switched left-handers is an in-
signicant -5%. Including years of education as mediator in column two leads both
coecients to become equal in size, -6%. Including only the Big Five personality
traits (column three) instead of education leads to rather little change in the wage
gaps, and so does adding only the external locus of control (column four). Inclu-
sion of either set of channels reduces the wage gap of non-switched left-handers to
8%. Including all mediators in column ve leads to the same result, qualitatively,
as in column two: both switched and non-switched left-handers experience nearly
the same wage gap of 5% to 6% to right-handers. The overall dierence between all
left- and right-handers (upper panel) of -6% changes remarkably little throughout
this exercise, while the overall R-squared increases from 0.171 to 0.281.
To check whether these results are driven by sample selection, I repeat the
analysis for samples where either only years of education or only personality traits,
or both, are non-missing. The external locus of control is not considered because it
leads to the largest loss in sample size. Columns one and two in Table 1.9 replicate
the same columns from Table 1.8 for the larger sample and I nd that their main
nding still holds: taking into account human capital dierences in column two, the
wage gaps for switched and non-switched left-handers become much more similar.
The sample in columns three and four of Table 1.9 is restricted to observations with
non-missing values on personality traits. As in column four of Table 1.8, I nd that
16Furthermore, in an unreported logit regression, I nd that, conditional on being in the base-
line samples of Table 1.3, the probability of being included in the corresponding restricted sample
does not dier signicantly between right-handers, switched and non-switched left-handers after
controlling for cohort eects.
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the wage gaps do not react to the inclusion of these traits. Note however, that also
R-squared increases only marginally, from 0.161 to 0.167. In a sample where years
of education and personality traits (columns ve to seven) are both non-missing, I
again observe that human capital dierences are more important in reducing the
dierence in the wage gap than are personality traits. The results for employment
status are provided in Table 1.10. Comparable to the baseline results in Table
1.3, I nd that non-switched left-handers are 4% less likely to be employed than
right-handers. This gap becomes an insignicant 3% after controlling for years of
education (columns two and ve). Again, non-cognitive skills do not matter as
much as human capital. However, and in contrast to wages, switched left-handers
are never signicantly more or less likely to be employed than right-handers, even
after taking into account human capital, personality, and the external locus of
control.
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Table 1.8: Log(wage) including channels (Random Eects model)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Outcome: Log(Wage)
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.065** -0.063*** -0.062** -0.059** -0.060**
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Overall R2 0.171 0.262 0.177 0.203 0.281
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty -0.046 -0.063** -0.044 -0.045 -0.064**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Non-switched lefty -0.096** -0.063* -0.091** -0.080** -0.053
(0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035)
Years of education 0.080*** 0.075***
(0.003) (0.003)
Openness 0.020** -0.012
(0.009) (0.008)
Conscientiousness 0.007 0.017**
(0.009) (0.008)
Extraversion -0.008 0.006
(0.009) (0.008)
Agreeableness -0.018** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.007)
Neuroticism -0.051*** -0.013*
(0.008) (0.007)
External locus -0.125*** -0.090***
of control (0.008) (0.007)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
N 34,836 34,836 34,836 34,836 34,836
N(cluster) 4,918 4,918 4,918 4,918 4,918
Overall R2 0.171 0.262 0.177 0.203 0.281
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables. Coecients of
channel variables are not shown in the upper panel. Table uses a linear random eects model.
Sample restricted to individuals between age 25 and 60, with positive wages, and with non-
missing values for years of education, Big Five personality traits, and external locus of control.
Pools observations between years 2004 to 2014. See text for further details. Standard errors
clustered at individual level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.9: Log(wage) including channels years of education and personality (Random Eects model)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Outcome: Log(Wage)
Sample Education only Personality only Education + Personality
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.067∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Overall R2 0.164 0.255 0.161 0.167 0.161 0.252 0.256
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty -0.037 -0.054∗∗ -0.027 -0.025 -0.032 -0.049∗ -0.046∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Non-switched lefty -0.106∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Years of education 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness 0.014∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.007)
Conscientiousness 0.007 0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007)
Extraversion -0.008 0.010
(0.008) (0.007)
Agreeableness -0.019∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Neuroticism -0.054∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 42,974 42,974 40,042 40,042 39,548 39,548 39,548
N(cluster) 7,434 7,434 6,595 6,595 6,448 6,448 6,448
Overall R2 0.164 0.255 0.161 0.167 0.161 0.252 0.256
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables. Sample restricted to individuals
between age 25 and 60, and with positive wages. Pools observations between years 2004 to 2014. Coecients of channel
variables are not shown in the upper panel. In columns one and two the sample is restricted to observations with
non-missing years of education. In columns three and four the sample is restricted to observations with non-missing
personality traits. The sample in columns ve to seven is restricted to observations with non-missing values of both,
years of education and personality traits. Table uses random eects regression. Standard errors clustered at individual
level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: Employment status including channels (Random Eects model)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Outcome: Employed
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Overall R2 0.059 0.073 0.073 0.071 0.093
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.020 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.017
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Non-switched lefty -0.043∗ -0.034 -0.037∗ -0.038∗ -0.027
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Years of education 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Openness 0.000 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Conscientiousness 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Extraversion 0.006 0.008*
(0.005) (0.005)
Agreeableness -0.013∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Neuroticism -0.023∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
External locus -0.044∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
of control (0.004) (0.005)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
N 41,876 41,876 41,876 41,876 41,876
N(cluster) 5,430 5,430 5,430 5,430 5,430
Overall R2 0.060 0.073 0.074 0.071 0.093
See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control variables. Coecients
of channel variables are not shown in the upper panel. Table uses random eects regres-
sion. Sample restricted to individuals between age 25 and 60, and with non-missing values
for years of education, Big Five personality traits, and external locus of control. Pools
observations between years 2004 to 2014 Standard errors clustered at individual level in
parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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1.5.4 Robustness checks
Robustness checks with respect to the set of control variables and samples for
wages are provided in Table 1.11. Without any controls (column one), there are no
signicant dierences between left- and right-handers. This is due to the variation
of left-handedness in certain demographic groups, as discussed in Appendix 1.B.
Controlling for these basic characteristics (gender, migration status, East German)
in column two, I nd a wage gap of 6%. Further controlling for the remaining co-
variables leads to a slight increase to 7% in column ve, which is equal to column
two of Table 1.3. This nding is reassuring, as it demonstrates the randomness
of left-handedness within certain demographic groups. In particular, including
cohort xed eects and parental education changes the coecient only marginally
while raising the overall R-squared substantially, from 9.7% (column two) to 14.7%
(column four). To address the issue of endogenous reporting behavior among
individuals born before 1950, I restrict the sample to observations born in 1950
or later, but include all control variables (column ve). The wage gaps remain
unchanged. Excluding individuals with some migration background, who are less
likely to report left-handedness than natives, leads to an even larger wage gap
of roughly 8% (column six). On the other hand, excluding East Germans, who
are also less likely to report left-handedness, leaves the baseline results unchanged
(column seven).
Throughout all specications and in all sub-samples, non-switched left-handers
earn signicantly lower wages than right-handers, while switched left-handers do
not earn signicantly less. As expected from my analysis in Section 1.4, columns
two to four show that basic demographic characteristics and cohort eects are
the most important confounders for the switching status. Parental background
again matters little. In the sample of natives (column six), the wage decit for
non-switched left-handers is even larger, at 14%. The same robustness checks for
employment status are provided in Table 1.12. I nd that the coecients are
very stable throughout this exercise, even more than they are for wages. However,
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the control variables are also less powerful in explaining variation in employment
status than in wages.
Since human capital was found to be the main mediating factor between switch-
ing status and wages, I also conducted robustness checks for years of education
in Table 1.13. After including basic demographics, all coecients become sta-
ble. It is noteworthy that including parental education nearly quadruples the
adjusted R-squared, from 6.4% to 24.8%, but the coecient for non-switched left-
handers remains virtually unchanged (columns three to four). When excluding
individuals born before 1950, I nd a signicantly positive dierence of switched
left-handers to right-handers (column ve). One explanation could be that the
"missing" left-handers in the older cohorts are actually switched left-handers who
report right-handedness.
Finally, I investigate the sensitivity of my results with respect to the denition
of being left-handed and switched. My preferred measure categorizes individu-
als as being left-handed (switched) if they ever report being a natural left-hander
(ever report a dierence between the innate hand and the writing hand) in any sur-
vey wave. As alternatives, I can assign an individual to the left-handed (switched)
group if she reports left-handedness (a dierence between innate and writing hand)
at least half the time or every time when asked about her natural handedness and
writing hand. I thus created two additional indicators, left-handed (50%) for the
former and left-handed (100%) for the latter case, and analogous indicators for
switching. Under the rst (second) alternative denition, 7.6% (5.6%) of respon-
dents in the full sample are left-handed, of which 52.2% (44.2%) are switched.
Table 1.14 contains these robustness checks. Compared with my baseline re-
sults from Table 1.3, the alternative denitions of my key variables make virtually
no dierence for labor market outcomes. The coecients for employment status
(columns one and two) are virtually unchanged and wage gaps between left- and
right-handers and between non-switched left-handers and right-handers are even
more pronounced (columns three and four). However, dierences in human capital
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(columns ve to eight) are lower than under my preferred assignment rule and less
statistically signicant. One possible explanation for this nding is positive selec-
tion bias. Left-handers, in particular those who were not switched, are more likely
to report left-handedness every time they are asked if they had less experience of
discrimination, e.g., in school which would also lead to lower years of education.
Thus, this nding corroborates my interpretation of discrimination in school based
on the writing hand.
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Table 1.11: Robustness checks for log-hourly wages (Random Eects model)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Outcome: Log(Wage)
Sample Full Born ≥ 1950 Non- West-
migrants Germans
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.017 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Overall R2 0.000 0.096 0.122 0.147 0.161 0.173 0.154
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.041 0.017 -0.030 -0.031 -0.027 -0.030 -0.031
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Non-switched lefty -0.088∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034)
Controls:
Demographics no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects no no yes yes yes yes yes
Parental education no no no yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects no no no no yes yes yes
Urbanization at 15 no no no no yes yes yes
N 43,514 43,514 43,514 43,514 41,894 35,291 32,971
N(cluster) 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,104 6,003 5,857
Overall R2 0.000 0.097 0.122 0.147 0.161 0.174 0.155
Robustness check to regression on log-wages in Table 1.3. See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of
control variables. Table uses a linear random eects model. Sample restricted to individuals between age 25 and 60. Pools
observations between years 2004 to 2014. Demographic controls are gender, migration background (none, 1st generation,
2nd generation) and an East German dummy. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
49
Chapter 1. Left-handedness, Social Norms and Human Capital
Table 1.12: Robustness checks for employment status (Random Eects model)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Outcome: Employed
Sample Full Born ≥ 1950 Non- West-
migrants Germans
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed -0.009 -0.022∗ -0.024∗ -0.024∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Overall R2 0.000 0.029 0.053 0.058 0.056 0.050 0.073
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.024 0.008 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Non-switched lefty -0.048∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Controls:
Demographics no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects no no yes yes yes yes yes
Parental education no no no yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects no no no no yes yes yes
Urbanization at 15 no no no no yes yes yes
N 53,213 53,213 53,213 53,213 50,885 42,335 40,390
N(cluster) 8,513 8,513 8,513 8,513 7,838 6,648 6,574
Overall R2 0.001 0.030 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.051 0.074
Robustness check to regression on employment in Table 1.3. See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list
of control variables. Table uses random eects regression. Sample restricted to individuals between age 25 and 60. Pools
observations between years 2004 to 2014. Demographic controls are gender, migration background (none, 1st generation,
2nd generation) and an East German dummy. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.13: Robustness checks for years of education (OLS)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Outcome: Years of education
Sample Full Born ≥ 1950 Non- West-
migrants Germans
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed 0.036 -0.035 -0.068 -0.062 -0.053 -0.138 -0.071
(0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.084) (0.101) (0.092) (0.094)
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.022 0.064 0.248 0.234 0.238 0.281
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty 0.075 -0.014 0.116 0.094 0.234∗ 0.009 0.126
(0.117) (0.116) (0.114) (0.102) (0.134) (0.108) (0.116)
Non-switched lefty -0.029 -0.069 -0.379∗∗ -0.326∗∗ -0.369∗∗ -0.411∗∗ -0.355∗∗
(0.157) (0.155) (0.155) (0.140) (0.148) (0.162) (0.152)
Controls:
Demographics no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects no no yes yes yes yes yes
Parental education no no no yes yes yes yes
Urbanization at 15 no no no no yes yes yes
N 11,249 11,249 11,249 11,249 7,707 9,001 8,635
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.025 0.064 0.248 0.235 0.238 0.282
Robustness check to regressions in Table 1.4. See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and the list of control
variables. Demographic controls are gender, migration background (none, 1st generation, 2nd generation) and an
East German dummy. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
51
Chapter 1. Left-handedness, Social Norms and Human Capital
Table 1.14: Robustness checks by denition of left-handedness and switching
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Outcome: Employed (RE) Log-wage (RE) Education (OLS) Higher track (OLS)
Pool left-handers:
Left-handed(50%) -0.024∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.026
(0.013) (0.024) (0.090) (0.016)
Left-handed(100%) -0.027∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.040 -0.027
(0.015) (0.028) (0.105) (0.019)
Overall/Adjusted R2 0.061 0.061 0.164 0.163 0.251 0.251 0.252 0.252
Dierentiate between switched and non-switched left-handers:
Switched lefty(50%) 0.002 -0.028 0.037 -0.005
(0.018) (0.032) (0.110) (0.021)
Non-switched lefty(50%) -0.050∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.238 -0.055∗∗
(0.019) (0.035) (0.150) (0.025)
Switched lefty(100%) -0.006 -0.004 0.035 -0.002
(0.023) (0.040) (0.133) (0.025)
Non-switched lefty(100%) -0.046∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.095 -0.044
(0.021) (0.038) (0.162) (0.027)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 53,213 53,213 43,514 43,514 11,249 11,249 9,940 9,940
N(cluster) 8,513 8,513 7,600 7,600 11,249 11,249 9,940 9,940
Overall/Adjusted R2 0.061 0.061 0.164 0.164 0.251 0.251 0.252 0.252
Robustness checks with respect to the denition of being left-handed and switched. See the notes of Table 1.3 for table description and
the list of control variables. Left-handed(Switched) (50%) indicates individuals that self-report to be naturally left-handed (report a
dierence between their innate and writing hand) at least half the time across survey waves. Left-handed (Switched) (100%) indicates
individuals that always self-report to be naturally left-handed (always report a dierence between their innate and writing hand) across
all survey waves. Table uses linear random eects models in columns (i) to (iv) and OLS in columns (v) to (viii). Sample restricted
to individuals between age 25 and 60. Pools observations between years 2004 to 2014. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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1.6 Discussion
The analysis so far has been limited to comparing conditional means between
endogenous groups dened by handedness and switching status; this precludes
claims about causality. As discussed above, one worry is positive selection bias of
switched left-handers due to unobserved parental characteristics, and another is
reverse causality from endowed skills which increase the likelihood of a successful
switching. As motivated from my theoretical model of parental investment in
Section 1.4, a variation in the prevalence of the switching practice across cohorts
can aid in developing an identication strategy.
Since right-handers were never switched, their cohort trend can serve as a
counterfactual for left-handers. The identifying assumption in this approach is
that time trends for left- and right-handers would have developed in parallel in
the absence of switching. I am not aware of any institutional change in school-
ing practices which applied only to left-handers. However, if trends would have
changed for other reasons, I would falsely attribute this change to switching. For
example, stigmatization and prejudices against left-handers in society may decline
in general, leading left-handers to catch up over time. Decline of the pathological
left-hander due to improvements in perinatal medical care over time could also be
a confounding trend.
The prevalence of switching might thus only serve as an indicator for a positive
development of attitudes towards left-handedness and liberal schooling practices.
Violation of the exclusion restriction would lead to a downward bias of the IV
estimate.17 Since the OLS estimate is likely to be upward biased (due to positive
selection), the OLS and IV estimate could serve as upper and respectively lower
bounds on the true causal eect (Nevo and Rosen, 2012).
Under the assumption that switching is the only reason for diering cohort
17To see this, note that the reduced form coecient, the dierence in cohort trends between
left- and righthanders, will be positive if e.g. stigmatization in school decreases over time. The
rst stage coecient is negative as switching decreases over time. Thus, the IV estimate will be
downward biased.
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trends for left- and right-handers, I can employ a two-stage least-squares (2SLS)
estimation, with a dierence-in-dierences specication in the rst stage. I for-
malize this idea in the following two-equation model
Yit = α switchingi + γ1leftyi + θ1 φ(ti) + β1Xi + εit (1.9)
switchingit = δ φ(ti)× leftyi + γ0leftyi + θ0 φ(ti) + β0Xit + νit, (1.10)
where α is the treatment eect of interest, the Xi are control variables, and φ(ti)
is a function of the cohort trend, e.g., a linear or quadratic trend. The dummy
switchingi denotes switched individuals, leftyi denotes reported left-handedness,
and εit and νit are two correlated error terms. The set of control variables Xi is the
same as in the previous section. In what follows I use a quadratic cohort trend,
hence φ(ti) = ν1 ti + ν2 ti2.
Table 1.15 shows estimates of α and γ1 using OLS and 2SLS regressions for
labor market outcomes.18 I nd that the OLS and 2SLS coecients are very similar
for both outcome variables. While the standard errors are higher from the 2SLS
estimation, these results suggest only minor problems of selection bias for labor
market outcomes. The rst stage F -statistics are quite large, with a value of 120.
Tables 1.16 and 1.17 contain robustness checks for the 2SLS estimation similar
to those in section 1.5, for employment and wages respectively. Across all specica-
tions, I again nd that the eect of left-handedness is negative on both outcomes,
while the eect of switching is positive. For employment, the eect size of switch-
ing is similar to that of left-handedness, while it is slightly smaller for log-wages
as in table 1.15. However, despite large rst stage F-statistics, the coecient for
switching is imprecisely estimated and never signicant at conventional levels.
18Note that the dierence in the OLS coecients between Tables 1.3 and 1.15 comes from
the fact that all switched individuals are also left-handed. It follows that the coecient on
left-handedness in Table 1.15 corresponds to the non-switched left-hander coecient in Table
1.3.
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Table 1.15: OLS and 2SLS estimates for labor market outcomes
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Employed Log(Wage)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Unconditional mean 0.820 0.820 2.596 2.596
Left-handed -0.049∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.019) (0.029) (0.032) (0.048)
Switched 0.054∗∗ 0.055 0.063 0.072
(0.024) (0.052) (0.043) (0.084)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes
Age xed eects yes yes yes yes
N 53,213 53,213 43,514 43,514
N(cluster) 8,513 8,513 7,600 7,600
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.061 0.164 0.164
First stage F-stat 121.33 119.91
See table 1.3 for control variables and variable denition. The dummy vari-
able switched is instrumented by the interactions of an indicator for being
left-handed and a linear and quadratic cohort trend (two instruments). The
rst stage is visualized in the lower graph of Figure 1.2. Right-handers were
never switched. In eect, cohort trends of right-handers serve as counterfac-
tual. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01,
∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 1.16: Robustness checks for employment status in 2SLS estimation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Outcome: Employed
Sample Full Born ≥ 1950 Non-migrants West-Germans
Left-handed -0.050* -0.044 -0.054 -0.032
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029)
Switched 0.054 0.041 0.046 0.030
(0.053) (0.056) (0.059) (0.055)
Controls:
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes
Parental education no yes yes yes
Urbanization at 15 no yes yes yes
N 53,213 50,885 42,335 40,390
N(cluster) 8,513 7,838 6,648 6,574
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.073
First stage F-stat 121.04 109.92 97.97 111.09
Robustness checks for 2SLS regression on employment from Table 1.15. Demographic controls
are gender, migration background and an East German dummy. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1.
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Table 1.17: Robustness checks for log-hourly wages in 2SLS estimation
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Outcome: Log(Wage)
Sample Full Born ≥ 1950 Non-migrants West-Germans
Left-handed -0.085* -0.105** -0.122** -0.103**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.050)
Switched 0.050 0.082 0.089 0.088
(0.086) (0.089) (0.093) (0.091)
Controls:
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes
Parental education no yes yes yes
Urbanization at 15 no yes yes yes
N 43,514 41,894 35,291 32,971
N(cluster) 7,600 7,104 6,003 5,857
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.161 0.173 0.154
First stage F-stat 119.49 109.95 94.58 105.23
Robustness checks for 2SLS regression on log-wages from Table 1.15. Demographic controls
are gender, migration background and an East German dummy. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.1.
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1.7 Conclusion
Recent research documents that left-handers have lower cognitive skills than right-
handers, are more likely to have behavioral and learning problems as children,
and perform worse on the labor market. These dierences are likely to be of a
pathological origin (Goodman, 2014). Does an early childhood intervention such
as switching compensate or engrave such decits?
I nd evidence for the former hypothesis. In contrast to non-switched left-
handers, those left-handers that write with their right hand today do not show
lower measures of human capital than right-handers. Labor market outcomes show
a similar pattern: non-switched left-handers earn about 10% to 11% lower wages
than right-handers and are less likely to be employed. There exist no statistically
signicant dierences between those forced to switch and right-handers.
One explanation for this observation could be that switching the writing hand
is a signal of conformism and ability, one that can be observed by teachers who
would prohibit students' progression to higher tracking schools in the absence of
this signal. Another explanation could be that these children receive additional
attention and care by their teachers and parents. A successful switching of the
writing hand may also induce a feeling of success and motivate children to improve
their skills further in the future.
My ndings are robust to applying dierent sets of control variables, exclud-
ing specic sub-samples and to the denition of left-handedness and switching.
Furthermore, I use the cohort trends of right-handers as a counter-factual for the
cohort trends of left-handers in a dierence-in-dierence approach. The interac-
tion of left-handedness and cohort trends delivers a strong rst stage as switching
declines rapidly across time and was never performed on right-handers. My iden-
tication strategy requires that the cohort trends of labor market variables would
have evolved in parallel between left- and right-handers. I argue that if they did
not, IV estimates will deliver a lower bound on the true eect, while OLS estimates
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deliver an upper bound due to positive selection into switching. However, I nd
that the IV estimates are close to those using OLS, suggesting that selection bias
is of minor concern.
I also document dierences in the Big Five personality traits and external
locus of control by handedness and switching status. However, these are not
primarily responsible for the observed wage gaps. No signicant dierences were
found for two measures of cognitive skills, which somewhat stands in contrast to
the existing literature that reported left-right-hander dierences among children
(Johnston et al., 2009, 2013; Goodman, 2014). Including the intermediate variables
step-by-step into the log-wage regression reveals that labor market gaps are driven
by human capital accumulation.
My ndings point to the importance and long run persistence of early infant
endowments and the compensatory function of early childhood interventions in a
vulnerable population.
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1.A Personality and the Locus of Control
Table 1A.1 shows the wording of the items that were used to construct the Big Five
personality traits and the external locus of control. Respondents could answer on
a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies completely).
The corresponding answers were averaged and standardized in the analysis sample.
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Table 1A.1: SOEP items used to construct Big Five personality traits and Locus
of Control
Item label Trait
Big Five: I see myself as someone who...
is original, comes up with new ideas Openness
values artistic experiences Openness
has an active imagination Opennes
does a thorough job Conscientiousness
does things eectively and eciently Conscientiousness
is rather lazy (reversed) [not used] Conscientiousness
is communicative, talkative Extraversion
is outgoing, sociable Extraversion
is reserved (reversed) [not used] Extraversion
is sometimes somewhat rude to others (reversed) Agreeableness
has a forgiving nature Agreeableness
is considerate and kind to others Agreeableness
worries a lot Neuroticism
gets nervous easily Neuroticism
is relaxed, handles stress well (reversed) Neuroticism
Locus of control
Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve. External LOC
What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck. External LOC
I frequently have the experience that other people External LOC
have a controlling inuence over my life.
The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions. External LOC
Inborn abilities are more important than any eorts one can make. External LOC
I have little control over the things that happen in my life. [not used] External LOC
Note: Table follows Heineck and Anger (2010)
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1.B Reporting left-handedness
Although left-handedness is nearly random in the population (Johnston et al.,
2009), self-reporting it is not. As mentioned in Section 1.3, the previous liter-
ature has used more and more sensitive measures to construct the variables for
handedness than I are able to use. This section thus sets out to investigate which
characteristics predict reported left-handedness and are thus important to avoid
bias from measurement error. One additional predictor that I use is country of
birth19.
Cohort xed eects are included in all regressions. Column one of Table 1B.1
demonstrates that females, East Germans, and migrants are signicantly less likely
to report left-handedness. Interestingly, 2nd generation migrants are not signi-
cantly less likely to report left-handedness, although about 50% report having at
least one parent born in an Eastern European or Middle Eastern country.
The fact that females are less likely to report left-handedness than males is
well-known in the laterality literature (Harris, 1990). The explanations for this
phenomenon range from a higher natural predisposition for males, females' in-
creased ability to switch handedness, and stronger social pressure on females to
align with norms (Porac et al., 1986; Papadatou-Pastou et al., 2008). Investigating
this nding further, Figure 1B.1 repeats Figure 1.2, but splits the sample up by
gender. The upper graph in Figure 1B.1 exhibits the level dierence between males
and females, and it appears that the share of left-handed females actually decreases
after the 1960 cohort. However, there exists no signicant upward trend among
19Germany, Middle East (incl. central Asia), Eastern Europe (incl. Russia), Northern Europe,
Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain), and other (incl. Africa and Asia). The Middle
East includes Turkey, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Lebanon,
Kirghiztan, Egypt, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Palestine, and Turkmenistan.
Eastern Europe includes former Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech, Russia,
Albania, Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Belarus, Kosovo, Georgia, Serbia, and other Eastern Europe countries. Northern Europe includes
Austria, France, Denmark, the UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Ireland, Luxemburg,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. Other includes all other countries, mainly the USA and Asian
and African countries.
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males. Linear or quadratic cohort trends in a logit regression for left-handedness
among individuals born after 1930 are not signicant at any conventional level.
The interaction with gender however is negative and signicant (p-value 0.054).
Figure 1B.1: Left-handedness and writing by gender and year of birth
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Females: Born as Left-hander Females: Writes with left hand
Left-handedness and left hand writing by gender
Note: Includes 95% condence intervals for left-handedness.
Although migration decisions are highly endogenous, and might be directly
related to left-handedness, I also investigate the heterogeneity of left-hander rates
by country of birth (this only applies to 1st generation migrants) in column two.
The lower rates among individuals from Middle Eastern and Southern European
countries can be explained by religious norms. In Islam, the left hand is the
unclean hand, not to be used in human interaction or eating. The Southern Eu-
ropean countries are predominantly Catholic (Spain, Italy, Portugal) or Orthodox
and considered to be more religious than Northern European countries (Hank and
Schaan, 2008). At the same time, the left hand or left side has negative associ-
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ations in Christianity. Obviously, these cross-country dierences are subject to a
highly endogenous migration decision, in which left-handedness may play a role.
However, the observed cross-country pattern here has been reported in previous
studies (Perelle and Ehrman, 1994; Medland et al., 2004). I nd no signicant
dierences in left-hander rates between Germans and migrants from its North-
ern European neighbors, the majority of which come from Austria, France, the
United Kingdom, or the Netherlands. Whether there exist dierences in religious
aliation is investigated in column three, which excludes migrants.
No signicant dierence in reported left-handedness exist between Catholics,
Protestants, or non-denominational, among German natives (column three). In
columns one to three of Table 1B.1, parental education is never a signicant pre-
dictor of left-handedness and neither is urbanization at age 15. Excluding East
Germans in column four does not change any of the previous ndings.
If stigmatization against left-handers has been changing over time, it could be
the case that certain characteristics predict reported left-handedness in dierent
cohorts. For example, more progressive parents may be more tolerant towards
a left-handed child, even when there is discrimination in society as a whole. To
investigate this, I split up the sample into four cohort groups of roughly equal
size. The rst cohort group covers individuals born between 1920 and 1949. These
cohorts are most likely to be subject to survival bias, as they lived through World
War Two (see Kesternich et al., 2014). Underreporting of left-handedness, as
suggested in Figure 1.2, is also most likely to occur in this group. The next three
groups comprise respondents born between 1950 and 1960, 1961 and 1970, and
1971 and 1997. However, the overall share of left-handers in all four groups does
not dier signicantly. Among the left-handed, the share of switched individuals
decreases from roughly 91% in the rst group, to 83% in the second, 51% in the
third, and only 16% in the fourth. Although the enforcement of the right hand
writing norm diminishes, the association between parental education and reported
left-handedness remains very low, even in the rst cohort group. Dummies for
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parental education are never jointly signicant in any sample. The same holds
for degree of urbanization. Inclusion of either only maternal or only parental
education, and exclusion of urbanization dummies, does not change these ndings.
This is important, as it suggests there were no signicant compositional changes
of left-handers with respect to these covariates over time.
The level dierence between East and West in the full sample is driven by
cohorts born after 1960. The Berlin Wall was built in 1961 and brought a new
wave of oppression. As dissidents could no longer simply leave the country, the
regime aimed to stigmatize non-conformists to the socialist ideology, starting early
in school. Thus, the liberal movement of the 1960s was much less developed in
East Germany than in West Germany (Ohse, 2010).
To summarize, I nd that left-handedness is only poorly predicted by my co-
variates, as indicated by the adjusted R2s of less than 1%. A low correlation of
handedness with family background characteristics has been observed by John-
ston et al. (2009) in a sample of Australian children and with a broader range of
variables. They nd no dierences between left- and right-handers with respect
to either maternal or paternal income, labor force participation, or education.
Left-handedness is so nearly random that some studies have employed it as an in-
strumental variable for the cognitive skills of children (Frijters et al., 2009, 2013).
Furthermore, Goodman (2014) found that perinatal health and maternal hand-
edness are important predictors of left-handedness, while maternal education is
not. While I can conrm the latter, my data contain no measure for infant health,
such as birth weight. However, I have information on parental handedness for some
individuals, because their parents reside in the same household and participated
in the grip strength measurement. This sample comprises 1,646 relatively young
individuals, who were on average 26 years old at the time of the survey. I nd
that having a left-handed mother nearly doubles the chance of being left-handed
(15.32% vs. 8.48%, p-value 0.007), while the father's handedness is statistically
unrelated to own-handedness (9.08% vs. 8.75%, p-value 0.888). These results are
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robust to controlling for the parent's year of birth and education. Either a left-
handed gene is inherited only via the mother, or, more plausibly, children are more
keen to use the left hand if they observe their mother doing so, as suggested by
Goodman (2014).
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Table 1B.1: Regressions on left-handedness
Linear regression for left-handedness
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Sample restrictions: Non-mig- Exclude By cohort
rants only East Germans 1920-1949 1950-1960 1961-1970 1971-1997
Share of left-handers: 8.95% 8.95% 9.49% 9.21% 8.47% 9.12% 9.45% 8.72%
Female -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.016 -0.016 -0.035∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
East German -0.016∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.010 0.004 -0.006 -0.025* -0.042∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Mothers education
Basic/none (ref.)
Middle/other -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.037 -0.040∗∗ 0.014 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013)
High 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.012 -0.001 -0.028 0.001 0.022
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.034) (0.026) (0.024) (0.018)
Fathers education
Basic/none (ref.)
Middle/other -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.026 -0.021 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.013)
High -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 0.014 -0.015 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
Urbanization at age 15
Large city (ref.)
Mid-size city 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 -0.006 0.019 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Small town -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.019 -0.014 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Countryside -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 -0.022 -0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Migration background
none (ref.)
direct -0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.030∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
indirect -0.008 -0.015 0.019 -0.021 -0.013 -0.019
(0.010) (0.011) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
Country of origin
Germany (ref.)
Middle East -0.043∗∗∗
(0.013)
Eastern Europe -0.036∗∗∗
(0.011)
Northern Europe 0.020
(0.034)
Southern Europe -0.067∗∗∗
(0.017)
Other -0.024
(0.029)
Religious aliation
Catholic (ref.)
Protestant 0.006
(0.009)
Denomination free -0.003
(0.010)
Other 0.019
(0.035)
Cohort xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 11,153 11,133 7,341 8,748 2,588 2,624 2,807 3,134
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.006
Left-handed is a dummy equal to one if the individual self-reports at least once in any survey wave that he is born as a left-hander.
Full sample restricted to cohorts between 1920 and 1997. Middle eastern countries include Central Asian countries. Eastern Europe
includes Russia. All regressions include cohort xed eects. Robust standard errors in in parenthesis below. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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Chapter 2
Increasing the Credibility of the
Twin Instrument
*
Abstract: Twin births are an important instrument for the en-
dogenous fertility decision. However, twin births are not ex-
ogenous either as dizygotic twinning is correlated with maternal
characteristics. Following the medical literature, we assume that
monozygotic twins are exogenous, and construct a new instrument,
which corrects for the selection although monozygotic twinning is
usually unobserved in survey and administrative datasets. Using
administrative data from Sweden, we show that the usual twin in-
strument is related to observed and unobserved determinants of
economic outcomes, while our new instrument is not. In our appli-
cations we nd that the classical twin instrument underestimates
the negative eect of fertility on labor income. This nding is in
line with the observation that high earners are more likely to delay
childbearing and hence have a higher risk to get dizygotic twins.
*This chapter is based on joint work with Helmut Farbmacher and Johan Vikstroem.
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2.1 Introduction
As fertility decisions are endogenous, most papers on how family size aects ma-
ternal and child outcomes use instrumental variable (IV) techniques. One com-
monly employed instrument are twin births. Early studies that use the twin in-
strument to study maternal outcomes include Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a);
Bronars and Grogger (1994); Angrist and Evans (1998); Jacobsen et al. (1999).
The twin instrument has also been used to study the prediction of the Becker
and Lewis (1973) quantityquality model, that family size has a negative eect on
children's economic outcomes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b; Black et al., 2005;
Cáceres-Delpiano, 2006; Angrist et al., 2010). Recent applications using the twin
instrument include, for instance, Mogstad and Wiswall (2016); Braakmann and
Wildman (2016); Lundborg et al. (2017).
However, it has been questioned if having twinsparticularly dizygotic twins
really is a random event. In particular, it has been shown that dizygotic twinning
depends on, for example, maternal age, height, weight, race, and the use of fertility
treatments (Reddy et al., 2005; Fauser et al., 2005).1 On the other hand, monozy-
gotic (identical) twin births are considered a random event (Tong and Short, 1998;
MacGillivray et al., 1988), since they are the result of the random and spontaneous
division of a single fertilized egg (e.g., Hall, 2003).2
Some studies (Black et al., 2007; Figlio et al., 2014) have already employed the
superiority of monozygotic twinning in robustness checks by comparing estimates
using all twins as instrument with estimates using only same-sex twins. If the
estimates of both instruments are similar in size, this indicates that selection on
unobservables is not a problem. However, if the estimates dier, this would cast
doubt on the identication strategy. As a response, we construct a new instrument
1Some of these variables, such as maternal age and race, are typically observed, while, for
instance, fertility treatments, weight and height typically are unobserved in census data.
2In a review of the medical literature Bortolus et al. (1999) conclude that it is very rare to nd
signicant correlations between socio-economic characteristics of the parents and monozygotic
twin births.
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based on monozygotic twins which corrects for the selection bias even though
monozygotic twinning is usually unobserved.
Initially, we use longitudinal data from Sweden to show that twin births are
correlated with observed and unobserved maternal characteristics and that this
correlation is stronger in more recent cohorts. To analyze the selection on unob-
servables, we use information about pre-pregnancy labor force participation, labor
income, and hospitalizations, and conclude that these pre-pregnancy outcomes
predict future twin births. This selection is likely to be even more pronounced in
data from the US, where twin rates are almost twice as high as those in Sweden.
We emphasize, however, that these concerns only apply to dizygotic twin births
and not to monozygotic twin births.
We propose a new instrument based on monozygotic twin births which cor-
rects for the non-randomness of twin births. The starting point is the fact that
monozygotic twin births are considered to be random events (Tong and Short,
1998; MacGillivray et al., 1988). Our key assumption therefore is that monozy-
gotic twinning is exogenous, but since zygosity rarely is known our approach does
not rely on observing zygosity. We show that it is possible to use the observed
opposite-sex dizygotic twin mothers to correct the same-sex twin instrument by
the remaining selection bias (induced from the same-sex dizygotic twins). This is
possible because of the peculiar structure of the data, for instance, since we know
that all monozygotic twins are of the same-sex and that dizygotic twin births with
same-sex twins are equally likely as dizygotic twins with opposite-sex. Our new
approach can easily be implemented using standard regression techniques.
We also discuss ways to relax our main assumption using instead that monozy-
gotic twinning is less endogenous than dizygotic twinning. Here, we add to the
growing literature on imperfect instruments by considering misclassied discrete
instrumental variables. Ashley (2009) provides the asymptotic distribution of the
IV estimator and discusses strategies to assess the robustness of IV inference with
imperfect instruments. Nevo and Rosen (2012) examine identication under dif-
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ferent assumptions, for instance, that the correlation between the instrument and
the error term is less than the correlation between the endogenous variable and the
error term. Conley et al. (2012) consider identication and inference for dierent
strategies that use prior information about how close the exclusion restriction is to
being satised, including also a Bayesian approach. Kraay (2012) and Chan and
Tobias (2015) also use a Bayesian approach to capture prior uncertainty about the
exclusion restriction.
Our contribution is important for several reasons. Firstly, twin births provide
an unexpected fertility shock and twinning usually results in a strong rst-stage
regression. Secondly, as already mentioned, the twin instrument has been used in
several settings, including studies on fertility and maternal outcomes and studies
of the child quality-quantity hypothesis.
Thirdly, since the mid-1970's we have seen a rise in the twinning rate, caused by
delayed childbearing and an increasing need for fertility treatments (Martin et al.,
2012; Fauser et al., 2005). Since the decision to undergo fertility treatment is an
endogenous choice, which is clearly aected by the wish or need to postpone moth-
erhood, it is even more likely that the twin births induced by in-vitro fertilization
(IVF) are correlated with important socioeconomic characteristics. For instance,
Braakmann and Wildman (2016) show that instrumental variables estimates with
and without information on fertility treatments might dier substantially in ap-
plications to female labor supply and the child quantityquality relation.3 This
suggests that mothers with twins have become an increasingly selective sample,
which poses a threat to the identication of causal eects using the classical twin
instrument.
Fourthly, there are only a few other potential variables which can serve as
an instrument for endogenous fertility decisions. A commonly used instrument
3Moreover, several studies that analyze the quantityquality trade o explicitly argue that
the twin approach is valid because they study cohorts born before the introduction of modern
fertility treatments (e.g., Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010; Åslund and Grönqvist, 2010;
Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen, 2012).
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is parental preference for a mixed sex composition of children. Other previously
used instruments for fertility are natural infertility (Agüero and Marks, 2008),
successful IVF treatment (Lundborg et al., 2017), and, in cultures with strong son
preferences, the sex of the rst child (Lee, 2008).
Besides the non-randomness of twin births another concern with the twin in-
strument, raised by Rozenzweig and Zhang (2009), is that twins have inferior
endowments at birth, such as lower APGAR scores and lower birth weight, than
singletons. If these dierences induce parents to reallocate resources across their
children this will violate the exclusion restriction in studies that uses the twin
instrument to study quantity-quality eects on non-twin siblings. Rozenzweig and
Zhang (2009) nd that such dierential birth endowment eects are important,
while Angrist et al. (2010) nd no evidence that would invalidate the exclusion
restriction. Another concern with the twin instrument is the close spacing of twins
makes their child-rearing more equal, leading to economics of scale in the child
quality production. On the other hand, mothers with twins will only have one
child-related leave and not two.4 Note that the assumption that monozygotic
twins are at least less endogenous than dizygotic twins is still valid if the birth
endowment eect and the economics of scale eect are the same for monozygotic
and dizygotic twins. Another important feature of the twin birth instrument is
that the composition of compliers can change with time since birth. Mothers who
did not get twins can catch up to twin-birth mothers in terms of fertility. This is
thoroughly discussed in Braakmann and Wildman (2016). We acknowledge that
our new instrument is not able to address this problem.
We use both Swedish and US data to illustrate our new approach. We revisit
the study by Angrist and Evans (1998) and use their data on mothers from the
1980 US census. One result is that both the classical twin instrument and the
same-sex twin instrument underestimate the true negative eect of fertility on
4In many countries, twin parents have some extra months of leave. In Sweden, twin parents
have currently three additional months of leave with income related benets.
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labor earnings. This conrms that dizygotic twin mothers are a positively selected
sample, partly because high earners are more likely to delay childbearing and hence
have a higher risk to get twins. We obtain similar results using Swedish register
data both for mothers who got their rst child before the strong rise in fertility
treatments and for mothers who got their rst child during later periods with
substantially higher twin rates.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the Swedish administrative data
set and shows the relation of twin's zygosity with observed and, using a panel ap-
proach, unobserved maternal characteristics. Section 3 outlines our identication
strategy and how it is applied in practice. The two empirical applications are given
in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Zygosity and selection on (un)observables
2.2.1 Data
We use Swedish register data to assess the importance of selection on observable
and unobservable variables. The multi-generational register links individuals to
their biological parents and contains information on the year and month of birth,
which we use to construct information on twin births. The population register con-
tains yearly information on labor income, labor force participation and education.
The National Patient Register provides information on all episodes of in-patient
care in Sweden. Our sample comprises all mothers who got their rst child in
the years 1987 to 2006, which gives us roughly 45,000 women per year. Table 2.1
gives some descriptive statistics of our data set over time. To observe a sucient
number of twins, we split the observational period into ve cohorts each containing
four years. For instance, maternal age at rst birth was around 26.3 in the earliest
period and 29.2 in the latest, reecting the well-documented delay in childbearing.
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Chapter 2. Increasing the Credibility of the Twin Instrument
2.2.2 Twin births in Sweden and the US
To investigate the changes of twinning in Sweden over time, Figure 2.1 shows the
twin rates across the rst child's year of birth (separately for younger and older
women).5 The overall twinning rate remains fairly constant between 1950 and
1980 but increases thereafter. While the steady but mild rise in the twin rate of
younger mothers from 1980 onwards can be attributed to delayed child bearing,
the steep increase in the twin rate of older mothers since 1990 mainly follows the
availability of IVF. The drop after 2003 is caused by a recommendation of the
Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare regarding the method of elective
single embryo transfers (SET), which proceeds by implanting one fertilized egg at
a time, instead of several eggs at once, as was done before (Bergh, 2005).
As can be seen in Figure 2.1 (older mothers), the earliest time period (i.e., 1987
1990) we are investigating was just at the beginning of a strong rise in overall twin
births (thick solid line). IVF was rather unusual at this time. The later time
periods (e.g., 19992002), however, are associated with substantially higher twin
rates, which are mainly caused by increased fertility treatments. In particular,
from 1990 to 2000, the rate of dizygotic twins almost tripled in this age group
while the monozygotic rate remained fairly constant in the same period.
The overall twinning rate in the US shows similar patterns to the rate in Swe-
den, although at a much higher level (see Figure 1A of Kulkarni et al., 2013). The
US twin rate (from all parities) was already at 2% in 1980 and increased to more
than 3% in 2006. In contrast to Sweden, the US twin rate does not experience
the SET related drop and remains high, also by international comparison (Pison
and D'Addato, 2006). Thurin et al. (2004) nd that twin or higher order preg-
nancies make up 20% to 25% of all pregnancies induced by IVF in Sweden and
Kulkarni et al. (2013) estimate that, in the US, more than one-third of all twins
were conceived from fertility assisted pregnancies. Hence, non-random selection
5To compute the mono- and dizygotic twinning rates, we apply Weinberg (1901)'s rule, which
we discuss in more detail in Section 3.
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Figure 2.1: Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) between 1940 and 2007.
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Note: Statistics based on the Swedish register data described in Section 2.1. To compute the
mono- and dizygotic twinning rates, we apply Weinberg (1901)'s rule as described Section 3.
into twinning is likely to be of even more relevance in data from the US.
2.2.3 Selection on observable and unobservable characteris-
tics
Particularly older women need fertility treatments. As postponing childbearing is
often related to an individual's labor market decisions, the selection into dizygotic
twinning has increased in recent years. Twin mothers are becoming a more and
more selected subgroup, which may not be comparable to mothers without twins.
For instance, delayed childbearing may help to accumulate more work experience
or it may reect already existing dierences in career preferences.
While we can easily determine whether there is any selection on observable
characteristics, testing for selection on unobservables is by denition impossible.
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However, as many economic determinants are inherently persistent, we can assess
the importance of the selection on unobservables by using pre-pregnancy outcomes.
That is, we can test whether, conditionally on observable characteristics, twin
mothers and non-twin mothers were already dierent before their rst pregnancy.
Our pre-pregnancy outcomes are labor force participation, yearly labor income,
and hospitalizations two years before the rst birth.6 At this point in time, the
future mothers have no children. They might not even know that they will have
kids in two years, and they surely do not know that they will have twins. Therefore,
the pre-pregnancy outcomes should be causally unaected by the twin births and
the only reason for a pre-pregnancy dierence between the twin and non-twin
groups is selection on unobserved characteristics.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show how our observed socio-economic characteristics and
the pre-pregnancy outcomes correlate with twin births.7 Initially, we regress the
twin indicators on mother's age at rst birth and level of education, and report the
overall F -statistic of joint signicance (Figure 2.2). The point estimates from these
regressions are reported in Table 2C.2, showing, for instance, that the probability
of a twin birth is increasing in maternal age.
From the solid line in Figure 2.2 we see that the usual twin indicator correlates
with these observables in all time periods. The F -statistic increases strongly from
16.29 in 19871990 to over 50 in the later years and does not drop until the year
2003 (for the years 2003-2006 the F -statistic is 34.76). This drop coincides with the
rethinking of the SET technique in 2003 to avoid implanting several fertilized eggs
at once. The increasing F -statistic reects the strong rise in twin rates and the
increased selection because of fertility treatments and delayed childbearing among
mothers with high career preferences. Interestingly, when we use the improved
6Labor force participation or employment status is measured in November each year. Labor
income includes all cash compensation paid by employers and is based on tax records. For
hospitalizations we use an indicator for at least one episode of in-patient care.
7Throughout the paper we control for mother's age at rst birth using a quadratic polynomial
and dummies for mother's education. All results are essentially the same when we use a more
exible regression with age dummies. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2.2: Assessing the importance of selection on observables.
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Note: F -test for joint signicance of the regressors from a regression on twin indicators as out-
comes and maternal age, age squared and maternal level of education (7 categories) as regressors.
The point estimates from the regression are reported in Table C.2. Swedish sample of mothers
described in Section 2.1. All models also include year xed eects.
same-sex twin indicator (dashed line), the value of the overall F -test statistic de-
creases by roughly half in all periods. This indicator variable excludes all opposite-
sex twins which cannot be monozygotic.8,9 Thus, when we exclude twins who have
to be dizygotic and thereby implicitly increase the fraction of monozygotic twins,
we see a lower dependence of the instrument on socio-economic characteristics.10
8Opposite-sex twins are not dropped from our analysis. One could in principle also think
about dropping the opposite-sex twins but the results should be almost similar due to the low
frequency of twinning compared to singleton births.
9The F -statistic would decline anyway when the fraction of twins declines, even if we were to
randomly exclude some of the twins. To further investigate this relation, we randomly exclude
the fraction of opposite-sex twins in a simulation. Using 500 replications, we see, for instance,
an average drop of the F -test statistic to 11.71 in the years 1987-1990. This is still distinctly
larger than the F -test statistics of 7.43 which we obtain from the regressions on the same-sex
twins. This pattern is the same for the other cohorts.
10The underlying regressions to Figure 2.2 are reported in Appendix Table 2C.2.
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Figure 2.3: Assessing the importance of selection on unobservables.
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Note: Dierences in pre-pregnancy outcomes (two years before rst birth). Note: Estimates
and 95%-condence intervals. Labor income is in SEK. Hospitalization is an indicator for at
least one in-patient care episode. All models also include year xed eects, maternal level of
education (7 categories), and a quadratic term in maternal age at birth.
We obtain similar patterns for the pre-pregnancy outcomes. Figure 2.3 shows
thatconditionally on the set of covariatesthere are still signicant dierences
between women with and without future twins. In the more recent years, women
had signicantly higher incomes two years before the birth of their twins. The
probability of being hospitalized was increased in all cohorts.11 The signicant
twin coecients suggest that there are other (potentially persistent) unobservable
variables which may confound estimates based on the conventional denition of
11We have information on hospitalization for the period 1987-2005. Therefore, we can include
only mothers that gave birth in 1989 or 1990 in the earliest time period sample.
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the twin instrument. Similar to the results for selection on observables, these dif-
ferences become less signicant when we use the improved same-sex twin indicator.
We will now turn to our methodological contribution and there we will also discuss
the remaining results in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
2.3 Learning from monozygotic twins
In this section, we discuss how the available information about twin births and
sibling sex composition can be combined to estimate causal eects even when
dizygotic twinning is endogenous and when zygosity is unknown. Consider the
model
yi = βxi + ui, (2.1)
where yi is a scalar denoting the dependent variable, and xi is the number of
children or siblings.12 The number of children is often used as a unidimensional
measure of fertility in labor or health economics (e.g., Angrist and Evans, 1998;
Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen, 2012), while the number of siblings is used in the
literature analysing the child quantityquality trade-o (Black et al., 2005, 2010).
In the former case β is the causal eect of fertility on labor or health outcomes,
and in the the latter case β is the causal eect of siblings on, for instance, school
performance. The variation in the number of children or siblings is generally
considered as endogenousmainly because having children is a choice and clearly
depends on the preferences and socio-economic characteristics of the parents.
Let z∗ be an indicator pointing to all mothers with monozygotic twins at their
rst birth.13 Monozygotic twinning is most often unobservableeven for the par-
12For notational ease, we keep additional explanatory variables implicit. Thus we think about
yi and xi as variables where the eects of additional explanatory variables have been partialled
out, i.e., yi and xi are the residuals of a regression of ỹi and x̃i from a wider model on the
additional explanatory variables. In the following, we will suppress the subscript i.
13We abstract from higher orders of multiple births such as triplets, since those are very
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ents. In one-third of identical twins, each fetus has its own placenta, which is also
the case for all dizygotic twins (Bomsel-Helmreich and Al Mufti, 2005). Without
further tests, these identical twins cannot be distinguished from fraternal twins
unless they have opposite sexes. Typically, neither administrative data sets (like
census data) nor surveys contain information on monozygosity. Therefore, we
assume having data only on the classical twin indicator, which we denote by z̈, in-
dicating both monozygotic and dizygotic twin births, and an indicator for the sex
composition of the rst two children (SX). Following Angrist and Evans (1998),
the latter variable is dened as SX = s1s2 + (1− s1)(1− s2), where s1 and s2 refer
to male rst-born and second-born children. Note that SX points to all siblings
with the same sex, not only to like-sex twins. Since opposite sex twins can never be
monozygotic, we can also dene a more precise measure for monozygosity, namely
the same-sex twin indicator, ż. Dene
ż = z∗ + ė,
z̈ = z∗ + e = z∗ + ė+ ë = ż + ë,
where e indicates dizygotic twinning, and we allow e to be correlated with the
structural error term in Equation 2.1 (i.e., cov(u, e) 6= 0). This reects the clear
evidence that dizygotic twinning varies with socio-economic characteristics. Some
of these characteristics, such as maternal height and weight, are typically not ob-
served but may have an eect on health or labor outcomes, rendering the classical
twin instrument invalid. ė = SX × e indicates dizygotic twins with the same sex,
and ë = (1 − SX) × e indicates dizygotic twins with a mixed sex composition.
Note that ë is observable as z̈ − ż = ë, while ė is unobservable for the econo-
metrician, since without further information, same-sex dizygotic twins cannot be
distinguished from monozygotic twins.
rare events. In addition these births are the ones that have increased the most due to the IVF
availability.
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2.3.1 Assumptions
Following the medical literature and the empirical evidence from the previous sec-
tion, we assume that monozygotic twinning is exogenous or at least less correlated
with the structural error term than dizygotic twinning, i.e., the following assump-
tion holds:
Assumption. 1. line break
monozygotic twinning is less endogenous than dizygotic twinning:
E(u|z∗ = 1) = θ∗E(u|e = 1) 6= E(u), with −1 < θ∗ < 1
twinning is relevant:
σxz∗ 6= 0; σxe 6= 0
where z∗ is exogenous when the endogeneity parameter θ∗ = 0. We also make
use of the standard relevance condition of the 2SLS estimator. Since there is an
obvious link between having twins and the number of children, relevance is more
a technicality ruling out datasets without twin births.
To proceed, we impose two additional assumptions: one medical and one eco-
nomic. The rst assumption is known in epidemiology and medicine as Weinberg
(1901)'s dierential rule.
Assumption. 2. line break
Weinberg (1901)'s rule:
Pr(ė = 1) = Pr(ë = 1)
The rule says that dizygotic twins are equally likely to be of same sex as of
opposite sex. The basic assumptions behind this rule are that the probability of
a male dizygotic twin (π) is 0.5 (A.2a) and that the sexes in a dizygotic twin set
are independent (A.2b). Although the sex ratio at birth is slightly male biased,
this rule is generally considered as rather robust (Hardin et al., 2009; Fellman and
Eriksson, 2006; Vlietinck et al., 1988; Bulmer, 1976). Nevertheless, in Appendix A
we investigate Assumption A.2 using results from the East Flanders Prospective
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Twin Survey (EFPTS), and Section 2.3.3 discusses sensitivity analyses with respect
to the assumption.
The economic assumption depends on the application one has in mind. It
replaces the usual exogeneity assumption of the twin birth indicator, E(u|z̈ =
1) = E(u|z̈ = 0), which is invalid in our setting, by the exogeneity of the sibling
sex composition:
Assumption. 3. line break
Sex composition of the children is exogenous:
E(u|SX = 1, e = 1) = E(u|SX = 0, e = 1) = E(u|e = 1)
Assumption A.3 states that the same-sex instrument is exogenous within the
group of mothers with dizygotic twins. This is similar to the standard same-
sex assumption made by Angrist and Evans (1998), but we argue that our new
instrument has several advantages compared to the standard same-sex instrument.
First, the same-sex instrument has been criticized because it uses a planned (as
opposed to an unplanned) change in fertility to identify the causal eect (Butcher
and Case, 1994; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). Second, the twin instrument
could be used to study the eects of having two children instead of only one child,
whereas the standard same-sex instrument is only applicable for families with at
least two children. For instance, Lundborg et al. (2017) show that the fertility
eects dier depending on the margin that is studied. Third, twinning usually
results in a strong rst-stage regression.
Finally, the external validity of the standard same-sex instrument is debat-
able, since it identies the local treatment eect (LATE) for parents that actually
have preferences for a mixed sex ospring, and Agüero and Marks (2008) note
that these women may dier systematically from the population at large. More
recently, Bisbee et al. (2017) use data from 139 country-year censuses to study
the external validity of the same-sex instrument, by comparing the actual LATE
for one country-year to the extrapolated LATE eect using LATE estimates from
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other country-years.14 One conclusion is that the extrapolation works well if it is
between similar settings and given that sucient data is used in the extrapolation.
Here, we instead provide additional evidence in favor of the external validity of
monozygotic twinning. To this end, Figure 2.4 depicts the twin rates by moth-
ers' age at rst birth. According to this gure, monozygotic twinning does not
only aect the entire relevant population, but it also seems to be equally likely for
women of all age groups.
Figure 2.4: Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) by maternal age.
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Note: Statistics based on the Swedish register data described in Section 2.1. To compute the
mono- and dizygotic twinning rates, we apply Weinberg (1901)'s rule as described Section 3.
One potential threat to Assumption A.3 is that having mixed sex siblings might
violate the exclusion restriction. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) argue that same
sex siblings could aect the marginal utility of leisure and child rearing costs and,
thus, has a direct eect on labor market outcomes. As support of this Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (2000) study expenditures per children in rural India, and conclude
that the expenditures are lower for same-sex siblings. But, Bütikofer (2010) nds
14Specically, they rst characterize the complier populations, and then use these characteri-
zations to extrapolate the LATE estimates from some country-year(s) to another country-year.
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no dierences in household expenditures for families with dierent sibling sex com-
position using data from richer countries (UK and Switzerland). Moreover, the
Swedish Household Budget Survey shows that important child rearing costs like
clothes and shoes only accounts for about 5.06.3 percent of the total household
consumption, mainly depending on the number of children (Statistics Sweden,
2010). All this supports Assumption A.3. In Section 2.3.3, we also propose a sen-
sitivity analyses approach to examine the robustness of the estimates with respect
to violations of Assumption A.3. This could, for instance, be important if our new
approach is applied to data from developing countries.
2.3.2 Identication
In the following, we discuss what can be learned about β using the available
information about twinning and the siblings' sex composition. Dene βIVz as the
probability limit of the IV estimator for β with z as the instrumental variable. The
corresponding estimator is dened as β̂IVz . We will use the following notation: σab
denotes the covariance between any two random variables a and b, and πa denotes
the probability that a binary random variable a is equal to 1. We will also make
use of the following relation: If d and w are random variables where d is binary
and E(w) = 0, then σwd = πdE(w|d = 1).
Using z∗ as instrument, we asymptotically get
βIVz∗ ≡
σyz∗
σxz∗
A.1
= β +
πz∗θ
∗E(u|e = 1)
σxz∗
Although β̂IVz∗ would be consistent if Assumption A.1 holds and θ
∗ = 0, it is
infeasible since monozygotic twinning is generally unobserved. Estimation based
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on the observed but misclassied instruments will always be inconsistent, as
βIVż ≡
σyż
σxż
A.1
= β +
πz∗θ
∗E(u|e = 1)
σxż
+
σuė
σxż
,
βIVz̈ ≡
σyz̈
σxz̈
A.1
= β +
πz∗θ
∗E(u|e = 1)
σxz̈
+
σuė
σxz̈
+
σuë
σxz̈
,
and because σuė 6= 0 and σuë 6= 0 due to the non-random selection process behind
dizygotic twinning. However, using Weinberg's law (Assumption A.2) and the
same-sex exogeneity assumption (Assumption A.3), the following result can be
derived:
Proposition 1. If Assumption A.2 and A.3 hold, then
σuė = σuë.
Proof of P. 1. Note that by the denitions of ė = SX × e and ë = (1−SX)× e,
it follows that E(u|ė = 1) = E(u|SX = 1, e = 1) and E(u|ë = 1) = E(u|SX =
0, e = 1). Furthermore,
σuė = πėE(u|ė = 1)
= πėE(u|SX = 1, e = 1)
A.2
= πëE(u|SX = 1, e = 1)
A.3
= πëE(u|SX = 0, e = 1)
= πëE(u|ë = 1) = σuë.
Q.E.D.
Using Proposition 1 we can derive the following moment condition
E(uz̄(θ)) = 0, (2.2)
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where z̄(θ) = ż − λ(θ)ë is a weighted average of two observed variables with
λ(θ) = 1− θ(1− πż/πë). The moment condition holds if θ = θ∗, as
cov(u, z̄(θ)) = cov(u, z∗ + ė− λ(θ)ë)
= σuz∗ + σuė − σuë − θπ̃σuë
P.1
= πz∗E(u|z∗ = 1)− θπ̃σuë
A.1
= πz∗θ
∗E(u|e = 1)− θπ̃σuë
A.3
= πz∗θ
∗σuë/πë − θπ̃σuë
A.2
= ((πż − πë)/πë)θ∗σuë − θπ̃σuë
= (θ∗ − θ)π̃σuë,
where π̃ = πż/πë − 1. The intuitive idea behind this new instrument is that we
use the observed opposite-sex dizygotic twin mothers to correct for the selection
bias induced by same-sex dizygotic twins and possibly also by monozygotic twins.
The correction factor λ(θ) also depends on the degree to which monozygotic twins
are endogenous.
In the special case where monozygotic twinning is assumed to be exogenous
(i.e., θ∗ = 0), we get the new instrument z̄(0) = z̈ − 2ë by simply subtracting
the opposite-sex twins (ë) twice from the classical twin instrument (z̈). By doing
so, we remove not only the endogeneity from the opposite-sex twins but also the
endogeneity from the same-sex dizygotic twins.
Assuming that monozygotic twinning is at least less correlated with unobserved
characteristics than dizygotic twinning (i.e., −1 < θ∗ < 1), we can obtain a set
of estimates for β under dierent assumptions about the degree of endogeneity
of monozygotic twinning. For this we construct z̄(θ) for a grid of values of the
endogeneity parameter θ (in between -1 and 1) and calculate the 2SLS estimate
separately for each of these variables. This procedure is similar to the idea of
imperfect instruments in Nevo and Rosen (2012). They argue that if z is less
endogenous than x, the ratio of the correlations between z and u and between x
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and u must be between zero and one, i.e., λ = ρzu/ρxu ∈ (0, 1). Knowledge of λ
would enable the construction of an exogenous instrument, but in its absence, one
can use any reasonable value or a set of values between zero and one to construct
new instruments and to bound the causal eect.
The set of estimates can be tightened if the selection on observables is infor-
mative about the selection on unobservables. For instance, we may get tighter
bounds by assuming that selection on unobservables is not an issue as long as the
selection on observables is not signicant. Following this argument, we could even
point-identify β by assuming that there is no selection on unobservables at the
value of θ which minimizes the selection on observables. This idea is similar to
the approach of Altonji et al. (2005), who also use selection on observables to infer
on the selection on unobservables. In a similar way, we assume that the θ which
minimizes the correlation between the instrument z̄(θ) and the observed covari-
ates, also minimizes the correlation between the instrument and the unobservable
characteristics. A sucient condition for this would be that we observe a random
subset of all determinants of the outcome variable. In practice, one could use the
overall F -statistic of joint signicance to measure the selection on observables.
We now return to the results on the selection on observables in Figure 2.2 for
all cohorts to assess how the new instrument correlates with mothers' observed
characteristics. While the F -statistic of the classical twin instrument and the
same-sex twin instrument resembles the IVF-induced twin birth boom depicted in
Figure 2.1, the F -statistic of our proposed instrument is between 0.78 and 1.59,
and is never signicant. This indicates that the observables cannot explain the
variation in our new instruments. Turning to the remaining results in Figure
2.3, we nd that selection on unobservables is reduced as well, in particular in
the more recent cohorts. The proposed instrument is never correlated with the
pre-pregnancy outcomes.
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2.3.3 Sensitivity analyses
We now propose a sensitivity analyses approach with respect to violations of As-
sumptions A.2 and A.3. It turns out that a violation of both assumptions can be
captured in the same framework. Assuming θ∗ = 0 (i.e., monozygotic twinning is
exogenous), any violations of Assumption A.2 and A.3 only aect Proposition 1.
A generalized version of Assumption A.2 is:
A. 2 g. line break
Generalized Weinberg (1901)'s rule: Pr(ė = 1) = Pr(ë = 1)
(
1
2π(1−π) − 1
)
Assumption A.2 is a special case of A.2g with π = 0.5, where π denotes the
probability of a male dizygotic twin. It is also possible to generalize Assumption
A.3:
A. 3 g. line break
Generalized version of sex composition is exogenous: E(u|ė = 1) = γ E(u|ë = 1)
In Assumption A.3, we achieve identication by setting γ = 1. If the outcome
of interest is maternal labor supply, γ > 1 implies that mothers with dizygotic
twins with a mixed sex composition (ë) on average have lower labor supply than
the the mothers with same-sex dizygotic twins (ė). One reason for this could be
complementarities of raising children of the same sex, possibly leading to higher
maternal labor supply. Under Assumption A.2g and A.3g, Proposition 1 changes
to
σuė = πėE(u|ė = 1)
A.2g
=
(
1
2π(1− π)
− 1
)
πëE(u|ė = 1)
A.3g
=
(
1
2π(1− π)
− 1
)
πëγE(u|ë = 1)
= γ
(
1
2π(1− π)
− 1
)
σuë.
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Interestingly, both violations change Proposition 1 in a multiplicative way. We
therefore analyze the robustness of our estimates with respect to γ. To do this
we need to have information on plausible values of γ. For violations of Wein-
berg's rule, we have that the probability of a male dizygotic twin roughly is 0.5144
[99%-CI=(0.5009;0.5279)], according to the East Flanders Prospective Twin Sur-
vey (described in Appendix A). This 99%-condence interval of π would correspond
to γ ∈ [1.000; 1.006]. For violations of the same-sex assumption, it is more di-
cult to assess the range of plausible values of γ. In the two applications we will
apply a conservative approach and show results for a 20% violation of A.3 (i.e.,
γ ∈ [0.8; 1.2]).
2.4 Empirical applications
2.4.1 Swedish register data
We now apply our new instrument to the Swedish cohort-based samples introduced
in Section 2. Our outcome variables are labor force participation and yearly labor
income one year after the birth of the rst child. We are interested in the eects of
having more than one child one year after the rst birth and use either the classical
(z̈), the same-sex (ż) or our (z̄) twin indicator as instruments.15 If, as we have
demonstrated in Section 2, twinning is more endogenous in the recent years than
in the earliest cohort, we expect the 2SLS coecients obtained by using our new
instrument to dier more markedly from those obtained by using the classical or
the same-sex twin instrument in the recent years. We control for mothers' age at
rst birth and education, as well as time (year) xed eects.16 Note that, within
15Sample sizes dier from Section 2 because there mothers had to be working two or more
years before their rst birth to show up in the register data while here they only need to be
working one year after their rst birth.
16Mothers education is taken from the year of their rst birth. If this was missing, we use the
information from up to seven subsequent years. As the sample sizes in Table 2.2 indicate, there
was a strong birth decline during the late 1990s.
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the 1987-1990 cohort, about 10% of the mothers had more than one child the year
after the rst birth, while this gure is 8% for the 20032006 cohort.
Table 2.2 reports estimates for labor force participation, Table 2.3 for labor
income and Table 2.4 for log-labor income. Apart from the log-labor income
regression in the 1995-1998 cohort, our new instrument gives the strongest eect
out of all IV regressions, correcting for positively selected mothers with dizygotic
twins. In the earlier two cohorts, the correction is not that important. For example,
for the earliest cohort, the estimated eect on labor force participation (Table 2.2)
is -6.0% when using the classical twin instrument and -9.4% when using the new
instrumenta relative dierence of more than half. The results are similar for the
years 1991-1994. For two of the three more recent cohorts, the correction is even
stronger with a relative dierence by a factor of around 1.5. For instance, for the
middle cohort (i.e., 1995-1998), the estimated eect on labor force participation is
-5.8% with the usual twin instrument and -13.6% with our new instrument. These
are economically relevant dierences. On the other hand, we also observe that the
standard errors are two to three times as large with our new instrument. In the
Appendix B, we further investigate the statistical relevance of these dierences.
The corresponding OLS estimate is -7.4% in the earliest cohort and -9.6% in the
most recent cohort. The table also reports the rst-stage F-statistics.17
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report estimates for labor income and log-labor income.
The pattern for log-labor income (Table 2.4) is similar to the eects on labor
force participation, but with a lower magnitude.18 Table 2.3 contains estimates
for labor income in levels, which comprises the eect of fertility on the extensive
and intensive margin. Again, the largest dierence between the old and the new
instrument can be seen in the 1995-1998 cohort, where the eect on labor force
17Note that the rst-stage F-statistic seems extremely large for the z̈ and ż instruments,
which comes from the fact that as we are looking at short run outcomes only one year after rst
birth, about 10% (19%) of all mothers that have more than one child gave birth to twins in the
19871990 (20032006) cohort.
18The estimates of the log-income regression in the 1995-1998 cohort indicate a negative
selection. As all the other results point to a positive selection, we regard this as an outlier.
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participation clearly outweighs the eect on log-income.
Table 2.2: Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Labor Force
Participation - Swedish data
OLS 2SLS
z̈ ż z̄
First child born between 1987 and 1990 (N=184,587)
More than one child -0.074∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023)
First stage F-statistic 1,507,227 1,449,942 414
First child born between 1991 and 1994 (N=182,748)
More than one child -0.087∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.028)
First stage F-statistic 1,586,409 1,498,477 337
First child born between 1995 and 1998 (N=149,872)
More than one child -0.117∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.031)
First stage F-statistic 1,775,343 1,591,219 249
First child born between 1999 and 2002 (N=158,229)
More than one child -0.105∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.045
(0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.034)
First stage F-statistic 1,936,390 1,717,190 179
First child born between 2003 and 2006 (N=178,718)
More than one child -0.096∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027)
First stage F-statistic 2,071,708 1,891,536 323
Notes: Each cell reports estimates from one separate regression. OLS and 2SLS estimates
using the Swedish data described in Section 2.1. Outcome is an indicator for Labor Force
Participation. z̈ is an indicator equal to one if the mother gave birth to twins at rst birth, ż
indicates same-sex twins at rst birth and z̄ is our new twin instrument. Control variables are
mothers' education (7 dummies), a quadratic polynomial of age at rst birth, and year xed
eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Yearly
Labor Income - Swedish data
OLS 2SLS
z̈ ż z̄
First child born between 1987 and 1990 (N=184,587)
More than one child -15,736∗∗∗ -15,843∗∗∗ -16,507∗∗∗ -18,068∗∗∗
(279) (992) (1,113) (2,347)
First stage F-statistic 1,507,227 1,449,942 414
First child born between 1991 and 1994 (N=182,748)
More than one child -12,567∗∗∗ -15,002∗∗∗ -15,786∗∗∗ -18,115∗∗∗
(317) (937) (1,088) (2,803)
First stage F-statistic 1,586,409 1,498,477 337
First child born between 1995 and 1998 (N=149,872)
More than one child -16,748∗∗∗ -18,398∗∗∗ -19,410∗∗∗ -22,838∗∗∗
(479) (1,223) (1,217) (4,209)
First stage F-statistic 1,775,343 1,591,219 249
First child born between 1999 and 2002 (N=158,229)
More than one child -16,952∗∗∗ -17,679∗∗∗ -18,707∗∗∗ -23,016∗∗∗
(603) (1,463) (1,747) (6,227)
First stage F-statistic 1,936,390 1,717,190 179
First child born between 2003 and 2006 (N=178,718)
More than one child -17,936∗∗∗ -18,334∗∗∗ -19,975∗∗∗ -25,024∗∗∗
(623) (1,558) (1,816) (4,805)
First stage F-statistic 2,071,708 1,891,536 323
Notes: Each cell reports estimates from one separate regression. OLS and 2SLS estimates using
the Swedish data described in Section 2.1. Outcome is yearly labor income. z̈ is an indicator
equal to one if the mother gave birth to twins at rst birth, ż indicates same-sex twins at rst
birth and z̄ is our new twin instrument. Control variables are mothers' education (7 dummies),
a quadratic polynomial of age at rst birth, and year xed eects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Eect of having more than one child one year after birth on Log(Yearly
Labor Income) - Swedish data
OLS 2SLS
z̈ ż z̄
First child born between 1987 and 1990 (N=158,827)
More than one child -0.452∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.467∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.037) (0.044) (0.090)
First stage F-statistic 1,448,829 1,393,111 306
First child born between 1991 and 1994 (N=137,136)
More than one child -0.386∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.035) (0.043) (0.112)
First stage F-statistic 1,344,403 1,239,239 212
First child born between 1995 and 1998 (N=111,983)
More than one child -0.391∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗
(0.017) (0.034) (0.042) (0.134)
First stage F-statistic 1,625,512 1,394,021 136
First child born between 1999 and 2002 (N=124,239)
More than one child -0.367∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.032) (0.041) (0.141)
First stage F-statistic 1,812,816 1,551,194 129
First child born between 2003 and 2006 (N=139,171)
More than one child -0.230∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.032) (0.040) (0.108)
First stage F-statistic 1,939,387 1,749,103 203
Notes: Each cell reports estimates from one separate regression. OLS and 2SLS estimates
using data from the Swedish data described in Section 2.1 Outcome is log yearly labor income
using the sample of mothers with non-zero labor income. z̈ is an indicator equal to one if the
mother gave birth to twins at rst birth. z̈ is an indicator equal to one if the mother gave
birth to twins at rst birth, ż indicates same-sex twins at rst birth and z̄ is our new twin
instrument. Control variables are mothers' education (7 dummies), a quadratic polynomial
of age at rst birth, and year xed eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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2.4.2 1980 US Census data
To illustrate the broad usefulness of our approach, we investigate its relevance
using a second application. We revisit the study by Angrist and Evans (1998), in
short AE hereafter. The sample consists of all (married and unmarried) mothers
aged 21 to 35 with at least two children from the 1980 US census.19 We use age, age
at rst birth, sex of the rst/second child, and dummies for being black, Hispanic,
or of another race as covariates. For a detailed description of the variables, we
refer to AE, Table 2.
AE use the usual twin indicator (z̈) and an indicator for same-sex siblings. To
this we add the same-sex twin indicator (ż) and our two new instruments. z̄(0) is
constructed by assuming that θ = 0, i.e., monozygotic twins are uncorrelated with
the structural error term. In practice, this delivers an instrument which takes on
a value of -1 for all opposite-sex twins, a value of 1 for same-sex twins, and 0 for
non-twin mothers. To construct z̄(θmin), we derive θmin as the θ which minimizes
the overall F -statistic in a regression of z̄(θ) on the covariates. A grid search
delivers θmin = −0.07 for the whole sample and θmin = 0.01 for the sample of
working mothers.
We study the eects of having more than two children on annual labor income
using our various instruments. The covariates are the same as in AE, but our
sample size is 394,840 instead of 394,835. The rst panel of Table 2.5 shows
results for labor income as the dependent variable. Column 1 reports a highly
signicant negative eect of -3,762 on annual labor income when we use OLS
to estimate the fertility parameter. Using twins as instrument this coecient
reduces to -1,228 (column 2). We also nd large dierences between the estimated
eects using the usual instruments and those from using our new twin instruments.
The absolute size of the coecients increases with the share of monozygotic twin
mothers in the instrument. The eect is lowest when using all twins (-1,228), but
19AE restricted their analysis using twins to data from the 1980 US census, which allows us
to reliably identify twins using quarter of birth.
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almost doubles (-2,465 and -2,333) when using z̄(0) or z̄(θmin). The increase in the
coecients indicates that dizygotic twin mothers are a positively selected sample,
which lead to an underestimation of the true eect. This was to be expected
from the known relation between maternal characteristics (particularly, maternal
age) and dizygotic twinning. For instance, women who earn more and/or have
higher career preferences may also be more likely to postpone motherhood, which
would increase the likelihood of dizygotic twinning. The estimate for labor income
using the same-sex instrument of -1,902 is in between the estimates from the twin
instruments. The dierent eect size can be attributed to the identication of
dierent local average treatment eects (Angrist et al., 1996). Note that the rst
stage F -statistic of 632 and 855 of the new instruments are much lower than those
of the usual twin instruments z̈ and ż, but are still clearly above the rule of thumb
value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
The last row in the rst panel of Table 2.5 reports the F -statistics of regres-
sions of each respective instrument on the covariates to assess the importance of
selection on observables in the US data. The overall F -statistic decreases from
9.45 to 3.85 when using the improved same-sex twin instrument, as compared to
the overall twin instrument. As in the Swedish data, our new instruments are the
least correlated with the mothers' observable characteristics. Although there still
seem to be small correlations with mother's age and age at rst birth, the overall
F -statistics of 1.13 and 1.11 are insignicant.
Panel two and three of Table 2.5 report results for the probability of working
and log-labor income. In the latter case we exclude mothers with zero earnings.
For the probability of working we see small dierences between the dierent IV
estimates. For log-labor income we see a similar pattern as for labor income, with
larger labor supply eects when using our new instruments (z̄) compared to the
usual twin instrument (z̈) and the same-sex twin instrument (ż). Remember that
the primary reason why we would expect a dierent estimate from the conventional
twin instrument and our new instrument is that dizygotic mothers are positively
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selected, with respect to -among many other variables- career preferences. Thus,
our results for 1980 indicate that the unobserved heterogeneity relating to the
extensive labor supply margin (probability of working) is limited, while the unob-
served heterogeneity relating to the intensive margin (log-labor income) is more
substantial.
Finally, we make a detailed comparison of the results from the two applications.
Note that AE use cross-sectional census data from 1980 where fertility and outcome
variables are only observed in that year, while in the Swedish application outcomes
are observed one year after rst birth. For comparison reasons we also construct
a Swedish sample in similar way as the AE census data, using fertility and labor
market outcomes in 1990 and applying the same sample restrictions as in AE.
In line with AE, the endogenous variable of interest is now an indicator equal
to one if the mother has more than two children. With this sample we use the
twins instruments and the same-sex instrument. The results for the 1990 Swedish
census in Table 2C.1 reveal smaller labor supply and income eects for Sweden
compared to the US data.20 The dierence in IV estimates for labor income in
levels and logs are, however, not very dierent across the twin-based instruments.
The eect on income using the same-sex instrument (-23,765 SEK, i.e., roughly
-$4,021) are considerable larger not only compared to the estimates using our
new instrument (-7,544 SEK, i.e., roughly -$1,276) but also in comparison to the
corresponding estimates in the US data (-$1,902). This may point to a rather
special complier group for the same-sex instrument in Sweden.
20Note that the average exchange rate was 5.91 SEK to 1 USD in 1990.
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Table 2.5: Eect of having more than two children - US Census data
OLS 2SLS
z̈ ż z̄(0) z̄(θmin) Same-sex
Yearly Labor Income (N=394,840)
More than two children -3,762∗∗∗ -1,228∗∗∗ -1,586∗∗∗ -2,465∗∗∗ -2,333∗∗ -1,902∗∗∗
(34) (299) (320) (738) (1,000) (546)
First Stage F 60,239 44,576 632 855 1,675
Selection on obs. (F -stat.) 9.45∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 1.13 1.11 2.04∗
Worked for pay in last year (N=394,840)
More than two children -0.176∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.034) (0.040) (0.025)
First Stage F 60,239 44,576 632 855 1,675
Selection on obs. (F -stat.) 9.45∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 1.13 1.11 2.04∗
Log(Yearly Labor Income) (N=220,502)
More than two children -0.353∗∗∗ -0.072 -0.112∗∗ -0.215∗ -0.217 -0.135
(0.006) (0.045) (0.054) (0.117) (0.189) (0.092)
First Stage F -statistic 35,754 25,484 292 280 841
Selection on observables F -statistic 8.65∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 0.72 0.72 1.75∗
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimates using data from the 1980 US Census. All models also include age, age
at rst birth, sex of the 1st child, sex of the 2nd child, and dummies for being black, hispanic, or of
other race. Selection on observables F -statistic refers to the F -statistic of a regression of the respective
instrument on the above covariates, except sex of the 1st and 2nd child for the same-sex instrument. z̈
is an indicator equal to one if the mother gave birth to twins at rst birth, ż indicates same-sex twins at
rst birth and z̄ is our new twin instrument. θmin equals -0.07 for worked in last year sample and 0.01 in
the sample of working mothers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the regression with z̄(θmin)
we use a bootstrap with 1000 replications to obtain the standard errors. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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2.4.3 Sensitivity analyses
We now report results from the sensitivity analysis as described in Section 2.3.3.
Figures 2C.2 and 2C.1 in the Appendix report results for the Swedish and the US
data, respectively. We report results for a 20% violation of A.3g (i.e., γ ∈ [0.8; 1.2]).
In the US data a 20% violation of A.3 still leave the reported estimates in the labor
force participation regression almost unchanged. The point estimates of the wage
regression change slightly with γ (getting larger in absolute terms). The estimates
remain signicant. In contrast to the US results, the Swedish results are very
robust in the wage regression and vary slightly in the labor force participation
regression. The estimates remain clearly signicant.
2.5 Conclusions
Twin births are a popular instrumental variable for the endogenous fertility deci-
sion and family size. However, identication of causal eects might fail as having
dizygotic twins is strongly related to mothers' age, height, weight, race, and the
use of fertility treatments, such as in-vitro fertilizations. To overcome this, we pro-
vide a new instrument that corrects for the selection bias introduced by dizygotic
twins, even if zygosity is unknown. The new approach depends on a parameter
θ, which reects the researcher's assumption about the strength of the relation
between the structural error term and monozygotic twinning, relative to dizygotic
twinning.
Although exogeneity is not directly testable, we nd supporting evidence for
the exogeneity of monozygotic twinning (corresponding to θ = 0). First, we do not
nd signicant correlations between observed covariates and our new instrument.
And more importantly, we do not nd any signicant correlation between our
instrument and the lagged dependent outcomes, which contain (time constant)
unobservables.
We could, however, also assume that monozygotic twins are not fully exogenous
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but are less endogenous than dizygotic twins (θ ∈ (−1, 1)). In this case we propose
to set the parameter θ to the value that minimizes the overall F -statistic from a
regression of the new instrument on the observed variables under the assumption
that the selection on observables is informative about the selection on unobserv-
ables. In contrast to the usual instruments (any twins and same-sex twins), we
show using Swedish register data that the new instrument is completely unrelated
to important pre-pregnancy outcomes.
Additionally, we apply our new approach to both Swedish and US data. Our
main nding is that the usual twin instruments underestimate the true negative
eect of fertility on labor force participation and earnings. This indicates that twin
mothers are a positively selected sample, which is in line with the observation that
high earners are more likely to delay childbearing and, hence, have a higher risk
to get dizygotic twins.
100
Appendix
2.A Empirical assessment of Weinberg's rule
East Flanders Prospective Twin Survey (EFPTS) is a population-based registry of
multiple births in East Flanders (Belgium). The EFPTS distinguishes itself from
other twin registries because the information has been collected by the obstetri-
cians at birth (see Derom et al., 2006 for further information about the EFPTS
database). This dataset contains information about the zygosity of the twins,
which allows us to test Assumptions A.2a and A.2b.
To investigate the robustness of Assumption A.2a, we can derive a generalized
rule which requires only independence (Assumption A.2b) to hold. It isup to a
factor ( f = 1/(2π(1− π))− 1 )equal to Weinberg's dierential rule
Pr(ė = 1) = Pr(ë = 1)
(
1
2π(1− π)
− 1
)
. (2.3)
Weinberg's rule is the special case in which f = 1. Considering the 99% condence
interval of π from the EFPTS data (99%-CI=[0.5009;0.5279]), the corresponding
factor f ranges from 1.000 to 1.006, which makes Weinberg's rule an accurate
approximation given that independence (A.2b) holds.
To test whether the sexes in a dizygotic twin set are independent (Assumption
A.2b), we also use the EFPTS data. Table 2A.1 shows the observed sex compo-
sition of dizygotic twins and the expected frequencies under the null hypothesis
of independence. The corresponding χ2 test statistic is 0.753 (p-value: 0.385), so
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that independence cannot be rejected.
Table 2A.1: Sex composition of dizygotic twins in the East Flanders Prospective Twin
Survey
girl boy
girl
1078 1112 2190
[1063.44] [1126.56]
boy
1112 1208 2320
[1126.56] [1193.44]
2190 2320 4510
Notes: Expected frequencies (under independence) in brackets.
Source Derom et al. (2006)
2.B Statistic relevance of the dierences in the in-
struments
To investigate the statistical relevance between two IV estimates using dierent
instruments, we apply two approaches. The rst is to bootstrap both estimates,
say β̂IVz̈ and β̂
IV
z̄(0), B times to get β̂
IV
z̈,b and β̂
IV
z̄(0),b for b = 1, ..., B. We then compute
the fraction of bootstrap replicates in which the dierence between βIVz̄(0) and β
IV
z̈
was smaller than zero:
Σb1{β̂IVz̄(0),b − β̂IVz̈,b < 0}
B
.
In a second approach we compute the following t-statistic
t =
β̂IVz̈ − β̂IVz̄(0)√
V̂ (β̂IVz̈ ) + V̂ (β̂
IV
z̄(0))− 2 ˆcov(β̂IVz̈ , β̂IVz̄(0))
, (2.4)
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where β̂IVz̈ and β̂
IV
z̄(0) are the estimated coecients on the full sample, V̂ (β̂
IV
z̈ ) and
V̂ (β̂IVz̄(0)) are the respective estimated variances from the original IV regressions
and ˆcov(β̂IVz̈ , β̂
IV
z̄(0)) is estimated using 1000 bootstrap replications.
Turning to our applications in Section 4, we found a large dierence in IV
estimates on labor force participation for the Swedish 19951998 cohort when using
z̈ or z̄(0) as an instrument (Table 2, panel 3). In the former case, the estimate was
-5.8% and in the latter it was -13.6%. While the dierence is economically relevant,
we now set out to check its statistical relevance. Bootstrapping the estimates 1,000
times, we nd that in 998 cases β̂IVz̄(0),b was larger in absolute terms than β̂
IV
z̈,b . The
t-statistic from (2.4) is 2.649 with a p-value of 0.008.
In the AE application (Table 5, panel 1), the IV estimate for having more
than two children on labor income was -1,228 when using z̈, while it was -2,465
when using z̄(0). Bootstrapping both estimates 1000 times shows that in the vast
majority of cases (940 out of 1000) β̂IVz̄(0),b was lower than β̂
IV
z̈,b . The t-statistic from
(2.4) is 1.631 with a p-value of 0.103.
We also noted in Section 4 that estimates from our new instrument have a
larger standard error than those from the usual twin IV's. This can also be seen
from kernel density graphs over the bootstrapped estimates shown in Figure 2B.1.
The estimates are particularly well separated in the Swedish application.
Figure 2B.1: Kernel density estimates of bootstrap replications
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2.C Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 2C.1: Robustness analysis of the eect of having more than two children -
US Census data
(a) Worked for pay in last year (b) Log(labor income)
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Figure 2C.2: Robustness analysis of the eect of having more than two children -
Swedish data
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Table 2C.1: Eect of having more than two children - Swedish data in 1990
OLS 2SLS
z̈ ż z̄(0) z̄(θmin) Same-sex
Yearly Labor Income (N=287,095)
More than two children -28,677∗∗∗ -7,100∗∗∗ -7,228∗∗∗ -7,544∗∗ -7,552∗ -23,765∗∗∗
(245) (1,494) (1,763) (3,707) (4,411) (4,924)
First Stage F 42,738 29,643 511 489 702
Selection on observables F -stat 17.22∗∗∗ 6.95∗∗∗ 1.24 1.24 2.76∗
Labor Force Participation (N=287,095)
More than two children -0.080∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.022 -0.039
(0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028)
First Stage F 42,738 29,643 511 489 702
Selection on observables F -stat 17.22∗∗∗ 6.95∗∗∗ 1.24 1.24 2.76∗
Log(Yearly Labor Income) (N=253,551)
More than two children -0.465∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.072 -0.072 -0.524∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.033) (0.039) (0.081) (0.102) (0.103)
First Stage F 40,956 28,510 458 438 667
Selection on observables F -stat 14.11∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗∗ 1.27 1.26 2.10∗
Notes: OLS and 2SLS estimates using data from Swedish administrative data in 1990. Following AE, the
sample is restricted to mothers between age 25 and 35 with at least two children and rst child below age
18. All models include dummies for maternal age in 1990, age at rst birth and sex of the 1st and 2nd
child. The average exchange rate was 5.91 SEK to 1 USD in 1990. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2C.2: Assessing the importance of selection on observables. Point estimates.
Swedish data
z̈ ż z̄
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: 1987-1990 (N=175,011)
Maternal age/100 0.113∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.019
Maternal age2/100 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
Nine years of schooling -0.007 -0.004 -0.001
High school 2 years -0.007 -0.004 -0.000
High school 3 years -0.008 -0.004 -0.000
University or college < 3 years -0.008 -0.004 -0.000
University or college ≥ 3 years -0.008 -0.004 -0.000
Phd education -0.009 -0.005 -0.019
Sample: 1991-1994 (N=174,121)
Maternal age/100 -0.016 -0.004 0.008
Maternal age2/100 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.000
Nine years of schooling 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.000
High school 2 years 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000
High school 3 years 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.000
University or college < 3 years 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.001
University or college ≥ 3 years 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001
Phd education -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010
Sample: 1995-1998 (N=142,083)
Maternal age/100 0.206∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ -0.087
Maternal age2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002
Nine years of schooling 0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.001
Two year high school 0.004∗∗ 0.003 0.003
Three year high school 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.003
University or college < 3 years 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.002
University or college ≥ 3 years 0.002∗∗ 0.003 0.005
Phd education 0.010∗∗ 0.009 0.007
Sample: 1999-2002 (N=148,603)
Maternal age/100 0.131∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.119
Maternal age2/100 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002
Nine years of schooling -0.007 0.003 0.012
High school 2 years -0.008 0.002 0.012
High school 3 years -0.009 0.002 0.013
University or college < 3 years -0.009 0.002 0.013
University or college ≥ 3 years -0.010 0.000 0.011
Phd education -0.015 -0.008 -0.000
Sample: 2003-2006 (N=167,258)
Maternal age/100 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ 0.034
Maternal age2/100 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000
Nine years of schooling -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.001
High school 2 years 0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.002
High school 3 years -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000
University or college < 3 years -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000
University or college ≥ 3 years -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.001
Phd education 0.000∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.006
Notes: LPM estimates using the Swedish sample of mothers
described in Section 2.1. The outcomes are twin indicators.
z̈ is an indicator equal to one if the mother gave birth to
twins at rst birth. ż indicates same-sex twins at rst birth
and z̄ is our new twin instrument. All models also include
year xed eects. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Burden of Child Rearing and
Working on Maternal Mortality
*
Abstract: In times of increasing female labor market participa-
tion and policy eorts to combine work and family life, it is im-
portant to understand the consequences of actively raising children
and simultaneously pursuing a career for mothers' health. Based
on Swedish administrative data we document strongly increased
old-age mortality rates among mothers that potentially experienced
a double burden. We use twins at rst birth as an unplanned shock
to fertility and proxy labor force attachment by stratifying the sam-
ple by education and pension income. In line with the double bur-
den hypothesis, the eect of having twins is largest among highly
educated mothers and those with above-median pension income.
Deaths due to lung cancer, COPD and heart attacks, which are
strongly associated with stress during life, are over-proportionally
increased.
*This chapter is based on joint work with Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Helmut Farbmacher and
Johan Vikstroem.
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3.1 Introduction
In times of demographic change and a decreasing work force policy makers in
many developed countries aim at increasing female labor supply in order to better
tap into hidden reserves. At the same time preventing birth rates from declining
further or even increasing them is on the agenda (Jaumotte, 2004). However,
actively raising children and pursuing a career are two conicting, because time
consuming, activities. A large literature documents the negative eect of fertility
on female labor force participation and hours worked (Angrist and Evans, 1998;
Lundborg et al., 2017). Another strand of literature evaluates policy measures that
change the incentives for labor force participation and child bearing (Del Boca,
2002; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014). One often
made argument in the debate on how to improve the reconciliation of family and
working life is that mothers (and fathers) need to be shielded from stress that
could occur form the double burden of working and caring for children at the same
time. Up to this point, there exists very little evidence on this double burden and
the consequences of such a burden for parental health. This paper aims at lling
this gap by studying the eects of past fertility shocks and their interaction with
labor force activity on health later in life.
In order to study the combined eect of fertility and labor force activity on
maternal health, an ideal set-up would provide exogenous variation in both labor
market participation and having and raising children. We use twins at rst birth
as an unplanned shock to fertility. Two potential threats to this approach are
that twin births increase with mothers' age at birth and the availability of in-
vitro fertilization. We can use this strategy nevertheless, because the cohorts
examined in this study had their rst children between 1940 and 1970, which is
well before any major impact of fertility treatments on the number of twin births.
Additionally, we condition on mothers' age at rst birth in all our analysis. In
order to examine the interaction of fertility and labor market activity, we then
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stratify the sample along educational attainment and pension income at age 70,
respectively. These variables are strongly related to labor force attachment and
help us examine the heterogeneity of the eect of having twins on health.
This analysis is based on administrative birth and death registries from Swe-
den. The sample for our analysis includes more than 400,000 mothers that were
55-65 years old, alive and resident in Sweden in 1990. This means that we ana-
lyze mothers with completed fertility histories. We can follow these mothers over
time for twenty years until 2010. If they died within our observation window,
administrative death certicates give information on the cause of death. We focus
on mothers, because women are signicantly more likely than men to nd them-
selves in a situation where family and working life are in conictat least for
the cohorts of women examined here. In addition to their fertility history we can
draw information on these womens' sociodemographic characteristics from other
registers.
One challenge in the context of our research question is the measurement of
stress. We cannot directly measure life-time stress. However, besides looking into
overall mortality we can analyze two specic groups of medical diagnoses that
have been related to stress during life in the literature: Cardiovascular diseases,
specically heart attacks and strokes, and smoking-related diseases, specically
lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Stress from work-
family conicts is strongly predictive of smoking behavior (Nelson et al., 2012;
Hurtado et al., 2016) and smoking behavior in turn is strongly correlated with
a higher risk of dying from lung cancer and COPD. Low et al. (2010) survey
the connection of stress to coronary heart diseases among women. They suggest
that women that have to fulll multiple roles in the family are more prone to
suer from these diseases. Ridker et al. (2000) have shown that among markers
of inammation, C-reactive protein (CRP) and interleukin-6 (IL-6) are strong
predictors of cardiovascular diseases in older women. At the same time CRP and
IL-6 are known to be elevated by chronic stress, such as care-giving (Kiecolt-
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Glaser et al., 2003; Robles et al., 2005). Thus, in addition to overall mortality we
can analyze specic causes of death that have been linked to stress during life in
previous work.
Our paper is linked to past research on the interacting eects of fertility, work-
ing life, and maternal health. Using retrospective data from the Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS), Sabbath et al. (2015) categorize mothers along their past
marriage, fertility and working histories into seven typical work-family proles and
investigate dierences in mortality between these groups. Working single mothers
experience the highest mortality rates in old age. Sabbath et al. (2015) extend
the analysis with respect to mothers' job control and demand and nd the high-
est mortality rate in the subgroup of mothers who became single later in life and
had low job control. Van Hedel et al. (2016) investigate the association of work-
family proles with strokes, heart-diseases and smoking and compare estimates
from the US and Europe. Again, single working motherhood is associated with
higher likelihood of stress-related heart diseases, see also Berkman et al. (2015).
While suggestive of a double burden eect, these studies are not able to control for
selection of women into specic work-family proles depending on their health. By
using twins at rst birth as a fertility shock we can overcome part of that problem.
Closest to our study are Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012) and Kruk and
Reinhold (2014), who study the relation of fertility and parental health outcomes.
Using multiple births as an instrumental variable, Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen
(2012) nd that a higher number of children implies worse health for mothers aged
20 to 45 in the United States. Based on data from the Survey of Health Aging
and Retirement in Europe, Kruk and Reinhold (2014) show that an increase in the
number of children has a negative impact on mental health of older women but no
eect on older men. The authors use twin births and sibling sex composition as
instruments for the number of children.
Overall we nd, that women who had twins at rst birth are signicantly more
likely to die prematurely compared to mothers of singletons. At age 55 to 65 in
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1990 Swedish twin mothers' have a 3.8 percentage point (13%) higher probability
of dying within the next twenty years. Additionally we nd that having twins at
rst birth signicantly increases the likelihood of dying from heart attacks, strokes,
lung cancer and COPD. The eects are signicantly larger among highly educated
mothers and those with above-median pension income at age 70. These results
comes at a surprise, because highly educated mothers are a positively selected
group with a signicantly lower baseline probability of death. However, our nd-
ings are in line with the medical literature that studies the relation between stress,
diseases and mortality. Specically, our evidence concurs with an argument that
the double burden of working and raising children increases life-time stress and
takes its toll on mothers' health later in life.
This paper proceeds as follows. The administrative data set is introduced in
section 3.2. Section 3.3 lays out our empirical strategy, while section 3.4 shows the
results. We conclude in section 3.5.
3.2 Data
We use the Swedish multi-generation register, which links all individuals to their
biological mother and father, even if they do not live in the same household or
have died. It contains parental information for persons born in 1932 or later.1 The
multi-generational register has information on year and month of birth. Twins
are identied as being born to the same mother in the same year and month as
another sibling.
From the registry we identify 404,286 mothers that were 55-65 years old, alive
and resident in Sweden in 1990. Of those, 2,684 mothers (0.66%) had twins at rst
birth. We exclude mothers with higher order births than twins. We can follow
these mothers for twenty years from 1991 to 2010. From the death register we
know if they died and we have information on the cause of death. We identify two
1For further information about this register see Ekbom, 2011.
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specic groups of diseases that may be related to stress during life: Cardiovascular
diseases and smoking-related diseases. The former comprise heart attacks and
strokes and the latter lung cancer and COPD. We follow the strategy by Evans
and Moore (2012) to classify the diagnoses into specic disease categories, see
Appendix A for details.
Note that 8.6% of all mothers born between 1925 and 1935 are not observed
in 1990 because they either died (75%) or moved abroad (25%) before 1990. In
Appendix Table 3B.1 we investigate whether twin and non-twin mothers dier in
the probability to be included in our study sample (column 1) or in the probability
to die prematurely (column 2) and nd no signicant dierences. Thus, while the
sample as a whole may suer from survival/migration bias our results are unlikely
to be biased because twin and non-twin mothers are aected symmetrically.
Additionally we draw a rich set of socio-economic variables from the popula-
tion register, for example, education and pension income. Table 3.1 describes our
variables for the full sample and stratied by mothers' educational attainment.
Education is dened in three categories. Primary schooling means that moth-
ers completed compulsory education of nine years. Secondary schooling means
that mothers had at least some years of secondary schooling. Tertiary schooling
indicates that mothers experienced some tertiary schooling, i.e. some university
education or even hold a PhD.
On average the mothers are 60 years old in 1990. They had their rst child at
age 24.5 and have on average 2.4 children. The majority of the mothers completed
primary education (59%), about 30% of them hold a secondary and around 11%
hold a tertiary degree. The age at rst birth is on average three years higher in the
highly educated group as compared to the low educated group, while the average
number of children is about the same.
Overall, about 66% of the women between age 55 and 65 are still active on the
labor market, i.e. receive a positive labor income in 1990. The fraction of working
women varies considerably by education. While 89% of the women with a tertiary
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degree receive labor income, only 57% of mothers with a primary schooling degree
receive income form work at those ages. About 29% of the women in our sample
died between 1991 and 2010 with large variation by education. While about one
third of the low educated mothers died in the 20 year time window we consider,
the fraction is only 26% (19%) among the medium (highly) educated mothers.
Thus, low educated mothers are roughly 1.7 times more likely to die over a 20 year
period than highly educated mothers of the same cohorts. The prevalence of lung
cancer and COPD, and heart attacks and strokes also decreases by education.
Pension income at age 70 follows the expected pattern; the mean pension in-
come of mothers with tertiary schooling is just under 100,000 SEK and about
70% higher than the pension income of mothers with primary schooling or less.2
The probability to receive above median pension income strongly increases with
education.
2100,000 SEK correspond to 10,752 EUR in 2002.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics by mothers' education
Full sample Primary Secondary Tertiary
schooling schooling schooling
Age (1990) 60.03 60.34 59.74 59.24
(3.16) (3.13) (3.16) (3.06)
Age at rst birth 24.56 23.92 24.81 27.13
(4.67) (4.55) (4.62) (4.43)
Number of children 2.40 2.45 2.32 2.36
(1.21) (1.30) (1.11) (1.00)
Twins at rst birth (in %) 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.82
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Same-sex Twins 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.55
at rst birth (in %) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Employed (1990 in %) 66.00 57.08 74.82 88.74
(0.47) (0.50) (0.43) (0.32)
Died between 1991 and 2010 (in %) 28.72 31.81 26.16 19.48
(0.45) (0.47) (0.44) (0.40)
Died from lung cancer 4.46 5.02 4.15 2.40
or COPD (in %) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.15)
Died from heart attack 13.61 15.70 11.85 7.53
or stroke (in %) (0.34) (0.36) (0.32) (0.26)
N 404,286 237,558 120,340 46,388
in % 100.00 58.76 29.77 11.47
Pension income at age 70 663 569 672 994
in 100 SEK (360) (320) (322) (385)
Pension income above median (in %) 50.00 40.19 52.89 79.92
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.40)
N 62,058 33,069 20,216 8,773
Note: For each variable the rst line shows means with standard deviations below in parentheses.
Primary schooling dened as education levels 1 and 2, Secondary schooling as level 3 and 4, and
tertiary schooling as 5, 6 and 7.
115
Chapter 3. The Burden of Child Rearing and Working on Maternal Mortality
3.3 Empirical strategy
We start by documenting all-cause and stress related mortality rates by the num-
ber of children a mother gave birth to in her life. While being purely descriptive,
this analysis helps to understand the relationship between completed fertility and
old-age mortality. We provide these estimates as previous studies have been in-
conclusive on the direction of this correlation (Hurt et al., 2006).
Our basic linear regression model takes the form
yi = α0 +
K∑
k=2
αk1{#kidsi = k}+ x′iαx + φi, (3.1)
where yi is the outcome variable. Depending on the specication, the outcome
variables are indicators equal to one if the mother died from any cause between
1991 and 2010, if she died from a heart attack or stroke, or if she died from lung
cancer or COPD between 1991 and 2010. 1{#kidsi = k} is an indicator equal to
one if mother i gave birth to k children in her life, xi are control variables and φi
is an error term. We group mothers who gave birth to eight or more children into
one category.
As controls we include dummy variables for seven dierent education levels.3
We additionally insert dummies for mothers' birth cohorts, and a quadratic poly-
nomial in age at rst birth.4
We then turn to the causal eect of having twins at rst birth on mother's
3Note that the levels of education we include in the regression model are ner than the three
strata we use to condition our sample: 1=less then compulsory schooling of 9 years, 2=compul-
sory schooling of 9 years, 3=secondary schooling of at most 2 years, 4=secondary schooling of
three years, 5=tertiary education of less than 3 years, 6=tertiary education of 3 years or more,
7=PhD.
4We showed in the previous chapter that the probability to give birth to twins follows an
inverted U-shape across age at birth.
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health later in life. We specify the following regression model:
Yi = β0 + β1 1{twinsi = 1}+ x′iβx + εi, (3.2)
where 1{twinsi = 1} is an indicator equal to one if mother i gave birth to twins
at rst birth.
While previous studies used the birth of twins as an instrumental variable (IV)
for fertility, we study the reduced form eects of twinning and interpret them
as being caused by a random event. There are two reasons for this. First, twin
pregnancies and delivery are on average of a greater health risk to the mother than
are singleton births. This might directly translate into higher old-age mortality
rates (Rauh-Hain et al., 2009; Buhling et al., 2003). Second, twins might inuence
birth spacing which in turn might have a direct eect on mother's health. On the
one hand, twins are themselves extremely close-spaced, and on the other hand,
twins might inuence the spacing of further children. Thus, even in the case
where twins do not aect completed fertility in the long run, they may aect
the dynamics of child bearing, and could change the interaction of child rearing
and working (Heckman and Walker, 1990; Troske and Voicu, 2012). We therefore
estimate a mixture of eects. Twinning aects the number of children the mother
has over a specic period of time and it potentially directly inuences mothers'
health as argued above. Thus, we are not using the birth of twins as an IV for
fertility.
One worry when comparing twin-mothers with non-twin mothers is that twin-
ning might not be entirely random, as discussed in the previos chapter. This issue
arises due to dizygotic (fraternal) twins, which become more likely with increasing
age of the mother (Reddy et al., 2005; Fauser et al., 2005) and the use of in-vitro
fertilization (IVF) treatments (Thurin et al., 2004). Monozygotic twins on the
other hand are considered to be truly random (Tong and Short, 1998; MacGillivray
et al., 1988). See Hall (2003) for an exposition on mono- and dizygotic twinning.
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We have several strategies for dealing with these issues. First of all, as men-
tioned above, we control for age at rst birth in all our analyses. Second, in order
to investigate a possible selection bias stemming from dizygotic twins, we com-
pare estimates between mothers of all twins and same-sex only twins (while also
controlling for age at rst birth). The reasoning is that since monozygotic twins
necessarily have the same sex, their share must be higher among same-sex twins.
The share of monozygotic twins among all twins is 33% and among the same-sex
twins it is 50%.5 See also Black et al. (2007) and Figlio et al. (2014), who nd little
dierences in their estimates when using all or only same-sex twins. We follow this
literature and present results for both measures.
IVF is less of a concern in our data, since more than 99% of the mothers gave
birth to their rst child between 1940 and 1970 when IVF treatment was not yet
available. This is important, as the preference for IVF may be correlated with
other health-related outcomes which we cannot control for. Figure 3.1 shows the
twin rates across the rst child's year of birth. The overall share of twins remains
fairly constant between 1930 and 1980 but increases strongly thereafter. While
the steady but mild rise in the twin rate after 1980 can be attributed to delayed
child bearing, the steep increase in the twin rate since 1990 mainly follows the
availability of IVF. Note that the fraction of monozygotic twins remains fairly
stable over time.
In order to analyze the potential double burden eect we estimate the model in
equation 3.2 on sub-samples dened by education and pension income. Education
is an important predictor of labor force participation, working hours, and income.
We can use education for stratifying the analysis since most of the mothers in our
sample have completed their education before giving birth to their rst child, i.e.
the education level is less inuenced by fertility than labor force participation itself.
5This can be see from Table 3.1. The share of all twin mothers in the sample is 0.66% and
the share of same-sex twin mothers is 0.44%. Weinberg (1901)'s rule says that dizygotic twins
are equally likely to be of same sex as of opposite sex. Under this rule, 0.22% of mothers gave
birth to monozygotic twins.
118
Chapter 3. The Burden of Child Rearing and Working on Maternal Mortality
Figure 3.1: Twin rate in Sweden (rstborn children) between 1930 and 2007.
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Note: Statistics based on the Swedish register data. To compute the mono- and dizygotic
twinning rates, we apply Weinberg (1901)'s rule.
We still checked if we have a sample selection bias by comparing age at rst birth
and schooling outcomes. As it turns out most mothers in Sweden have completed
a schooling degree before their rst birth in the cohorts considered. In our sample
only 5.7% of mothers got their rst child before age 19, which is the typical age
of leaving secondary school. To explore this issue further we estimate an ordered
logit model on education (with seven education levels) using twins at rst birth,
cohort xed eects and a quadratic polynomial in age at rst birth as explanatory
variables. Column three of Appendix Table 3B.1 shows that neither all nor same-
sex twins are signicant predictors of education conditional on maternal age at
rst birth.
We have the following hypotheses with respect to education and fertility. While
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in principle the birth of twins lowers labor market activities of mothers of all
educational levels, it is likely that highly educated mothers are more prone to
pursue careers because of higher opportunity costs. We thus expect that, given
the same unplanned fertility shock, higher educated mothers are more likely to
experience a double burden of working life and child rearing. However, while
highly educated mothers might be more likely to work and thus experience more
stress, the Grossman (1972) model predicts that higher educated individuals are
better at using medical care and might thus be more able to mitigate possible
negative eects on their health. Thus, the overall potential double burden on the
health of highly educated mothers compared to those of lower levels of education
is not entirely clear. Additionally, low educated mothers may also experience a
double burden eect as they might need to work more hours due to lower hourly
wages compared to mothers with higher educational degrees and higher hourly
wages.
While higher education only holds the ex-ante potential to a higher labor force
attachment, pension income at age 70 is a proxy for life-time income and is thus an
ex-post realization of the former. We use the earnings-related part of the pension
income (tilläggspension) and do not include the basic pension (folkpension) in our
pension income measure. Note that pension income in Sweden is independent of
the partners' income. Again one could worry about selective sorting when splitting
the sample in this way. Twins at rst birth could directly aect pension income or
survival and retirement until age 70. In Appendix Table 3B.1 (columns four and
ve) we show that there are no dierences between (same sex) twin mothers and
non-twin mothers with respect to whether the pension income at age 70 is missing
or the size of the pension at age 70 conditional on covariates.
We expect a higher potential double burden eect on mothers with a higher
pension income. Higher pension income reveals if an individual was active on
the labor market during her life-time and thus was potentially aected by the
double burden eect. We chose age 70 to avoid the selection problem that some
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individuals might still be working. The retirement age was 65 for the cohorts
considered and only 20 individuals did not receive at least some pension income
by age 70. Due to data restrictions, we can observe pension income at age 70 only
for two cohorts, those aged 58 and 59 in 1990.6 Thus, the sample for this analysis
is considerably smaller. We stratify the sample at the median pension income in
order to investigate the double burden eect.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Completed fertility and old age mortality
As explained above, we rst would like to investigate the correlation between the
number of children and mothers' health later in life. In Panel A of table 3.2 we
present OLS estimates of all-cause and stress related mortality rates of mothers
aged 55+ using the model from equation 3.1. Mothers who gave birth to one
child are the reference group. We nd that overall mortality rates (column one)
are signicantly lower for mothers who have up to ve children compared to those
with only one child. Mortality rates are about equal between mothers with one and
six children, but rise for mothers with more than six children. Thus, there exists
a u-shaped relationship between the number of children and overall mortality.
These patterns are in line with results by Grundy and Kravdal (2010) based on
Norwegian register data.
In columns two and three we present cause of death specic results. For moth-
ers with two to four children the number of children is associated with a lower
likelihood of dying from lung cancer or COPD compared to mothers with one
child (column two). In contrast to overall mortality, mortality rates from these
diseases are not higher among mothers with more than ve children, as compared
to mothers with only one child. The coecients for heart attack and strokes
6Pension income for individuals between age 65 and 74 is only available for the years 2001
and 2002.
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(column three) again follow the pattern of all-cause mortality in the sense that
mothers with up to four children show a lower likelihood of to dying within twenty
years compared to mothers with one child only. Having more than four children
is related to a signicantly higher risk of dying from cardiovascular diseases.
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Table 3.2: Mortality by number of children and twinning
(i) (ii) (iii)
Died between Lung cancer/ Heart attack/
1991 and 2010 COPD stroke
Panel A
Mothers with
2 children -0.042*** -0.010*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
3 children -0.043*** -0.009*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
4 children -0.030*** -0.004*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
5 children -0.012*** 0.000 0.007*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
6 children 0.005 0.002 0.020***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
7 children 0.032*** 0.006 0.052***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009)
≥ 8 children 0.041*** -0.000 0.058***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
Panel B
Twins 0.037*** 0.013*** 0.018***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
Panel C
Same-sex twins 0.038*** 0.013** 0.020**
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008)
Unconditional mean 0.287 0.044 0.136
Observations 404,286 404,286 404,286
Note: Table displays linear probability models controlling for education, co-
hort dummies and a quadratic polynomial in age at rst birth. In panel A the
reference group are mothers with one child, in panel B the reference group are
mothers without twins at rst birth and in panel C mothers without same-
sex twins at rst birth. Robust standard errors in parentheses below. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
123
Chapter 3. The Burden of Child Rearing and Working on Maternal Mortality
3.4.2 Twins and old age mortality
We now turn to our main analysis. In Figure 3.2 we present Kaplan-Meier survival
curves for mothers with and without twins. A clear gap in the survival probabilities
emerges between the two groups over the 20-year period. Twin mothers are dying
at a higher rate compared to their peers who only had one child at rst birth. The
gap becomes larger around the year 2000, i.e. when the women in our sample are
on average 70 years old. We performed the same analysis using only the same-sex
twin mothers and the pattern is even more pronounced.
Figure 3.2: Survival rates of mothers with and without twins 1990 to 2010
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Panel B of table 3.2 contains estimates for the eect of having twins at rst
birth based on the regression model from equation 3.2. Having twins at rst birth
increases the probability of dying by 3.7 percentage points over a 20 year period.
Related to a baseline probability of dying of 28.7% this means that twin mothers
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have a 13% higher mortality rate compared to mothers of singletons during the
period of observation.
Looking into specic causes of death the pattern is conrmed. Twin mothers
are 1.3 percentage points (or 20%) more likely to die of lung cancer or COPD
compared to other mothers. Their likelihood of dying from a heart attack or
stroke is 1.8 percentage points or 13% higher during the period of observation.
As a robustness check, Panel C contains estimates when using only same-sex
twins as treatment, excluding potentially non-random opposite-sex twins from the
treated group. The eects do not dier by much from the results presented in
Panel B. This suggests that our results are not driven by non-random selection
into twinning.
3.4.3 Results by educational level
In order to investigate the interaction of fertility and labor market attachment,
we now split the sample by education and pension income. Table 3.3 displays our
results stratied by maternal education. Panel A shows that the eect of having
twins at rst birth for mothers with at most primary schooling is slightly smaller
compared to the eect estimated for the whole sample (see table 3.2 Panel B).
However, the probability of dying from lung cancer, COPD or heart diseases is
slightly higher among the mothers with a primary schooling degree compared to
the overall eects. For mothers with a secondary school degree we nd a similar
eect of twins on overall mothers' mortality compared to the full sample (Panel
B). However, there are no elevated levels of lung cancer and COPD or cardiovas-
cular diseases for these mothers. The largest eect sizes in absolute and relative
terms are experienced by mothers within the highest education group (Panel C).
For twin compared to non-twin mothers all-cause mortality is increased by 8.4
percentage points or 43%, and death due to lung cancer and COPD is increased
by 2.2 percentage points, which corresponds to an almost 100% increase. Death
due to a heart attack or stroke is 4.1 percentage points or 55% higher. We nd
125
Chapter 3. The Burden of Child Rearing and Working on Maternal Mortality
that eect sizes for the estimates based on all and same-sex twins are quite similar
for all specications.
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Table 3.3: Results by education
(i) (ii) (iii)
Died between Lung cancer/ Heart attack/
1991 and 2010 COPD stroke
Panel A: Primary schooling
Twins 0.028** 0.018*** 0.021**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Same-sex twins 0.027* 0.020** 0.023*
(0.015) (0.008) (0.012)
Unconditional mean 0.318 0.050 0.157
Observations 237,558 237,558 237,558
Panel B: Secondary schooling
Twins 0.032** -0.003 0.001
(0.016) (0.007) (0.011)
Same-sex twins 0.028 -0.005 -0.002
(0.020) (0.008) (0.014)
Unconditional mean 0.262 0.042 0.119
Observations 120,340 120,340 120,340
Panel C: Tertiary schooling
Twins 0.084*** 0.022** 0.041**
(0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
Same-sex twins 0.099*** 0.020 0.055***
(0.028) (0.013) (0.021)
Unconditional mean 0.195 0.024 0.075
Observations 46,388 46,388 46,388
Note: Each coecient-standard error pair comes from a separate regression
of a linear probability model controlling for education, cohort dummies and a
quadratic polynomial in age at rst birth. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses below. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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3.4.4 Results by pension income
Finally, we split the sample at the median of the pension income at age 70. As
described in section 3.2, we can only use mothers aged 58 and 59 in 1990 for this
exercise. Thus, the sample size drops considerably.
Results for overall mortality are shown in Table 3.4. Column one shows the
eect of having twins at rst birth on mortality. For mothers of twins the proba-
bility of dying is increased by 3.4 percentage points in the sample of 58 and 59 year
old women. The eect size is quite close to the 3.7 percentage points estimated in
the full sample (see Table 3.2). Comparing the eect of twinning for individuals
below and above the median pension income demonstrates that the eect found in
the combined sample is clearly driven by individuals with above median pension
income (columns two and three). 7 Among mothers with a pension income above
the median, having twins increases the probability of dying over a 20 year time
period by 9 percentage points. Compared to a baseline probability of 15.2% this
translates into an almost 60% higher mortality.
7As a robustness check we ran the same analysis for the pension income at age 69 for the
cohorts age 57 and 58 in 1990 and the results are very similar.
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Table 3.4: All-cause mortality by pension income.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Sample Pension at 70 Low pension High pension
observed
Twins 0.034* -0.016 0.090***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.031)
Same-sex twins 0.077*** 0.034 0.121***
(0.026) (0.034) (0.039)
Unconditional mean 0.156 0.161 0.152
Observations 62,058 31,060 30,998
Note: Each coecient-standard error pair comes from a single regression
of a linear probability model controlling for education, cohort dummies and
a quadratic polynomial in age at rst birth. Low (high) pension sample are
individuals with below (above) median pension income at age 70. Robust
standard errors in parentheses below. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In summary, we nd evidence of a u-shaped relationship between the number of
children and mothers's mortality. This appears to be in line with healthy mothers
getting more children. However, after a certain point more children take their toll
on mothers' health either due to stress or because of the direct negative eects of
giving birth to a large number of children on mothers' health. While this pattern
cannot be interpreted causally, we also estimate the eect of having twins at rst
birth on mothers' mortality later in life. We nd that having (same-sex) twins
increases all-cause morality signicantly for women older than 55. We also nd
substantial eects on cause-specic death rates. In particular, twin mothers have
a higher probability of dying from lung cancer and COPD and heart attacks or
strokes. The eects are stronger among women with higher educational degrees
and higher pension income.
Our results t into a recent line of epidemiological and sociological literature
that tries to determine the adverse eects of work-family strain on women's later
life health. The general theoretical considerations in that literature are the fol-
lowing. First, there are selection eects, i.e. women who are employed, married,
and have children are healthier than their childless, unmarried and unemployed
counterparts. Second, according to the role accumulation theory, combining fam-
ily and work is benecial for women's health. Third, multiple role theory states
that combining work and family roles leads to stress with negative consequences
for health.
Using twins at rst birth as a shock to fertility we can overcome part of the
endogeneity problem plaguing this literature. All-cause mortality as well as dying
from lung-cancer and heart diseases are signicantly elevated among mothers that
give birth to twins. We take the higher probability of death due to lung cancer
and COPD as well as the higher death rates due to heart attacks and strokes
as indication that at least part of the eect is stress related. As argued in the
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introduction, the medical literature strongly associates these causes of death with
stress from work-family conicts, care-giving, and multiple role requirements of
women. Thus, our results indicate that the additional burden on women due to
getting two instead of one child at their rst birth takes its toll on their health
later in life.
In addition to overall higher levels of all-cause and stress-specic mortality
among twin mothers we nd particularly strong eects among mothers with ter-
tiary education and above median pension income at age 70. These results come
as a surprise, as these mothers are a socioeconomic advantaged group that due to
high education, ability, income and savings should be more able to stay healthy
and mitigate negative shocks (Smith, 1999). However, we take this as an indication
of a double burden eect, because women with tertiary education have a higher
likelihood of following their career despite having kids and higher pension income
is an indicator that women worked more during their life-time. In other words, we
use tertiary education as an ex ante predictor of higher labor market attachment
and pension income as a proxy for ex post realized labor market activity. Higher
all-cause and stress-related death rates among women with tertiary education and
above median pension income point to the existence of a double burden from si-
multaneous child rearing and working on maternal health in old age. Women who
have worked more over their life have higher mortality rates from the same fertility
shock than others.
The particular mechanisms behind these ndings deserve further research.
However, it is important to note that we make these observations in Sweden,
a country famous for its generous parental leave and child support policies that
attempts to make labor market and fertility decisions as compatible as possible.
What is more, our ndings are particularly important in the light of the fact that
women of younger generations are increasingly more likely to stay attached to the
labor force and raise children at the same time (Goldin and Mitchell, 2017). Also,
fathers' roles in supporting their families both nancially and by taking a more ac-
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tive role in raising children are changing, too. Thus, more research is necessary in
order to nd adequate policies that buer the negative consequences of a potential
double burden from parents.
132
Appendix
3.A ICD codes of outcome variables
We follow the classication of diseases documented in table A-2 in the online ap-
pendix of Evans and Moore (2012), see table 3A.1 below.8 The ICD-9 is applied
in the years 1979 to 1998, ICD-10 from 1999 onwards.
Table 3A.1: ICD codes of causes of death and hospitalization.
Disease ICD-9 ICD-10
Lung Cancer 162.2-162.5, 162.8-162.9 C34
Heart Attack 410 I21
Other Heart Disease 390-398, 402, 404, 411-429 I00-I09, I11, I13, I20, I22-I51
COPD 490-496 J40-J43, J44.0-J44.7, J44.9, J45-J48
Stroke 430-439 I60-I69
8Their web appendix can be found here http://home.gwu.edu/~tim_moore/Evans_Moore_
Restat_Appendix.pdf
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3.B Sample Selection
Table 3B.1: Selection into dierent samples.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Outcome Resident Died in Education Pension 70 Pension 70
in 1990 1961 1990 (ordered logit) missing in 100 SEK
twins 0.005 -0.004 -0.014 0.000 -7.270
(0.005) (0.004) (0.037) (0.002) (16.269)
same-sex twins 0.005 -0.005 0.046 0.000 -16.226
(0.006) (0.005) (0.046) (0.003) (19.930)
Unconditional mean 0.914 0.065 2.224 0.835 616.547
Observations 444,197 444,197 404,286 404,286 66,742
In columns 1,2,4 and 5, each coecient-standard error pair comes from a single regression of a
linear probability model controlling for education, cohort dummies and a quadratic polynomial
in age at rst birth. Column 3 uses education in seven levels as outcome, is estimated using a
ordered logit model and controls for cohort dummies and a quadratic polynomial in age at rst
birth. Robust standard errors in parentheses below. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Does Having Insurance Make
Overcondent?
*
Abstract: Research on the role of behavioral biases in contract
theory implicitly assumes that biases are stable. We show for the
example of overcondence that such biases may be malleable by the
incentives provided even if incentives should not aect rational
decision makers. Using a novel laboratory experimental design
that allows to disentangle selection from incentive eects, we nd
that having insurance against losses in a real-eort task induces
individuals to consistently overstate their performance relative to
others. At the same time, we nd no evidence that overcondence
plays a role in insurance choice.
4.1 Introduction
Self-assessments and beliefs matter in decision making and contract design. Opti-
mal decisions depend on correct self-assessments and well-calibrated beliefs. One
important example is self-condence in own ability and performance. In particular,
overcondence has been established as a relevant aspect in individual's economic
*This chapter is based on joint work with Joachim Winter and Martin Kocher.
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behavior. For example, overcondence has been found to predict excess market
entry of entrepreneurs (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), risky investment decisions of
CEOs (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and speculative trading (Scheinkman and
Xiong, 2003). In the context of insurance, Sandroni and Squintani (2007) con-
sider the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model in the presence of overcondent
individuals. They nd that if the share of overcondent types in the population is
large enough, compulsory insurance is not Pareto-optimal anymore. It follows that
overcondence as a behavioral inclination has important implications for contract
design in many settings (see for example Sautmann, 2011, De la Rosa, 2011 and
Santos-Pinto, 2008).
Overcondence and imperfect self-condence calibration relate to many eects
observed in human decision making. Our focus here is on overplacement, which
is related to the better-than-average eect. However, a general interpretation of
the literature on self-condence is that over- or undercondence are comparably
stable traits, at least within a certain decision environment. That is, one can be
overcondent when driving and undercondent with math tasks, but overcon-
dence when driving should not be aected by the color of the car. This paper
provides evidence for self-condence to be malleable in a setting that has relevant
implications. We show in a laboratory experiment that condence in one's own
performance depends on whether people acquire insurance or not. While insurance
in our setup partially covers potential losses from bad performance in a real-eort
task, it should be unrelated to performance and to the overcondence elicitation
for rational decision makers. At the same time, we nd no evidence for more
condent individuals choosing more or less insurance in the rst place.
More specically, we implement an experimental design that allows us to
cleanly disentangle eects from the incentives provided by the insurance contract
from eects coming from selection into the contract. In the insurance context, the
former is known as moral hazard and the latter as adverse selection. Before at-
tempting the real-eort task, individuals are given the choice to buy an insurance
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contract. Conditional on this choice, the actual insurance status is randomized, i.e.
whether one obtains insurance or not is based on a random draw, and individuals
are informed about their insurance status. Our design is similar to the one used
in a credit market eld experiment by Karlan and Zinman (2009). Their idea is to
attract borrowers with an advertised interest rate and, conditional on showing up
in the lenders oce, to randomize the actual interest rate. However, Karlan and
Zinman (2009) are not able to impose an interest rate that is higher than the one
advertised, as borrowers could simply walk out of the experiment. In a laboratory
experiment, by design there is no attrition. This allows us to assess whether the
eect of insurance on overcondence only comes from feeling (un-)lucky when ac-
tually (not) receiving it - remember, insurance status is based on a random draw -
or whether there is another mechanism that is able to explain the eect. A related
design is used by Bó et al. (2010), who let individuals vote on a policy that allows
punishment for defection in a prisoners dilemma, but then randomize the actual
implementation of the policy (see also Sutter et al., 2010).
Our real-eort task involves the forecasting of numbers with the help of two
cue values (Brown, 1998; Vandegrift and Brown, 2003; So et al., 2017). This task
fullls two requirements for our purpose of creating a realistic insurance setting.
First, the ability for forecasting, which might in the present case be related to
math skills, varies suciently in the sample to create dierent levels of condence.
Second, the participant's eort can inuence the precision of their forecasts and
thus their belief in their own performance. Schram and Sonnemans (2011) also
consider insurance choice by varying various parameters such as the number of
available contracts. However, in their setting, losses occur without a subject's
inuence, which may not be realistic for some insurance contracts such as car
insurance. Previous experiments studied insurance choice with exogenous loss in
various settings, see for example Ganderton et al. (2000) and Laury et al. (2009).
Our design naturally exhibits features of insurance markets outside the labora-
tory such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Condence is measured as an
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individual's self-assessed performance, relative to others in the real-eort task,
stated as a rank within the experimental session. The elicitation is incentivized
by rewarding accuracy. The form of overcondence that we measure is termed
overplacement (see Moore and Healy, 2008). On average, our subjects are slightly
undercondent. This is in line with experiments by Clark and Friesen (2009) and
Murad et al. (2016), who argue that the use of real-eort tasks and incentivized
condence elicitation lead to a lack of overcondence which is generally observed
in "better-than-average" predictions. Moore and Cain (2007) and Hoelzl and Rus-
tichini (2005) nd that subjects are undercondent in tasks that are perceived as
dicult and where performance is low in absolute terms, which is in line with our
setup.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we show that self-condence can be af-
fected strongly by actually irrelevant aspects of contractual design. While in its
generality, this result is probably not too surprising, its impact on our insurance
application bears relevant implications - just imagine that drivers become rela-
tively more overcondent after being insured. While contract design has started
to take behavioral biases into account (K®szegi, 2014), we are not aware of any
existing model that would be consistent with our main nding. Second, we ex-
perimentally study assumptions made on the selection mechanism into contracts
based on presumably stable personality traits such as self-condence calibration
(see for example Sandroni and Squintani, 2007, 2013). This paper thus speaks to
a broader literature that studies sorting into contracts based on behavioral biases
and preferences (Larkin and Leider, 2012; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). Finally, we
add experimental evidence to decision making in a behavioral insurance context
in which own eort instead of a random device determines losses (Browne et al.,
2015). We believe that such a setup adds to the external validity of our results for
certain insurance classes.
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4.2 Experimental design
We start by describing the general procedure in our experiment, the real eort task
and then the insurance decision. Monetary payo was based on points, converted
to euros at a xed and pre-announced exchange rate. Participants received an
endowment of 100 points, equal to EUR 10. The show-up fee for participants
was EUR 4. The experiment was computerized with the help of z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007), and participants were invited with the organizational software
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
4.2.1 Experimental procedure
All steps in the experimental setup were known in advance and common knowl-
edge among participants. However, we did not announce that we would elicit
self-condence after the real-eort task and insurance decision. The experiment
consisted of three parts, and participants were aware of the existence of the three
parts from the start of the experiment. They did, however, not know anything
about the content of the following part until the end of the previous part. In
the following, we just report results from the rst part.1 The experimental pro-
cedure for the relevant stages is illustrated in Figure 4.1, along with the variables
generated at each stage. We explain the details for each stage below and in the
subsequent sections.
In the rst stage, subjects received a sheet of paper with ten examples of
solutions in the real-eort task. The real-eort task was a forecasting task, and
participants saw realized values of Y , W1 and W2, which could be studied for
ve minutes, on the example sheet. A pen was provided, and participants were
allowed to take notes, which was done frequently. The second stage consisted of ve
practice rounds (ve forecasts) with feedback on individual performance. These
1The second part consisted of a set of lottery decisions; the third part was a short survey on
relevant experience with insurance. Experimental instructions for the rst part are provided in
Appendix 4.C, and screenshots of steps 2 to 6 of the procedure can be found in Appendix 4.B.
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practice rounds were not incentivized, but there was an implicit incentive in the
form of a potential information gain regarding one's own ability in this task. In the
third stage, individuals had to decide whether they wanted to buy the insurance
for the upcoming payo-relevant rounds or not. An on-screen calculator could be
used at this point. The fourth stage randomized actual insurance receipt, and the
choice made in stage 3 was realized with 70% chance. Thus, if a subject did not
want to buy insurance, there was still a 30% chance that she got the insurance and
that she had to pay the premium. Conversely, there was an equally large chance
to not receive insurance, although the subject wanted to buy it. This creates a
2 by 2 matrix of possible outcomes shown in table 4.1. The probability of 70%
was chosen trading-o incentive-compatibility and statistical power. A message
informed participants about the realized insurance status. The message stayed on
the screen throughout the following ten payo-relevant rounds of the real-eort
task in stage 5.
After the ten rounds of the real-eort task were completed, we elicited self-
condence in stage 6. Remember that this stage was not announced in the in-
structions. Individuals were asked to think about their average performance in
the previous ten rounds and should indicate which rank they think that they hold
in their respective session. The person with the lowest average forecasting error
would take the rst rank, the one with the second-lowest the second rank, and so
on. At this point, subjects had not received any feedback on their or other partic-
ipants' performance. Guessing the rank correctly earned 10 additional points, and
a deviation of plus or minus one from the realized rank earned 5 additional points.
We chose to measure condence in performance after the task, instead of before
the task, in order to avoid hedging behavior and possible priming eects. Asking
individuals about their relative performance to others before the task could give
the wrong impression of a competitive environment, which we neither consider in
this paper, nor is it common in an insurance context. We are well aware of the
fact that linear incentives when eliciting beliefs have their limitations (see, Gächter
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Figure 4.1: Experimental procedure and denition of variables.
and Renner, 2010; Trautmann and Kuilen, 2015), but for our case it seems a good
compromise between validity and straightforward implementation. Between stages
6 and 7, the second and third parts of the experiment took place. In stage 7, one
of the ten real-eort task rounds was randomly drawn by the computer, and sub-
jects were informed about their performance and earnings in this round. They
also learned how much they earned from the ranking guess. At the end of the
experiment, individuals answered a standard demographic questionnaire and were
paid out in private.
Table 4.1: Sample distribution
Insurance actual
status yes no Total
yes 68 41 109
choice
41% 25%
no 13 45 58
8% 27%
Total 81 86 167
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4.2.2 More information on the real-eort task
We used the forecasting task by Brown (1998), Vandegrift and Brown (2003),
and So et al. (2017). Participants are asked to enter the price Y of a ctitious
stock whose price they had to predict from two cue values W1 and W2. The true
relationship of Y and the two cues was given by
Y = 50 + 0.3W1 + 0.7W2 + e,
where W1,W2 ∼ U(0, 250) and e ∼ N(0, 5). Y was rounded to the nearest integer.
Individuals knew that there was a potential constant, but did neither know that
the function was linear, that the weights added to one, nor that there was a random
error term e. During the task, individuals where shown W1 and W2 on the screen
and had 60 seconds every round to enter their forecast Ŷ into a box and click OK
(see gure 4B.5 in the Appendix). The remaining time was always displayed on
screen. There were no incentives for speed, but after 60 seconds without any input
the program would skip to the next round, automatically creating a no-input. We
introduced a penalty to avoid this, and the details are described in the next section.
From the forecasting input we derived the error in each forecast, which is given by
the absolute dierence between the true and the predicted value of Y :
error = |Y − Ŷ |
4.2.3 Insurance
Based on a pilot of the real-eort task, we set the insurance premium to 22.5
points, with a coverage 65%. Remember that only one round was payo-relevant,
i.e. the insurance was valid for all rounds. Earnings from the task are
earningsno = 100− error
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for individuals that did not get the insurance and
earningsin = 100− error × (1− 0.65)− 22.5
for those that did. Thus, insurance covered 65% of the loss from the absolute
dierence between the true and the predicted value of Y . Notice that we capped
losses at the zero earnings boundary. As a consequence, there were no losses from
this part of the experiment unless a participant had not entered any forecast at
all for the randomly chosen round and was insured. In that case, the participant
would have to pay the insurance premium of 22.5 points from her show up fee.
This happened only once.
4.2.4 Experimental participants
We conducted seven sessions in November 2015 in the MELESSA laboratory at the
University of Munich. In total, 167 subjects participated and earned on average
EUR 12.50 in a bit more than one hour per session. Participants were mainly stu-
dents from various elds of study, with 33% from economics or business, 18% from
life sciences or engineering and 13% from humanities. Almost 60% of participants
were female, and age ranged from 18 to 43, with an average of 22.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptive results on overcondence and insurance
choice
We rst look at a set of descriptive results. Our variable of interest is rankdi, the
dierence between the individual's actual and guessed ranks as entered in stage 6
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of the experiment:
Rankdiff = TrueRank −GuessedRank.
A positive value indicates overcondence, where higher values imply stronger over-
condence. A similar variable has been applied by Sautmann (2011), who uses the
dierence between predicted and actual scores in trivia quizzes as her measure for
overcondence. The mean of rankdi in our study is -1.37 (which is signicantly
dierent from zero at the 5% level), indicating slight undercondence, on average.
The distribution of rankdi is shown in gure 4.2. The average undercondence
result is in line with Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and their task-specic explana-
tion. However, there exists considerable variation of self-condence in our sample
on the individual level and when comparing treatments. An alternative measure is
a simple indicator variable for overcondence. It takes on the value one if rankdi
is larger than zero, and the value zero otherwise. The entire sample has a share of
38.32% overcondent individuals according to this measure.
Remember that we can distinguish between four insurance outcomes, indicated
by the variables HasInsurance and WantsInsurance. The variable HasInsurance
describes the true insurance status of an individual in the real-eort task, and it is
randomized. The variable WantsInsurance describes the individual's initial choice
for or against insurance, and it is endogenous in the sense that it may correlate
with any observed or unobserved individual characteristics such as gender, age and
risk attitude. Conditional on insurance choice (=WantsInsurance), HasInsurance
identies the incentive eects of the insurance contract. Conditional on actual
insurance status (=HasInsurance), WantsInsurance identies selection eects, i.e.
dierences between individuals who wanted insurance and those who did not.
Table 4.2 displays means and standard deviations by insurance outcome. Table
4A.1 in the Appendix contains p-values of t-tests within every cell of table 4.2
for the hypothesis that the mean of rankdi is signicantly dierent from zero.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of variable rankdi.
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In addition, table 4A.2 displays p-values of pairwise, two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests for dierences in rankdi between all experimental groups. We
observe strong and highly signicant undercondence without insurance. There
is, however, also signicant undercondence for those who did not want insurance,
when we pool observations for those who ended up with insurance and those who
did not.
Two-third (109 out of 167) of individuals wanted to buy the insurance. We
can investigate which individual characteristics predicted insurance choice. Table
4.3 shows mean values of these variables by insurance choice status and in the full
sample. Individuals who made larger errors in the practice rounds were more likely
to want insurance, which is in line with standard predictions of adverse selection
models. Insurance pays o is a dummy equal to one if the forecasting error in
a practice round was larger then 22.5/0.65=34.62, which is the break-even point
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Table 4.2: Mean and standard deviation of rankdi
Wants Insurance=1 Wants Insurance=0 Total
Has Insurance=1 0.088 -0.46 -2.01
(7.39) (6.00) (7.67)
Has Insurance=0 -2.88 -2.46 -1.03
(6.99) (7.96) (7.41)
Total -2.66 0.00 -1.37
(7.56) (7.23) (7.50)
(error) of the insurance for a fully rational, risk-neutral decision maker. There is a
large dierence (20%-points) between those who wanted insurance and those who
did not. However, buying insurance would still have paid o in 40% of rounds
for those that did not want to buy insurance. Females more frequently wanted
insurance than males and so did younger individuals.
Table 4.3: Insurance choice
Did not want insurance Wanted insurance Total
Error in practice rounds 41.52 57.81∗∗∗ 52.15
Insurance pays o 0.40 0.60∗∗∗ 0.53
Female 0.36 0.67∗∗∗ 0.56
Age 23.33 21.42∗∗∗ 22.08
Insurance pays o is a dummy equal to one if the forecasting error in a practice round was
larger then 22.5/0.65=34.62, which is the break-even point (error) of the insurance for a fully
rational risk-neutral decision maker. Stars indicate mean dierences signicant at 1% (***),
5% (**), and 10% (*) level. Standard errors clustered at individual level in rows 1 and 2.
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4.3.2 Regression analysis
We now turn to the eect of insurance on overcondence and selection into in-
surance based on overcondence by using parametric models. All regressions in
table 4.4 use OLS estimations and include session xed eects.2 We start with
performance in the real eort task in the rst column. We nd that having the
insurance increases the absolute forecasting error by 4 points (or 0.15 standard
deviations). The same dierence is found between individuals who wanted and
did not want insurance. The rst eect is moral hazard and the second adverse
selection, two classic elements in insurance markets (Shavell, 1979; Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1976). Column two shows the direct consequence of a lower performance
in the task: both incentive and selection eects lead to a higher (i.e. worse) ranking
within a session. Column three concerns the rank that individuals guessed they
are taking. Individuals who ultimately got the insurance do no rank themselves
worse or better than those who did not. In contrast, the pure selection eect in
guessed ranks equals the one in true ranks. It follows in column four that insur-
ance increases the dierence between individual's guessed and actual rank by 2.7
ranks. Conditional on actual receipt, there exists no signicant dierence between
those subjects that wanted and did not want the insurance. This is in contrast to
Sandroni and Squintani (2007), who assume that overcondent individuals are less
likely to buy insurance, because they perceive their risk to be lower than is actually
the case. We nd that, on average, individuals anticipate their performance in the
task based on their skill level and adjust their rank accordingly, but independent
of the actual insurance status.
In the following we investigate if other biases specic to the experimental envi-
ronment drive our results. One explanation could be that not getting the insurance
despite wanting it leads to what is called "choking", a sudden decline of concen-
tration and performance when individuals feel under pressure (Baumeister, 1984).
2Ordered logit (for rank outcomes) and logit (for the overcondent dummy) models yield
very similar results. The results are available on request.
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This could lead to a severe underestimation of own performance, independent of
its true level. Conversely, individuals receiving the insurance might feel lucky and
thus rank themselves better than they actually are. These two confounding factors
imply that the eect of the insurance on overcondence should be larger among
those individuals who also wanted it. In our 2 by 2 design, we can test for this
possibility. Column ve shows that the interaction term between wanting and ac-
tually receiving the insurance is positive, but far from signicant. The main eect
of the insurance is not signicant anymore, but the point estimate is similar to
that in the columns before.3 Column six includes gender and age as explanatory
variables to check if these explain the non-signicant selection eect. Although
the coecient turns positive, it is not statistically signicant and only one-third
of the insurance eect. Columns seven and eight replicate columns four and six
with a dummy equal to one if Rankdi is positive as outcome variable and we
get qualitatively similar results. The occurrence of overcondence in ranking is
increased by one-quarter under the insurance contract.
4.4 Discussion
One major concern when trying to elicit self-assessment biases is to detect what
Benoît and Dubra (2011) call apparent overcondence. If individuals are Bayesian
updaters and receive only a limited number of noisy signals on their performance,
they might rationally rank themselves better than others, while this is interpreted
as overcondence by the researcher. This is less of a concern in our experiment, as
individuals do not receive any signal on their (or others') performance in the payo-
relevant rounds. Their ranking should therefore solely be based on the perceived
diculty of the task over the ten rounds and an idiosyncratic component, which
3This could also be due to lack of power, as the main coecient of HasInsurance now refers
to the insurance eect in the group that did not want the insurance and this group comprises
only one-third of the sample. The insurance eect in the group that wanted the insurance is still
signicant at the 10% level.
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Table 4.4: Insurance and overcondence
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Outcome: Error True rank Guessed rank Rankdi 1{Rankdi > 0}
HasInsurance 4.088** 2.311** -0.649 2.960** 2.443 3.157** 0.240*** 0.251***
(1.729) (1.147) (0.872) (1.235) (2.137) (1.254) (0.082) (0.083)
WantsInsurance 4.032*** 3.081*** 3.303*** -0.222 -0.473 0.925 -0.016 0.042
(1.544) (1.177) (0.893) (1.262) (1.710) (1.400) (0.084) (0.091)
Has × Wants 0.729
Insurance (2.709)
Female -1.651 -0.016
(1.329) (0.080)
Age 0.391** 0.031***
(0.171) (0.010)
Constant 18.171*** 9.368*** 11.341*** -1.974 -1.943 -11.268** 0.296** -0.475*
(2.407) (1.730) (1.118) (2.174) (2.187) (4.793) (0.114) (0.263)
Session f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1,670 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
Adj. R-squared 0.017 0.056 0.053 0.000 -0.006 0.028 0.032 0.074
Rankdi is the dierence between the true and guessed rank of performance in the task. Individuals
were incentivized to guess their rank among all participants in their session with respect to their average
performance in the 10 payo-relevant rounds of the forecasting task. No feedback on performance was
provided. Robust or clustered (column one) standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗
p<0.10.
on average is the same between those that get and do not get the insurance,
conditional on choice. Furthermore, Merkle and Weber (2011) demonstrate that
the extent to which apparent overcondence poses a problem in the laboratory is
limited.
Another concern may be an insurance-induced change in a potential hedging
motive when condence levels are elicited. Since insurance reduces the downside
risk in the real-eort task, the hedging motive in the condence elicitation part
loses importance. As a result, insured individuals could understate their perfor-
mance less strongly than non-insured. However, this would imply that the insured
place themselves at better ranks than the non-insured, which is not the case, as
can easily be seen in column three of table 4.4. Another change in placement be-
havior arises if participants anticipate the lower performance of others, potentially
induced by having insurance. Knowing that others will perform worse, they can
place themselves better in the condence elicitation. However, such higher order
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thinking applies to both treatment groups and should therefore be averaged out.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which losses from a real
eort task could be reduced by purchasing an insurance. Conditional on choice,
actual insurance receipt was randomized, allowing us to disentangle selection from
incentive eects. Overcondence is measured as the dierence between an indi-
vidual's true and self-assessed performance rank. While the previous literature is
concerned about selection, we are the rst to demonstrate that normatively irrele-
vant incentives can change overcondence ex-post. Moreover, we nd no evidence
for selection into insurance based on overcondence.
Why does the insurance make individuals relatively overcondent in their per-
formance? One possible explanation from our regression analysis is that individuals
do not anticipate the moral hazard that is introduced by the insurance. Subjects
do however anticipate their skill level and adjust their rank estimate accordingly.
Put dierently, the eect of the insurance is not reected in an adjusted ranking,
while the selection eect is. Another explanation involves the perception of the
diculty of the task. Under insurance, the task could appear easier, although it
is actually only the loss from the task which is lowered. As a consequence, under-
placement is reduced. One can imagine alternative psychological explanations: for
instance, insurance could let individuals focus more strongly on potential gains
and thus, the expected performance could appear more gloomy.
Our results have implications for insurance markets. Take car insurance as an
example. Outside the laboratory it is next to impossible to distinguish between
potential moral hazard eects and potential overcondence eects. If both are
present, the optimal policy of the insurer should take both into account. Reme-
dies against moral hazard would not be enough to minimize unwanted behavioral
tendencies, when we assume that biased self-assessment has negative consequences
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on driving. The experiment in this paper also has its limitations. For reasons ex-
plained above we do not have measures of overcondence before randomization of
the insurance. Further, we have no information on whether the induced overcon-
dence translates to other tasks and situations without insurance or on whether it
is persistent or not. Ultimately answering this puzzle will require further research
on why individuals become overcondent in the rst place.
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4.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 4A.1: Distribution of forecasting errors in practice and payout-relevant
rounds.
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Table 4A.1: P-values for zero mean t-test of rankdi
Wants Insurance=1 Wants Insurance=0 Total
Has Insurance=1 0.922 0.794 1.000
Has Insurance=0 0.013 0.046 0.002
Total 0.151 0.050 0.019
Notes: Table shows p-value from t-test with the Null hypothesis that the mean of
rankdi equals zero within the respective cell.
Table 4A.2: P-values from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of pairwise dierence in
rankdi
Group 1 Group 2 p-value
has=1 has=0 0.021
wants=1 wants=0 0.445
has=1 has=0 | wants=1 0.051
has=1 has=0 | wants=0 0.287
wants=1 wants=0 | has==1 0.862
wants=1 wants=0 | has==0 0.839
Notes: Table shows p-value from Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test of a dierence in rankdi between ex-
perimental groups.
153
Chapter 4. Does Having Insurance Make Overcondent?
4.B On-screen instructions
Figure 4B.1: Stage 2a: The real eort task in practice rounds.
154
Chapter 4. Does Having Insurance Make Overcondent?
Figure 4B.2: Stage 2b: Feedback to the real eort task in practice.
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Figure 4B.3: Stage 3: Decisions whether to buy the insurance.
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Figure 4B.4: Stage 4: Message on realized insurance status.
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Figure 4B.5: Stage 5: The real eort task in payo-relevant rounds.
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Figure 4B.6: Stage 6: Ranking of own performance within session.
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4.C Experimental instructions
Instructions are translated from German. Instructions were identical for all par-
ticipants. Instructions from the second part of the experiment are not shown here.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for
your participation!
Please stop talking with the other participants now
General procedures
In this experiment we study economic decision making. You can earn money
by participating. The money you earn will be paid to you after the experiment
privately and in cash.
The experiment takes about 1 hour and consists of three parts. At the beginning
of each part you will receive detailed instructions. If you have any questions about
the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. An instructor
will then come to you and answer your questions privately.
Payment
You prot will be denoted in points, where 10 points = EUR 1. In part I and II
you will have to solve multiple rounds. Which round of a part is payout relevant
will be randomly and with equal probability decided at the end of the experiment
(part III). Since you do not know which round will be drawn, it is optimal to
behave as if every round is payout-relevant.
At the end of the experiment your points will be converted into Euro and imme-
diately paid out to you in cash. For showing up on time you receive EUR 4 in
addition to what you will earn in the experiment.
Anonymity
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The analysis of the experiment will be anonymous. That is, we will never link your
name with the data generated in the experiment. You will not lear n the identity
of any other participant, neither before nor after the experiment. Also the other
partic ipants will not learn your identity. At the end of the experiment, you have
to sign a receipt to conf irm the payments you received. This receipt will only be
used for accounting purposes.
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Part I
Task
In this part, we ask you to forecast the the price Y of a ctitious stock. To do this,
you receive two values W1 and W2, which underlie the price of the stock. You will
not learn how exactly the price of the stock is formed out of the two values and
a possible constant. However, you will receive examples for this relation, which
will not change throughout the experiment. Please enter the predicted price of
the stock into the respective window on the screen and click on OK. You have 60
seconds for this task. There are no advantages or disadvantages if you enter your
solution faster than 60 seconds. You cannot change your input after clicking on
OK. You can enter integer values between 1 and 500.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment you receive 100 points. 10 points are equal
to EUR 1. To get a feeling for the relationship of the stock with the two values,
you will once receive 10 examples at the beginning of the experiment on a piece of
paper. You then have 5 minutes to study these examples. You can keep them for
the rest of the experiment, but may not leave with them.
Next, you have the possibility to practice the task. There are 5 practice rounds
with 60 seconds time each. After the ve practice rounds you will be shown the
true price of the stock, your forecast and the deviation of your forecast. The
practice rounds do not inuence your payout, but should help you in estimating
your abilities for this task.
After the practice rounds the task will be done ten more times. This time, the
accuracy of your forecast inuences your payout. Every unit that your forecast
deviates from the true value leads to a reduction of 1 point.
At the end of the experiment, one out of the 10 rounds will be chosen randomly
and with equal probability. The forecasting error from this chosen round will be
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deducted from your 100 points. If the error is larger or equal to 100 points, you
receive no payout from this part.
Insurance
Before solving the task, you have the possibility to buy an insurance. This in-
surance costs you once 22.5 points and is valid for all 10 rounds. The insurance
reimburses 65% of your forecasting error. This means that, if you own the insur-
ance, only 35% of your forecasting error will be deducted from your points.
However, it is not sure if you receive the insurance. In a rst step you have to
indicate if you want to buy the insurance. If you want to buy the insurance,
you will actually receive it with a probability of 70%. With a probability of 30%
you will not receive it. In this case you also don't need to pay 22.5 points. The
reverse holds, if you indicate that you do not want to buy the insurance. With a
probability of 70% you will not receive it, and with a probability of 30% you will
receive it nevertheless and you have to pay 22.5 points.
After you decided for or against the purchase of the insurance, you will be informed
if you received it or not. Then the 10 rounds start. Only at the end of the
experiment will you know the correct value, your forecast and the deviation of
your forecast. None of the other participants will ever be informed about your
forecast, your choice or receipt of the insurance.
When choosing the insurance, you can activate a calculator by clicking on it symbol
in the lower right corner on the screen.
Payment
The payout-relevant round will be drawn at the end of the experiment. If you did
not receive an insurance, prot from this part of the experiment will be
(100− |PriceStock − Forecast|)× 0.1EUR.
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If you did receive the insurance your prot will be
(100− |PriceStock − Forecast| × 35%− 22.5)× 0.1EUR.
If you do not enter any forecast within 60 seconds in a round and if this round
is chosen as payout-relevant you do not receive any prot from this part of the
experiment, even if you have the insurance.
Let's look at some examples.
Example 1
After the practice rounds you decide against buying the insurance. You receive
the message that you actually did not get the insurance. Now you perform the
task 10 times. At the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round
7 is payout relevant. The true price of the stock in this round was 122. Your
prediction was 170. The absolute dierence of 48 will be deducted from your 100
points. Converted to euros you will receive (100− 48)× 0.) = 5.2 Euro.
Example 2
After the practice rounds you decide to buy the insurance. You receive the message
that you actually did get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10 times. At
the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 2 is payout relevant.
The true price of the stock in this round was 99. Your prediction was 105, so
your forecasting error equals 6. The insurance reimburses 65% of your error, or
3.9 points which will be rounded to 4. Hence, only 2 points will be deducted from
your 100 points. However the price of the insurance of 22.5 points will also be
deducted. Converted to euros you will receive (100− 6× 35%− 22.5)× 0.1 = 7.6
Euro.
Example 3
After the practice rounds you decide to buy the insurance. However you receive the
message that you did not get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10 times.
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At the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 10 is payout
relevant. The true price of the stock in this round was 150. Your prediction was
100. Since you did not get the insurance a full 50 points will be deducted from
your 100 points. Converted to euros you will receive (100− 50)× 0.1 = 5 Euro.
Example 4
After the practice rounds you decide against buying the insurance. However you
receive the message that you did get the insurance. Now you perform the task
10 times. At the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 3
is payout relevant. The true price of the stock in this round was 175. Your
prediction was 125, so your forecasting error equals 50. The insurance reimburses
65% of your error, or 32.5 points which will be rounded to 33. Hence, only 17
points will be deducted from your initial 100 points. However the price of the
insurance of 22.5 points will also be deducted. Converted to euros you will receive
(100− 50× 35%− 22.5)× 0.1 = 6.1 Euro.
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Examples for Part I
Here you nd 10 examples on the relation of the ctitious stock Y and the two
valuesW1 andW2. The exact form of this relationship is identical in the examples,
the practice rounds and the payo-relevant rounds.
Y W1 W2
137 73 95
160 152 85
175 79 152
151 100 87
115 76 49
85 27 37
212 219 139
129 244 7
203 14 217
90 69 25
Please leave this paper on the table when you exit the room.
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